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1
Introduction: Researching Memory 
and Generation
Danica, Aida and Darko spent (most of ) their lives in the city of Mostar. 
However, they grew up in three different countries: while Danica (born 
1926) spent her childhood in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
(renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929), Aida (born 1969) grew 
up in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or SFRY. Darko (born 
1989) spent only the first three years of his life in SFRY before he and 
his family had to flee. When he returned to Mostar at the end of the war, 
it was to a country called Bosnia and Herzegovina (Figs. 1.1 and 1.2). 
The lives of Danica, Aida and Darko were all significantly affected by 
the war that was fought in present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosna i 
Hercegovina, BiH) between 1992 and 1995, yet they attribute different 
meanings to that war.
I met Danica, a graceful and cheerful woman of 80 years, at Otvoreno 
srce (Open Heart), a day-centre for elderly people—a place open to all 
nationalities1 and one of my main research sites. Danica likes to sing 
1 Throughout this book, I refer to ‘nation’ or ‘national identity’ instead of ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic 
identity’. In BiH people employ the terms narod/nacija (people/nation) to describe group identities 
(Bringa 1995). Moreover, the term ’ethnic’ has often been used in a selective and hierarchical way 
and has been ascribed only to some groups and not to others (Baumann 1996).
traditional Sevdalinka2 and delve into her memories of past times, which 
centre mostly on Mostar’s former beauty and the deceased Yugoslav state-
man Josip Broz Tito, who she will never stop admiring. Danica does 
not accept national identities as primordial. Regardless of her Catholic 
background, she never introduced herself as a Croat to me, as is common 
in post-war Mostar.3 Her best friend, also a regular visitor to Otvoreno 
srce, is a Muslim. They both first and foremost identify themselves as 
city dwellers and not in national terms, as Croat or Bosniak, respective-
ly.4 In Danica’s narrative, World War II (WWII) is of more significance 
than the 1992–1995 war. When she talks about the latter, she draws on 
interpretative templates based on her early experience of WWII. Thereby 
she integrates the 1992–1995 war into a wider narrative of suffering and 
the fight against fascism. Moreover, her experience of post-WWII recon-
struction and economic progress, and the renewed peaceful coexistence 
of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs give her hope that times will also get better 
after the recent war.
The 1992–1995 war was the first war Aida experienced. In contrast 
to Danica, Aida grew up under relative political and economic stability, 
and to the day it eventually broke out, a war in her home country was 
impossible to imagine for her. For Aida, the war in the 1990s constitutes 
a significant rupture and is connected with the loss of home and future 
prospects—life is sharply divided into a time ‘before’ and ‘after’ the war 
and the break-up of Yugoslavia. Aida was just about to pursue her career 
and to establish her own household when war broke out. She had to flee 
her hometown of Mostar. Now, two decades after the war ended, she still 
lives with her parents, a fact she connects to the uncertainties the war 
brought her and her family. She shares with Danica warm memories of 
Tito (partly transmitted to her by her much-loved grandmother). But 
she does not share Danica’s optimistic outlook that social relations in 
Mostar will normalise. Aida and I met on a regular basis over a period 
of three years, mostly in a café or for a walk, but always on the Bosniak-
dominated east side of Mostar. Only once could I convince Aida to cross 
2 Sevdalinka is a traditional folk music from BiH with very emotional melodies.
3 In this book Bosnian Croats are referred to as Croats, as is common practice in Mostar, regardless 
of whether they are in possession of the Croat passport or not.
4 ‘Bosniak’ is today the official term for a Bosnian Muslim (Donia 2000).
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sides with me to visit Mostar’s only proper park. It was the first time since 
the war that Aida had been to this park, as she no longer feels at home on 
the Croat-dominated west side, regardless of the fact that she was born 
and grew up there.
In contrast to Aida, Darko, who was a child when the war in Mostar 
started, narrates his life as relatively unaffected by the experience of war and 
its aftermath by distancing his personal experience from that of the wider 
society. His life narrative is not divided by the war as is Aida’s. Darko is a 
student at Stara gimnazija, Mostar’s prestigious secondary school, where 
Bosniak and Croat students are now taught separate curricula albeit under 
the same roof. While he is critical of the students’ separation, he still has, 
at least to a certain degree, incorporated the division of Mostar’s citizens 
into separate nationalities (with separate histories) as ‘natural’. Whenever 
I spent time with Darko, wandering around town, meeting for coffee or 
a movie, he preferred to steer clear of topics concerning war and post-war 
issues. This was also the case when I asked him for a memory-guided tour 
through Mostar with a group of visiting foreign students. The places and 
stories Darko chose to share were strikingly detached from the war’s legacy.
Danica, Aida and Darko each belong to one of the three generations 
identified in this book: Danica to the ‘First Yugoslavs’, Aida to the ‘Last 
Yugoslavs’ and Darko to the ‘Post-Yugoslavs’.5 They position themselves 
differently in relation to the significant political, societal and economic 
changes BiH has faced in the recent past. In this book I introduce the 
concept of ‘generational positioning’, which incorporates age as well as 
stage of life (past and present). I show the way in which generational 
positioning is significant in how individuals in present-day Mostar nar-
rate their lives, rethink the past and (re-)envision the future, and at the 
same time (re-)position themselves in post-war and post-socialist society.
Mostar is a city where the rapid political shifts BiH experienced 
in the 20th century have revealed themselves most prominently, and it is 
a suitable place to explore questions related to generation and memory. 
Mostar has seen severe political and societal transformations over the last 
century, which culminated in the fall of socialist Yugoslavia and in a brutal 
5 I named the three generations ‘First Yugoslavs’, ‘Last Yugoslavs’ and ‘Post-Yugoslavs’, because their 
personal experience of different phases of Yugoslavia or the lack of it is decisive in the way 
Mostarians position themselves in the past.
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war that divided the once multinational city into a Bosniak-dominated 
east side and a Croat-dominated west side. Accordingly, experiences of 
different (often opposing) nationality and memory politics, as well as 
of different forms of coexistence vary greatly along generational lines. 
What makes the Mostar case so special is that there has been very limited 
interaction between Bosniaks and Croats since the 1992–1995 war, and 
generational commonalities still prevail in the way Mostarians6 position 
themselves vis-à-vis the fractures and turning points of local history. By 
conducting long-term fieldwork on both sides—in Bosniak-dominated 
East Mostar as well as in Croat-dominated West Mostar—and by concen-
trating on the ways in which individuals give meaning to their personal 
and their community’s past, I reveal generational commonalities that tran-
scend the national border, always so dominant in present-day Mostar.
6 When referring to ‘Mostarians’ in this book, I mean all people presently living in Mostar, includ-
ing those who were born in other places.
Map 1.1 Map showing the borders of former Yugoslavia, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. Map by Alexei Matveev. Map data © OpenStreetMap 
contributors
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This book explores how Mostar’s different generations place themselves 
vis-à-vis competing authoritative narratives of the local past. It analyses 
how experiences and exposure to different political-historical periods/
events and memory politics affect people’s historical understanding. I do 
not suggest that individuals are unaffected by existing canonical national 
historiographies when orienting themselves anew in society and that they 
do not take part in reaffirming them. Instead, I argue that we should not 
assume individuals naïvely take on new dominant public discourses and 
simply overwrite their previous experiences. Although political changes 
may come about abruptly and radically, it would be inaccurate to assume 
that a society fully adapts to all of these changes, and even more inaccu-
rate to imagine that such societal changes take place at the same speed at 
which political elites change.
Map 1.2 Map of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina showing the Serb 
Republic (Republika Srpska) and the Bosniak-dominated Bosniak–Croat 
Federation. Map by Alexei Matveev. Map data © OpenStreetMap contributors
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Following Holland and Lave (2001), I view the notion of generation 
as closely interlinked with memory and history: ‘Because history is 
made in person, registered in intimate identities as well as in institu-
tions, there is every reason to expect that age cuts across people’s expe-
riences and creates intergenerational differences’ (Holland and Lave 
2001: 17). Norman Ryder (1965), another scholar who has vividly 
engaged in the discussion on generations, has pointed out that trau-
matic events, such as wars and economic crises, are likely to leave an 
imprint on the lives of individuals regardless of their stage in life. This 
is also confirmed in this book. Still, there are significant generational 
differences in the ways Mostarians make sense of and position them-
selves towards the past in the present.
This said, the results of my study do not suggest that nationality 
has become secondary in the lives of Mostarians or that they feel more 
attached to people of the same generation than to those of the same 
nation. This is because the three generations identified in the study 
do not each constitute a community in the sense of being a group 
based on social interaction. By exploring generational differences in 
positioning oneself towards the past, I do not by any means attempt 
to downplay differences between Bosniaks and Croats concerning the 
respective nationalised historiographies. Nor do I deny other social 
locations. Besides generational and national identity, other identities, 
as for example those based on gender, socio-economic or rural/urban 
background, also play a role when Mostarians position themselves vis-
à-vis the local past (see Altinary and Pető 2015; Helms 2010; Henig 
2012; Jansen 2005; Kolind 2008; Leydesdorff et al. 1996; Paletschek 
and Schraut 2008). Although not at the centre of my analysis, when-
ever possible these social locations are considered.
 Generations: Between Personal and Collective 
Memories
In recent decades there has been a strong increase in studies of mem-
ory in the social sciences (Berliner 2005). Even if this development has 
brought a great wealth of insightful studies, one binary set of distinctions 
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has remained: the division between personal and collective memory (see 
Bloch 2007). The division of personal and collective memory often coin-
cides with the division of firsthand and secondhand experiences. Pickering 
and Keightley make a plea for a closer investigation of ‘the way that we 
take up and synthesise firsthand and secondhand experience in develop-
ing self-narratives, how collective “frames” of memory are adopted and 
applied in everyday remembering processes, and how we make sense of 
and operationalise institutionalised and objectivised memory’ (Pickering 
and Keightley 2013: 119). By focusing on personal memories as well as 
transmitted memories and on the specific generational discursive tactics 
and interpretative templates, this book hopes to contribute towards this 
aim and to bridge the division between personal and collective memory, 
even if it can never be eliminated fully. Individuals’ narratives are never 
solely personal memories but are always related to a wider social frame-
work and to the prevailing official histories (Fabian 2007; Halbwachs 
1980, 1992).7 By examining the role of generational positioning, it is 
precisely the intersection of the individual and the wider social arena that 
takes centre stage.
In the case of my particular study, I suggest that it is more accurate to 
speak of a Bosniak or Croat ‘dominant public discourse’ rather than of 
Bosniak or Croat ‘collective memory’ as such. I do so to emphasise that 
there is a difference between public/official history and what we may 
call vernacular/popular history, or between those who are professionally 
involved in creating national history and those who are not. Moreover, by 
speaking of discourse, we are reminded that the subject of discussion is 
historically embedded and is thus dynamic, while the notion of collective 
memory is rather tangible and static.
The title of this book, How Generations Remember, is an allusion to 
the title of Paul Connerton’s seminal book, How Societies Remember 
(1989). In his book, Connerton opens up a timely discussion going 
beyond the textual and discursive understanding of remembering by 
concentrating on embodied/habitual memory and ritual aspects of 
7 This central insight serves as the broadest common ground for social scientists working on 
memory today. Nevertheless, their foci may vary greatly between individualist and collectivist 
understandings of social (collective) memory (see Olick 1999; Olick and Robbins 1998).
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memory. In terms of the study of generations he thus mainly discusses 
generations as transmitters or receivers of group memory. Although 
Connerton’s pioneering contribution to the study of memory is 
unquestioned, by focusing on how memory is passed down through the 
generations he primarily answers the question of how group memory is 
conveyed and sustained. This emphasis on transmission and persistence 
leaves open the question of where to locate the individual, the agent, the 
force and possibility for reflexivity and change (Argenti and Schramm 
2010; Shaw 2010). My study, in concentrating on the role of generational 
positioning, reveals that past experiences inform present stances, but 
also shows that it is the actor in the present that gives meaning to the 
past. This is also true for narratives of the past that are passed on from 
older to younger generations, and are then scrutinised and contextualised 
by the latter. It is suggested that people’s sense of continuity can deal 
with the inconsistencies that arise with this transfer between generations. 
It is this field of tension between collective and personal, and between 
persistence and change that is central in the discussion of generational 
positioning in this book.
Generations can be seen as ‘mediators’ between individual and col-
lective memory. Several scholars have proven the significance of family 
narratives for the process of transmission of memories through gen-
erations (see, e.g., Erll 2011a; Feuchtwang 2005; Halbwachs 1925; 
Hirsch 2008; Welzer et  al. 2005). In recent discussions of families as 
small-scale mnemonic communities, the concept of transmission is 
critically reflected and sometimes replaced by other concepts, such as 
‘re- narration’ (Welzer 2010). Welzer argues that ‘narrations of memory 
are never transmitted, but rather constitute an occasion for an endless line 
of re-narrations that are constantly reformatted according to generational 
needs and frames of interpretation’ (Welzer 2010: 16). This indicates that 
generations borrow, cross-reference and negotiate personal and shared 
pasts in finding their narrative, as suggested by Rothberg’s multidirec-
tional understanding of memory (Rothberg 2009: 3). This process of 
‘bringing into relation different inherited pasts, and use them in orienting 
ourselves to the future’ (Pickering and Keightley 2013: 121) is still 
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widely unexplored and the analysis presented in this book hopes to 
contribute to its elucidation.
Following Mannheim’s seminal essay The Problems of Generations (1997 
[1928]), most studies linking generation with memory have concentrated 
principally on the different historico-political periods that individuals 
of different generations have lived through (see, e.g., Borneman 1992; 
Bude 2005; Corning 2010; Fietze 2009; Rosenthal and Gather 1986; 
Schuman and Corning 2012; Schuman and Scott 1989; Yurchak 2005). 
Some of these studies also consider the stage of life individuals were in 
when they witnessed a certain event. Adolescence and young adulthood 
here carry particular weight, and experiences during that early period 
are seen as formative, as in Mannheim’s work. This research does not, 
however, suggest that such interpretations and norms remain unchanged 
throughout a lifetime, but only that they continue to be important refer-
ence points.
The concept of ‘generational positioning’ that I introduce in this book 
gives further importance to the stage of life in the sense of a particular 
‘life situation’ individuals are in at the time when they reflect on the 
past (and not only at the time of the original experience). For example, 
we can expect differences in experiences of war between those who live 
through it as children and those who do so as adults or parents. Still, it 
is the actor in the present that gives meaning to the past. Thus the narra-
tors’ present life situation is likely to affect their retrospective narrations 
of past events. Consequently, the experience of certain events alone, such 
as the war, does not signify a generation, rather the interpretative act of 
making sense of it, whereby individuals position themselves by following 
certain discursive tactics does. Generational identity is constructed by 
sharing memories but also by collectively silencing them. Generations 
assign their identity and at the same time differentiate themselves from 
other generations.
Due to their divergent life situations, the First Yugoslavs, Last 
Yugoslavs and Post-Yugoslavs face distinct everyday realities and chal-
lenges, and thus are differently affected by the recent societal and eco-
nomic changes; this influences the way they probe the past. Generational 
positioning is closely interlinked with the meaning-making and mne-
monic processes that are likely to change with the different life situa-
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tions people face (Reulecke 2010: 121).8 Giving meaning to past events 
is a situational process and not a single act. It is likely that the meaning 
people give to important events and periods in their biography changes 
during the course of life. Here it is important to state, as Gardner has, 
that ‘the life course is of course not culturally neutral, nor is it unaf-
fected by particular geographical locations, for these involve very real 
material conditions and power relations’ (Gardner 2002: 221). In this 
book, the power relations concerning the transmission of memories (or 
the failure of the same) between generations in particular are carved out.
The generations I refer to evolved from my interlocutors’ narratives. 
These generations are understood as sharing a historical experience that 
generates a ‘community of perception’ (Olick 1999: 339). A shared past 
is crucial for a generation’s constitution. Equally important are ‘cer-
tain interpretative principles’ and ‘discursive practices’ (Nugin 2010: 
355–356). The narrator takes a central role; individuals are not passive 
consumers of experiences, but rather play an active role in generating 
meaning from their experiences.
Even if in most cases the generations outlined here correlate with 
the age of my interlocutors, we need to keep in mind that the bound-
aries drawn between the generations are not clear-cut and age alone 
is not always decisive. Consequently the generations should not be 
considered as homogeneous cohorts, but rather as trends based on 
generational identification. The notion of ‘generation’ used in this 
book should thus be understood as a heuristic device (see Borneman 
1992). Regardless of shared ‘discursive tactics’ identified, I did not 
encounter one ‘standard’ narrative representative for each generation, 
8 There is widespread interest today in the concept of generation within the social sciences and 
beyond. Yet it is understood in many different ways, not only between but also within disciplines. 
Existing research spans studies on kinship and family (see, e.g., Bertaux and Thompson 1993; 
Lisón Tolosana 1966; Parkin and Stone 2004), to ageing and the intergenerational contract (see, 
e.g., Lüscher and Liegle 2003) and life-course research related to political attitudes and educational 
and career paths (see, e.g., Mayer 2009). In the last few decades, generation has become a central 
concept in research on migration, connected to studies on exiles (see, e.g., Ballinger 2003; Berg 
2009) as well as second-generation migrants (see, e.g., Vertovec and Rogers 1998; Wessendorf 
2007). Moreover, generation has also been a topic in life-course and biography research connected 
with political ruptures (see, e.g., Borneman 1992; Diewald et  al. 2006; Rosenthal and Bogner 
2009) as well as in studies concerned with intergenerational aspects of memory (see, e.g., Argenti 
and Schramm 2010; Bloch 1998; Hirsch 2008; Welzer 2007).
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and even narratives told to me by the same person sometimes varied 
significantly depending on the situation in which they were told.
Lastly, the generations here are not political generations who share a 
politico-ideological outlook (see Bude 1997). The First, Last and Post- 
Yugoslavs are not necessarily connected through their political outlooks; 
what they share are certain discursive tactics in the ways they (re-)posi-
tioned themselves after the war. In this sense each generation may be seen 
as a group of people who share a certain processing of experiences, as 
suggested by Lüscher (2005) in the phrase ‘gemeinsame Verarbeitung von 
Erfahrungen’ (a shared way in coming to terms with the past) (Lüscher 
2005: 55). This is especially interesting if one considers that the contact 
between the Bosniak and Croat members of the generations is extremely 
limited. For the Post-Yugoslavs this has been true for most of their lives, 
yet this is the group that most often refers to itself as one generation, 
thereby differentiating themselves from the older population. As I show 
in Chap. 6, they do so not only by means of sharing memories but also 
by silencing them.
 A Narrative Approach to Remembering
In this study, I concentrate on what Assmann and Czaplicka (1995) 
refer to as ‘communicative memory’. This is the memory that is still 
preserved among living generations, and this time span is most impor-
tant for individuals’ perception of their lives. The aspect of time is cru-
cial here because communicative memory is limited to a time span of 
around 80–100 years (during which eyewitnesses to the events remain 
alive) (see Assmann and Czaplicka 1995). Central political periods 
(rather than specific events)—and the meanings they assume in the 
life narratives of individuals of different generations—are central in 
my analysis. The three historico-political periods primarily explored 
in this book thus are the period of socialist Yugoslavia (including the 
constituting period of WWII), the war in the 1990s and the post-war 
period. These are tightly interconnected and often narrated in relation 
to each other, both in public history representations as well as in per-
sonal accounts.
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The entry point I have chosen for this research are narratives of dif-
ferent forms (and in different settings) that allow me to make visible the 
actors and their strategies/tactics for dealing with the past. Memories are 
thus understood as interpretations of the past that always include intel-
lectual work (Wood 1991). Narratives are simultaneously born out of 
experiences and structure experience (Ochs and Capps 1996). In contrast 
to the cognitive approach to memory, in which memory is only  attributed 
to the individual mind, the narrative approach taken here treats memory 
as a social practice because it is communicative (Fabian 2007).
Whenever the notion of memory is used in this book, it should be 
understood as a narrative that is selective and situational in character, 
and a product of past experiences, present needs and future aspira-
tions. Although at first glance memory might seem to be chiefly con-
nected to the past, it is also closely linked to the present and the future 
(Haukanes and Trnka 2013). We remember in order to give meaning to 
the present and thus gain power over the future (see Assmann 2007; 
Schwartz 1982). Thus we are confronted with different temporal 
moments including the inherited and experienced past, the present 
moment of narration as well as the imagined future (Pickering and 
Keightley 2013: 125; see also French 2012). Consequently, narratives 
of experienced events refer both to current life and to past experi-
ence but are also linked to what the future holds for individuals as 
well as for societies (Kerby 1991; Koselleck 2004; Natzmer 2002; 
Palmberger and Tošić 2016; Polkinghorne 1998).
As Trouillot (1995) has rightly stated, ‘human beings participate in 
history both as actors and narrators’ (Trouillot 1995: 2). This means 
that individuals are narrators of history and also actors, and thus are not 
entirely free to choose since their narratives of the past are based to a 
certain degree on personal experiences and on wider public narratives 
they have been exposed to. This becomes apparent in the discussion of 
generations I present below. Despite all the choices individuals can draw 
on when narrating the past, they are also influenced by experiences in the 
past and by socio-historical structures (Rosenthal 2006: 1). Memories are 
thus selective constructions incorporating experience (Kansteiner 2002).
Processes of remembering not only enable us to make sense of our 
pasts, but they also help in identity constructions.
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Memory serves as both a phenomenological ground of identity (as when 
we know implicitly who we are and the circumstances that have made us 
so) and the means for explicit identity construction (as when we search our 
memories in order to understand ourselves or when we offer particular 
stories about ourselves in order to make a certain kind of impression). 
(Antze and Lambek 1996a: xvi)9
To be precise, it is not only a matter of the way the past is narrated, 
but also of the way the narrators position themselves in the past (Antze 
and Lambek 1996b). The way that meaning is attributed to past experi-
ences is likely to change during one’s lifetime due to changes in historico- 
political contexts, new autobiographical experiences and the fact that one 
is moving forwards in the life cycle (Rosenthal 2006). The dimension of 
temporal transformation and new interpretations of the past in new pres-
ents has generally been little explored and calls for closer investigation, 
not least through the focus on generation (Feindt et al. 2014).
 Different Temporal Moments in the Process  
of Remembering
As the preceding paragraphs have illuminated, the work presented here 
builds on the premise that memory (or better ‘remembering’) is an active 
process. Remembering is understood as a narrative act of generating mean-
ing located in the present and directed towards the future. Remembering is 
‘not only welcoming, receiving an image of the past, it is also searching for 
it, “doing” something’ (Ricoeur 2006: 56; see also Hodgkin and Radstone 
2006; Passerini 2007; Schwartz 1982; Tonkin 1992).
Remembering and its counterpart, forgetting/silencing, therefore have 
little to do with a mere retrospection on the past (Fabian 2007; Rasmussen 
2002), but also relate to the way one’s present and future are conceptual-
ised (Ochs and Capps 2001: 255; see also Erll 2011b; Lowenthal 1985; 
Tannock 1995). Memory thus acts as an orienting force and ‘there are 
times when a very specific vision of the future frames the utilization of 
the past’ (Irwin-Zarecka 1994: 101). As I show at different points in this 
9 On this matter see also Cole and Knowles 2001; Friedman 1992; Jureit 2009.
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book, nostalgia for Yugoslavia manifested within the three generations’ 
narratives and as such is a representation of the past that at times serves 
as a vision for the future.
Nostalgic feelings for the socialist past have been identified in many 
post-socialist contexts, and nostalgic icons have been identified as ‘mne-
monic bridges’ between the present and the past that offer continuity in 
times of wide-reaching societal changes (Ange and Berliner 2015; Bach 
2002; Bartmanski 2011; Boym 2001; Brunnbauer and Troebst 2007; 
Creed 2006; Heady and Gambold Miller 2006; Velikonja 2009; Yurchak 
2005). As recent work on post-socialism has shown, it would be wrong 
to assume ‘a clear break from the past’ and from experiences of socialism 
eradicated from people’s memories (Kay et al. 2012; see also Greenberg 
2014; Pine 2013; Ringel 2013). Assuming that regime changes coupled 
with war are likely to intensify feelings of loss and insecurity, and trigger 
a yearning for the past, it is not surprising that a longing for the pre-war 
times, for Yugoslavia, prevails in BiH. People in BiH have experienced 
not only a drastic change in the political system governing their country, 
but also the war that accompanied it.
This book builds on the past–present–future interrelations inherent 
to nostalgia (Davis 1977). Rather than viewing nostalgia for Yugoslavia 
as oriented towards the past alone, I argue that it can also be seen as 
criticism of the present post-war and post-socialist realities, and may be 
reflected in visions of a better future (see Boyer 2006). It is suggested that 
a longing for Yugoslavia has the potential to ‘paralyse’ individuals, who 
realise that what was lost can never be regained, and this puts them into a 
constant state of ‘waiting’. At the same time this longing is an expression 
of criticism of the present situation and in this way can become a source 
for future aspirations. As I reveal in this book, nostalgia shows itself in 
different forms along generational demarcations.
 Between Memory Politics and Individual 
Meaning-Making
In his critical article on memory studies, Confino (1997) argues that 
the discussions of memory in recent decades have reduced memory to 
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the political. In a similar vein, Kidron (2009) expresses concern about 
the vast scholarly interest in the political instrumentalisation of the past 
while neglecting the more silent everyday mnemonic practices that con-
stitute the ‘living presence of the past’ (Kidron 2009: 8). I would argue 
that this is particularly true for the case of Yugoslavia, noticeably in the 
concentration of literature on nationalism and memory politics. The fre-
quent succession of political regimes in the region of former Yugoslavia 
and their continuing efforts to rewrite local history have inclined social 
scientists to approach the region as a ‘laboratory’ for studying memory 
politics, whereby the ethno-national groups serve as the focus of analysis. 
The majority of research on Yugoslavia and her successor states concerning 
itself with memories and representations of the past thus has focused on 
partisan collective memory among the different ethno-national groups. 
This research has explored how the new political elites, after crucial political 
changes, rewrite the past in order to legitimise their rule and to make the 
past fit nationally oriented goals (see e.g., Basic-Hrvatin 1996; Bet-El 
2002; Denich 1994; Hayden 1994; Moll 2013; Verdery 1999). These 
studies are of great value. Nevertheless, the focus on collective memory 
is often maintained at the expense of the individual agent. It bears the 
risk of obscuring the view on diversity, such as other identities existing 
alongside only national ones.10
Recent work on public representations of the Yugoslav past has added 
to the already existing literature new angles of analysis going beyond the 
national fractions. Helms (2013), for example, in her work skilfully anal-
yses the way Bosnian national narratives greatly rely on gender logics. 
While female victims of sexual violence and rape are faced with silence 
and have received little support, they, as a collective, have become sym-
bols and proof of the nations’ innocence (Helms 2013). Such gendered 
discourses of victimhood are followed, primarily, to prove the nation’s 
moral purity and are instrumentalised to attract international aid proj-
ects. Another example of recent work on political/national memory in 
the post-Yugoslav successor states is that of Gordy’s work, which in a dif-
10 This shift away from the traditional focus on ethnicity in research and analysis has also been initi-
ated by leading scholars in other social science research fields, such as in the field of migration 
studies (see Glick Schiller et al. 2006; Vertovec 2007, 2014).
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ferentiated way and based on rich ethnography investigates memory and 
responsibility in present-day Serbia (Gordy 2013).
Compared to the attention that public, national discourses have 
received, however, little research has been conducted on local-level 
responses, on the way ‘ordinary’ people deal with disruptions and war, 
and how they reflect upon their lives and consider the significant political 
ruptures that have taken place during their lifetimes. Most importantly, 
what has been widely left unexplored is the interplay between personal 
memories and memory politics, a gap this book aims to fill. Together with 
other recently conducted research in the Yugoslav successor states (e.g., 
Brown 2003; Höpken 2007; Jansen 2002; Kolind 2008; Schäuble 2014; 
Sorabji 2006; Volcic 2007), this book hopes to provide a necessary cor-
rective to this distorted picture, not by ignoring the dominant national 
public discourses (drawing on so-called ‘collective memories’), but by 
considering them as powerful foils against whose backdrop people’s 
narratives are constructed. Thereby, the difference between the nature 
of the ‘stratagems’ found in the dominant public discourse (Bosniak and 
Croat) and in people’s personal narratives is investigated.
 Discursive Tactics versus Discursive Strategies
In order to tease out the particularities of my interlocutors’ narratives 
and the discursive tactics they employ (Chaps. 4–6), I first introduce the 
key themes found in the dominant Bosniak and Croat public discourses 
(Chaps. 2 and 3). Mainly using material gathered in the history depart-
ments of the Bosniak- and Croat-dominated universities in Mostar, but 
also at commemoration ceremonies, I analyse how history has been rewrit-
ten since the end of socialist Yugoslavia. In this process I point out specific 
discursive strategies employed in the historical narratives of the university 
lectures and those officiating at the ceremonies. My research reveals that 
there is a difference between the nature of the ‘stratagems’ found in the 
official (Bosniak and Croat) national narratives and in people’s personal 
narratives. By way of clarification, I use ‘discursive strategies’ to refer to 
what is employed by those professionally involved in the process of (re)
writing history (the political elites and their intermediaries; e.g., historians, 
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teachers, journalists) and ‘discursive tactics’ to refer to what is employed by 
those who are not.
Since individuals are not only exposed to changing political contexts 
but are also confronted with their personal past experiences, my inter-
locutors’ reconstructions of the past have to remain more flexible and 
situational than those of ‘memory makers’ (Kansteiner 2002) who are 
professionally involved in writing official national history. While the  latter 
presents a goal-oriented narrative, the former can be better described as 
target-seeking. This usage relates but does not fully correspond to Michel 
de Certeau’s distinction between strategy and tactic.11 For de Certeau, the 
former is linked to institutions and structures of power: ‘I call a strategy 
the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes 
possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a 
city, a scientific institution) can be isolated’ (de Certeau 1984: 35–36). 
Discursive strategies employed by those who claim to represent the nation 
are used to narrate independent coherent national histories, to legitimise 
and objectify them.
In contrast to discursive strategies, discursive tactics are found in the nar-
ratives of ‘common’ citizens who are not professionally involved in rewrit-
ing the past but who nonetheless are faced with having to rethink it and to 
reposition themselves with reference to it after great societal changes have 
taken place in their country. A tactic, in de Certeau’s sense, is utilised by 
individuals to create space for themselves in a field of power. A tactic is 
influenced, but not determined, by rules and structures (de Certeau 1980). 
In positioning themselves in relation to the past, Mostarians are confronted 
with the political ruptures in their society’s history. Discursive tactics present 
in their narratives are utilised to deal with these ruptures.12
In my work, discursive tactics are first and foremost verbal expressions 
by actors in the field that position an actor in relation to the local past, 
primarily to the period of Tito’s Yugoslavia (including WWII), the war 
in the 1990s and the post-war period. While a central discursive tactic 
employed by the First Yugoslavs is the connecting of experiences of dif-
11 The idea of making use of this distinction came from a stimulating conversation with my col-
league and friend, Kristine Krause.
12 Even if individuals may strive towards a meaningful life narrative, I nevertheless recognise that it 
is also the researcher’s aim to reveal a meaningful story (Bourdieu 1998: 76).
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ferent historico-political periods, that of the Last Yugoslavs is the oscilla-
tion between different discourses, even opposing ones; and the discursive 
 tactics of the Post-Yugoslavs are characterised by distancing and dissociat-
ing their personal histories from the experiences of the wider nation.
Although the concept of discursive tactic used in this study relates to de 
Certeau’s concept of tactic, it is understood in a somewhat  different way. 
Tactic as de Certeau describes it is more closely linked to resistance than 
the way tactic is used here. Relating tactics closely to resistance would sug-
gest that the narratives of my interlocutors represent ‘counter- memories’ 
or ‘alternative histories’, and that we can draw a clear line between ‘official’ 
and ‘popular’ representations of the past, between history and memory. 
This is not the case, as I will outline in the following paragraphs.
 The Fine Line Between Memory and History
I suggest being critical of drawing a clear line between memory and history 
and instead emphasise their interrelationship. Connerton claims that ‘the 
practice of historical reconstruction can in important ways receive a guid-
ing impetus from, and can in turn give significant shape to, the memo-
ries of social groups (Connerton 1989: 14). Hutton argues in a more 
radical way that historiography cannot be seen as a process freed from 
memory, but rather as an official version of memory which enjoys the 
sanction of academic authority (Hutton 1993; see also Assmann 1999; 
Crane 1997; Hall 1998). This does not mean that memory and history 
are synonymous, but rather that ‘memory is history located in relatively 
subjective space; history is memory located in relatively objectified space. 
History is memory inscribed, codified, authorized; memory is history 
embodied, imagined, enacted, enlivened’ (Lambek 2003: 212). Lambek’s 
portrayal of memory and history is useful as a working definition here, 
since it shows both the interconnectedness of memory and history, as 
well as their different qualities. Despite their differences, the connection 
between history and memory is reinforced by the fact that they are both 
mnemonic processes (see Burke 1989) and that they influence each other 
to a certain degree.
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On the individual level, too, history is not always clearly separable 
from autobiographical memories. ‘Unlike law and policy texts, personal 
recollections rarely attempt to divide history into discrete categories of 
political and domestic life, into a set of objective circumstances and sub-
jective responses’ (Borneman 1992: 38). As shown in this book, individu-
als make sense of the past by referring to autobiographical memories as 
well as to secondhand pasts (e.g., narratives of older family members) and 
institutionalised/official histories, which are intermingled in their nar-
ratives. The creation of a ‘generational consciousness’ is ‘creatively pro-
duced not by making a complete break with inherited pasts, but through 
the dialectical relationships between continuity and rupture, intimate 
knowing and irreducible difference that occur vertically through time in 
genealogical relationships’ (Pickering and Keightley 2013: 126).
On the national level, representations of the past are struggles over 
whose memories will be preserved and institutionalised and whose will 
be repressed or forgotten (Natzmer 2002; see also Purdeková 2008; 
Vidaković 1989). Memories first have to be included in a widely shared 
and publicly expressed narrative before they can have political effect 
(Ashplant et  al. 2009). Because different groups in any society have 
unequal access to power, the starting positions for making one’s own per-
ception of the past representative in the public domain are unequal.13 The 
state holds a privileged position in terms of historiography whereby the 
discourse of the state is presented as knowledge (history) while that of its 
citizens is presented as opinion (memory) (Borneman 1992: 40). This 
does not mean, however, that official historiographies are not contested, 
as Tilly (1994) reminds us when he says:
At least two processes within the politics of memory can be identified: On 
a large scale we see the whole political process of mutual influence among 
shared memories, definitions of the future, and collective action. At an 
increased magnification, we see the contestation that surrounds every effort 
to create, define, or impose a common memory. […] (Tilly 1994: 253)
13 In order to uphold a dominant discourse that supports existing power structures, ruling politi-
cians take advantage of commemorations and (war) memorials as well as of the reburials of the dead 
(see Bougarel 2007; Campbell et al. 2000; Sant Cassia 2005; Verdery 1999).
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Counter-versions may emerge at the same time as a dominant narrative 
is told or after years of silence (see Foucault 1977; Gal 2002; Ochs and 
Capps 1996; Saikia 2004). Within an authoritarian state, such narratives 
are likely to remain in the private sphere or outside of state control (e.g., 
in the memories of dissidents). In this context it is tempting to view the 
dominant discourse as oppressive and negative, and the discourses that 
contest it as positive and closer to ‘truth’. However, rather than asking 
about the truth of the official or counter-narratives, the more relevant 
and significant question, also for this book, is about the relationship 
between them (see Fentress and Wickham 1992). They are necessarily 
interrelated, since any counter-narrative always relates to the dominant 
discourse (see Schramm 2011). Moreover, as will become clear in Chaps. 
2 and 3, which deal with the memory politics and historiography of the 
Yugoslav period and in the present, the status of narratives is not fixed: 
a counter-narrative can become the dominant narrative manifested in 
historiography and vice versa. Nevertheless, even if we no longer treat 
history and memory as antithetical concepts, it does not mean that no 
distinction between the two should be made. Instead, I suggest that the 
question of interconnectedness should be explored within the specific 
ethnographic context.
By opting to speak of narratives of the past, I seek to avoid drawing 
too clear a distinction between memory and history. It is not useful to 
draw a strict line between memory and history, neither analytically nor 
ethnographically. With regard to the latter, Birth argues:
To ethnographically explore the fluid, interdependent relation between his-
tory and memory discards an inflexible bifurcation of the past into ‘history’ 
versus ‘memory.’ This dichotomy plays a role in both the purported objectiv-
ity of history and subjectivity of remembering. In this contrast, history 
becomes contextual, and ‘memory,’ whether it is collective or individual, 
becomes a dimension of intersubjective significance. (Birth 2006: 177)
In this book I treat both memory and history firstly as narratives and 
only later elucidate their different qualities, particularly when drawing 
on the distinction between discursive strategies and tactics. The arbitrary 
distinction between memory and history becomes clear when we look 
at concrete ethnographic examples, such as the way history is taught at 
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the two universities in Mostar. Here we are dealing with more than one 
version of history: it is history in the making but at two different ends.
 Situating Mostar’s Memories
Many of the people I talked to were quick to assure me that I had come 
to the right place when I told them I had come to Mostar to research 
memories of the local past. Independently of one another, many of them 
said that in Mostar ‘we have too much memory’. This statement refers to 
the history of the territory (and its inhabitants) that is today the coun-
try of BiH, a territory that was contested fiercely throughout his-
tory and claimed by various rulers (domestic and foreign) until it became 
one of the six republics of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia in 1945.14 
It was again violently fought over in the years following 1992, when it 
became the battleground for contesting national claims in the course of 
Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Certainly, the statement ‘we have too much 
memory’ is also connected to the widespread perception of the Balkans 
as a region prone to violence (Todorova 1997). This perception is also 
found in local history textbooks in which the outbreak of the 1992–1995 
war is commonly presented as inevitable due to ancient hostilities among 
the peoples of Yugoslavia (Torsti 2003).
It seems that such a deterministic perspective on the past could only 
have evolved in retrospect. The majority of my interlocutors narrated the 
outbreak of the war as having been abrupt and unexpected. According to 
those among them old enough to remember pre-war Mostar, the war has 
disfigured the city almost beyond recognition. In this they refer not only 
to the severely damaged cityscape and the fully destroyed parts of Mostar 
(including the Old Town and the famous Ottoman Bridge), but mainly 
to Mostar’s social core: the social relations between the city’s inhabitants 
often framed using the local term komšiluk (neighbourliness) (see Bringa 
1995; Henig 2012; Sorabji 2008; see Chap. 3 this volume). Pre-war 
Mostar, people on many occasions assured me, best exemplified what 
14 In 1946 it was renamed the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and in 1963 the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina supposedly stood for: peaceful coexistence 
among individuals of different national backgrounds. Accordingly, sta-
tistics showed Mostar to be the city with the highest number of cross- 
national marriages in all of Yugoslavia (Botev and Wagner 1993). The 
destruction of Mostar’s Old Ottoman Bridge in 1993 became a symbol 
of the destruction of this multinational coexistence in BiH, for locals 
and non-locals alike (Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999).
The Bosniak and Croat dominant national narratives deviate starkly 
when it comes to the interpretation of the 1992–1995 war. Although 
Bosniaks and Croats agree that the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National 
Army (YNA) presented the primary threat to Mostar, they disagree about 
the reasons for the war that broke out among them after they had success-
fully pushed back the YNA. While in the Bosniak national discourse the 
Bosniak–Croat war is narrated as a matter of Bosniaks liberating Mostar 
from Croat fascists (like the Partisans’ liberation of Mostar from the Nazis 
at the end of WWII), in the Croat national discourse the Bosniaks are 
portrayed as traitors who turned against their former protectors in order 
to Islamise Mostar.
With the Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the war, BiH became a 
state with two entities—the Bosniak–Croat Federation with its 10 cantons 
and the Serb Republic—with a strong presence of international actors 
(Bieber 2005). The city of Mostar is the capital of one of the only two 
mixed cantons and traditionally has been the centre of the Herzegovinian 
Croats (as Sarajevo is the centre for BiH’s Bosniaks and Banja Luka for 
BiH’s Serbs). For tourists, Mostar, a city in the southern region of BiH, 
initially impresses with its beauty and Mediterranean charm. Only after 
gaining deeper insights into the lives of people do the scars left by the war 
and the way they still dominate life in Mostar today become visible.
One day during the first months of my fieldwork, I ran into a woman 
in her 40s who had got lost in Mostar, a city that used to be her home. 
She had had to flee it during the war and only returned for the first time 
in 2005. Upon her return she became lost in Cernica, the part of the 
city where I lived with my family, and she had to ask her way around as 
she could no longer recognise the streets. This incident again made me 
aware of how the city had changed. The once-colourful Mostar is now 
full of ruins and damaged facades. The trees growing out of the ruins 
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give a sense of the time that has passed since the war ended. The ruins 
and bullet holes in the buildings, visible throughout the entire city, are 
much worse on the east side than on the west side because of the Croats’ 
advantage in heavy artillery. The situation is worst around the former 
frontline, the Bulevar (Bulevard), close to where the returnee lost her 
bearings.15 This anecdote represents an extreme case. It is likely that the 
woman experienced a lot of stress when returning to her former home for 
the first time after more than 10 years. But the experience of no longer 
recognising Mostar or parts of it as one’s former home—literally or 
metonymically—was described to me by many Mostarians.
The composition of Mostar’s population has changed drastically as 
a consequence of the war. The once multinational city—35 % Muslim 
(Bosniak), 34 % Croat, 19 % Serb and 12 % Other (including those who 
identified themselves as Yugoslav)—has been split in half between Croats 
and Bosniaks, who make up the vast majority of the population. Of the 
approximately 20,000 Serbs, only about 1000 remained in the divided 
city during the war, and only a minority of those who fled returned thereafter 
(Bose 2002). Today, Mostar is often cited as the ‘worst case’ of partition 
resulting from the war (Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999).
The war left Mostar as a city divided between a Bosniak east side and a 
Croat west side. Even after Mostar’s inhabitants were again able to move 
about the city freely, the two sides remained separated in all aspects of life: 
politically, economically, culturally and also in terms of health care, educa-
tion and the media (see Bose 2002; ICG 2000; Price 2002; Torsti 2003; 
Vetters 2007; Wimmen 2004). The lives of most Bosniaks and Croats are 
still separated. If they do not actively seek to interact with one another, 
then Bosniaks and Croats actually share little time with their national 
counterparts. Bosniak and Croat children attend different schools, teenag-
ers go to different universities, adults have separate workplaces, and leisure 
time is predominantly spent on ‘one’s own’ side of the city. Only a small 
number of people still maintain friendships with pre- war friends of a dif-
ferent nationality and even for them the nature of their relationships has 
often changed. Many Mostarians who still maintain old cross-national 
friendships no longer visit each other at home like they used to do before 
15 Fortunately, the Bulevar, which still is ‘perceived’ as the border between Bosniaks and Croats, saw 
much reconstruction during the three years of my stay in BiH.
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the war, but only meet in public places such as cafés. This change symbol-
ises a shift in the degree of intimacy in these old friendships.
Although no exact numbers exist, my fieldwork observations suggest 
that only a minority of Mostarians feel at home on both sides of the city. 
The majority only crosses the line between east and west if there is par-
ticular reason for it. For example, young Bosniaks prefer to go shopping 
in West Mostar because shopping malls are bigger and fancier. Sometimes 
such shopping expeditions are combined with having a coffee in one of the 
chic cafés close by. On the other hand, a modern beauty salon opened dur-
ing my stay in East Mostar, and it attracted Mostar’s Croats. Such ‘cross-
ings’, however, do not mean that people feel at home on the side where they 
are in the minority (even though some of them grew up there).
For example, a Bosniak woman of around 30  years of age told me 
that she feels watched in cafés on the west side. She always tries to use 
Croat instead of Bosnian words and fears accidentally using a turcizam.16 
Later, when re-crossing the Bulevar to arrive on the Bosniak side, she 
feels relieved for only then can she relax again. A Bosniak man of simi-
lar age told me that he did not feel safe on the west side. This feeling of 
insecurity had intensified since he went out one night with his friends in 
West Mostar and lost his mobile phone in a club. The waitress found it, 
searched for his name and when she called it out in order to identify him 
a couple of men came up to him and asked him aggressively what he, as 
a Bosniak, thought he was doing in that club.17
Both Bosniaks and Croats expressed a sense of insecurity when on the 
other side and when identified by people there. On the other hand, I also 
met people from both sides who did not (or no longer) feel insecure when 
crossing sides. This was particularly true for those who regularly spent 
16 Turcizam means a word of Arabic origin incorporated into what used to be referred to as Serbo-
Croatian and nowadays is used mainly by Bosniaks or the older population.
17 Names in BiH in many cases provide information on a person’s national background and are 
almost always ‘screened’ for this information. But not every name can be easily categorised, which 
might confuse the interlocutor, for example, when the first and last names suggest two different 
nationalities or when a name is common to more than one nation. Individuals with such names 
may take advantage of this since they can pass for more than one nationality and so may gain more 
access to resources, such as education or employment. But not being clearly identifiable as a mem-
ber of one nation can also cause suspicion and serious problems, as was the case especially during 
the war for mixed couples and their children.
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time on the other side, for example those who worked or studied there 
(Palmberger 2013b). In contrast, those who rarely crossed sides expressed 
deeper mistrust. In the media and literature one often hears of hatred 
between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in post-war BiH. I encountered such 
feelings only among a small number of people. For most, what remains 
between Bosniaks and Croats is a combination of mistrust, a feeling of 
uneasiness and a desire for conformity rather than outright hatred.
To some degree I also internalised the city’s division, always being 
aware of which side I was on when walking through Mostar. Only when 
I was showing visiting friends around the city did I realise, from their 
innocent questions about the side we were on, that there were indeed no 
clear signs marking the exact border between Bosniak and Croat Mostar. 
Nevertheless, some markers providing hints of the ‘nationality’ of the 
two parts of the city exist. Since religion is the main marker of national 
identity in BiH, religious symbols are the most straightforward territorial 
markers. Many mosques and churches have been built in recent times, 
and they attempt not only to outnumber one another but perhaps also 
to compete in size. This is not only the case in Mostar but also in its sur-
rounding small villages. This does not necessarily mean, however, that 
everyone welcomes the massive investment in churches and mosques. 
Quite to the contrary; many expressed great displeasure at what they 
regarded as a waste of money, money they thought would have been bet-
ter invested in public amenities such as schools and hospitals. This was 
also the case for Armen, an octogenarian, who is introduced in more 
detail in Chap. 4. While driving from Mostar to Sarajevo with Armen, 
we passed numerous small villages. As I had just arrived in BiH, I did not 
know about the national division of the villages and so asked Armen if 
he could tell me about them; he gave what I believe was the best response 
by saying: ‘Here every cow is either Bosniak or Croat, even the mice have 
Bosniak or Croat identities!’. With this statement he not only made clear 
what he thought of fanatical nationalism but also expressed his disap-
proval of my question. During our journey, I saw him shake his head 
repeatedly, in disbelief at the investments that had been made in the 
construction of churches and mosques.
Probably the most striking religious territorial marker in Mostar and 
a good example of the ‘symbolic arming’ that also goes on here is a huge 
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cross on the summit of Mount Hum, which overlooks the city. The cross is 
so big that it sticks out of the landscape and is one of the first signs visitors 
driving into the city see. The installation of this cross greatly provoked the 
Bosniak population, especially considering the fact that it was from Hum 
that the HVO (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane, Croat Defence Council) artillery 
shelled East Mostar. After several years, however, the cross has become, if 
not accepted, then at least a popular subject for jokes among the Bosniak 
population. For example, they joke that the cross, if not good for anything 
else, at least provides much-needed shade during hot summer days.
On another mountain, on the east side of the city, there is a huge sign 
laid out in white stones stating in capital letters, ‘BiH volimo te’ (BiH we 
love you). Peculiarly, before the war it read ‘Tito volimo te’ (Tito we love 
you) but had to be revised after Tito’s death and Yugoslavia’s break- up. 
For everyone who is informed about the situation in BiH, it is clear that 
such a statement could only be found on the Bosniak-dominated side. 
Most supporters of the new BiH state can be found among Bosniaks, 
while Croats generally show more patriotic sentiments for Croatia than 
for BiH. Many Croats in Mostar, as in the whole of Herzegovina, ori-
ent themselves towards the capital of Croatia rather than Sarajevo, the 
capital of BiH. On public holidays, in West Mostar the flag of BiH is 
only displayed on official governmental buildings and on the buildings 
of international organisations, while on the east side the BiH flag can be 
seen on many buildings, even on small shops.
This orientation towards Croatia is also displayed in the newly renamed 
streets in West Mostar. While on the Bosniak-dominated east side, street 
names for the most part remained as they were before 1992, street names 
on the Croat-dominated west side underwent extensive renaming. Today, 
street names, newly erected memorials and religious symbols mark the pub-
lic space of West Mostar as part of the Croat nation (Palmberger 2013c).18
18 The claim that Mostar is the city of BiH’s Croats leads, in its extreme interpretation, to a denial 
of Bosniak (and Serb) existence or to a denial of the Bosniak-dominated part of the city. The claim 
that Mostar is an exclusively Croat city goes so far that the Bosniak east side of the city is simply 
ignored, for example in books on or maps of Mostar (see, e.g., Augustinović 1999). Interestingly, a 
study of Mostar’s tourist guides conducted by Torsti revealed that Bosniak tourist guides continue 
to present the entire city similarly to before the war, while Croat guides concentrate only on West 
Mostar and leave the Ottoman heritage, such as the Old Town, unmentioned (Torsti 2004: 151). 
When we assume that ‘recognising others’ means also ‘remembering them’ (Fabian 2006: 145) then 
silencing the Bosniak presence is a denial of its existence through the act of wilful forgetting.
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The new street names emphasise a shared history with the motherland 
of Croatia by recalling Croat historic personalities and important Croat 
cities. The former include names of members of the Catholic Church and 
politically influential persons from the medieval Croat Kingdom as well as 
the NDH state (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, Independent State of Croatia, 
see Chap. 2). The new street names invoke the national meta- narrative by 
recalling the past glory of the medieval Croat Kingdom as well as the long 
period of victimisation on the way to national liberation. The victimisation 
of the Croat people by the communists is thereby given special attention.
The propagated Croat identity stands in sharp contrast to the Yugoslav 
identity and the socialist past. To maintain it, any reminders of the 
Yugoslav past had to be erased from everyday life. This also concerns 
street names whereby the socialist past was erased by ‘Croatianising’ them. 
For example, the street once called Omladinska (Street of the Youth) was 
renamed Hrvatske mladeži (Croat Youth). A similar example is the cul-
tural centre formally called Dom kulture (House of Culture; Fig. 1.1). 
Today, big letters on the front of the building proclaim its new name: 
Hrvatski dom herceg Stjepan Kosača (Croat House—Duke Stjepan Kosač).
In West Mostar, moreover, streets recalling the socialist period and 
those named after people known for their role in Serb or Bosniak national 
history were replaced by the names of Croat rulers, such as kings and 
dukes, or religious leaders, such as cardinals and bishops (Fig. 1.2). They 
were also renamed in memory of recent national heroes and victims, or 
after Croat cities in order to emphasise their affiliation with Croatia. For 
example, a street previously named ulica Jakova Baruha Španca, after a 
Spanish communist revolutionary, is today called ulica Žrtava komunizma 
(Victims of Communism Street). This policy of exclusion is supported by 
publicly remembering (within commemorations and through memorials) 
only the victims belonging to one’s own nation. In Mostar, new memori-
als and commemorations are dedicated to victims of either Bosniaks or 
Croats. Any ceremony commemorating atrocities committed during the 
war in the 1990s in Mostar is sure to draw plenty of media attention. 
Even if the number of direct participants is small, the evening news and 
local newspapers ensure that a good part of the population does not ‘for-
get’. However, even in those places where the dominant discourses are so 
obviously prescribed, we cannot simply assume that these memorials and 
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street names tell us much about the historical consciousness of the people 
who encounter them every day (Palmberger 2017). Instead, they first and 
foremost express the voices of those who claim to speak for the nation.
In the introduction to the volume The Art of Forgetting one of the edi-
tors suggests: ‘We cannot take it for granted that artefacts act as the agents 
of collective memory, nor can they be relied upon to prolong it’ (Forty 
1999: 7). Memorials and commemoration sites need people to note and 
read them, which means first of all people have to take notice of them. In 
Fig. 1.1 Hrvatski Dom at Rondo. Photo by the author
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the case of the renamed streets in Croat-dominated West Mostar, people 
have not (yet) switched to using the new names, but rather refer to the 
streets by their old names. I also noticed a discrepancy between the pre-
scribed meaning (by the ruling elites) and the people’s interpretations and 
‘reading’ of war memorials; the latter often significantly differed from the 
former (see Kansteiner 2002).
Another ‘identity marker’, though not visible in the cityscape, is lan-
guage. But the languages on the Bosniak-dominated east side and the Croat-
dominated west side of Mostar are only minimally distinguishable and one 
often has to listen carefully to conversations in order to grasp ‘typical’ Croat 
or ‘typical’ Bosniak words. Still, language is an important identity marker, 
particularly for Croats. Most Croats in Mostar refer to their language as 
Croatian (in contrast to Bosnian, Serbian or Serbo- Croatian). The distinc-
tive Croat language also serves as a central argument for a separate education 
system. The Croat-dominated university in Mostar is referred to as the only 
Fig. 1.2 Ulica fra Didaka Buntića is a new street name, named after a Catholic 
priest born in 1871. The old street name (in the sign below) was dedicated to 
Matija Gubec, a Croat farmer who was a leader of a farmers’ uprising in the 
sixteenth century. During WWII his name was associated with the socialist 
Yugoslav Partisans and a Croat and a Slovene Partisan brigade were named 
after Gubec. Photo by the author
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Croat university in BiH, since it is the only university in BiH where students 
are taught in Croatian (see Chap. 3). Bosniaks speak of their language as 
‘Bosnian’, while Croats often refer to it as ‘Bosniak’ (bošnjački), claiming 
that no shared Bosnian language exists. But many Croats also do not believe 
that the Bosniaks possess their own language. As we will learn in the next 
chapter, the language issue plays a central role in the division of Mostar’s 
education system. The division of education along national lines institu-
tionalises the division of Mostar into a Bosniak east and a Croat west side.
As shown above, a physical border no longer exists, but the Bulevar 
(the main street before the war and frontline during the war) persists 
as an ‘imagined’ border dividing the people of Mostar, as the major-
ity of them have little if any contact with those on the ‘other side’ in 
their everyday life (Hromadžić 2015; Palmberger 2013b). While Mostar’s 
‘border’ is not a physical, it is a border created by economic, political 
and cultural forces and manifested in everyday social practices (Aure 
2011: 173).19 ‘Interpreted along these lines, a border is not so much 
an object or a material artefact as a belief, an imagination that creates 
and shapes a world, a social reality’ (Houtum et al. 2005: 3). Houtum 
et al. with the notion of ‘b/ordering’ remind us that practices of border 
making are also practices of order making. Moreover, a border is likely 
to have two meanings. It may be interpreted as an obstacle to be over-
come for some, while for others it may be associated with protection 
and safety. In Mostar’s post-war setting, it is important to acknowledge 
the manifold experiences and interpretations of this b/order. While for 
part of the population a border between Bosniak- and Croat-dominated 
Mostar is welcomed as a protection of national ‘rights’, for others such 
a border is an obstacle to regaining a normal life (normalan život) (see 
Greenberg 2011; Jansen 2015; Palmberger 2013a, b; Spasić 2012; see 
also Chap. 2 this volume).
For me, as a foreigner living in BiH for three years, the ‘border’ between 
the Bosniak and Croat parts of the city as well as the war were ever present. 
Simply in walking through Mostar, I was reminded every day of the war by 
19 B/ordering practices in Mostar can also be found in everyday bureaucratic procedures, as Vetters 
(2009) vividly describes for the case of residence registration in Mostar.
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the high number of ruins. This included my immediate surroundings. Just 
at the doorstep to the house containing our first flat, a dud grenade was 
stuck in the ground, another stark reminder of the recent war. As I learned 
from the Croat landlords of our second flat, the building had a turbulent 
history. Built in the 1980s, the house was severely damaged during the war. 
Still, many people (presumably Bosniaks) from the neighbourhood sought 
shelter there during the war since it had a well-protected cellar. But the 
house had also served as a lockup for prisoners of war and as a temporary 
school where a small group of children were taught.
Another daily reminder of the legacy of the war was the fact that every-
one I got to know seemed to be interested in which side I was loyal to. 
Even spontaneous conversations on the street, at gallery openings, in the 
playground and so on all tended to end with people directly or indirectly 
questioning me about which side of the city I lived on. In addition, reli-
gious holidays—which I had always experienced as a private rather than a 
political matter—for the first time in my life seemed politically charged. 
I realised this, for example, when I bought a Christmas tree, which, of 
course, had to be purchased on the Catholic west side, and then carried 
to our flat, which was located in immediate proxmity to the border, but 
already on the east side. The Christmas tree in my hand felt like a political 
statement. I felt similarly exposed when reading what were considered to 
be newspapers of the ‘others’ in public, or when using an expression that is 
today regarded as one of the other side’s. For example, when ordering coffee 
on the east side it is common to say kafa for coffee, while on the west side it 
is kava; in the bakery people are now expected to use hljeb for bread on the 
east side, while on the west side one expects to hear kruh. Although most 
people I met pretended to ignore such subtleties, especially due to my sta-
tus as a foreigner, I was also corrected several times (particularly by Croats) 
when I was too slow to switch from one side’s terminology to the other.
 Notes on Methods
The research on which this book is grounded was conducted in Mostar 
between October 2005 and August 2008, with additional return visits in 
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Map 1.3 Map of Mostar showing the former frontline and some ‘field sites’. 
Map by Alexei Matveev. Map data © OpenStreetMap contributors
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2010 and in 2014.20 Despite the fact that its population numbers around 
111,000,21 Mostar has a town-like character (Map 1.3). Cernica—the 
part of Mostar where I lived together with my family, and one of the old-
est residential areas—was especially known for its village-like character 
and the prevalence of gossip. Although I did not choose the location for 
this reason—but rather because it was centrally located and directly on 
the border between East and West Mostar—I certainly benefited from the 
neighbourhood’s character. It did not take long before many of Cernica’s 
residents knew me, including neighbours but also shopkeepers and bar 
and café owners. The flip side of this, however, was that as in any small 
neighbourhood people I had never spoken to knew a fair bit about me 
and my family. Our flat in Cernica soon became an ‘open house’. From 
the beginning the childminder of our twin sons came every working day 
and my language teacher came on a regular basis, as did our childminder’s 
friends and family members as well as friends we made during our stay.
The long period of my fieldwork of three years enabled me to establish 
long-term relationships with many of my interlocutors. Moreover, I had the 
privilege to join commemoration ceremonies over a period of three years. 
In the second year I moved to Sarajevo with my family, but kept the apart-
ment in Mostar and was able to spend sufficient time there. Although after 
the first year in Mostar I had established stable relationships and friend-
ships, something rather unexpected took place when I moved to Sarajevo. 
These relationships did not weaken. On the contrary, they became stron-
ger. My friends in Mostar showed interest in staying in touch with me and 
I received regular phone calls, text messages and emails. Each time we met 
again back in Mostar (or in Sarajevo) our relationships became more inti-
mate since we could already reflect on a ‘shared past’ (Fabian 2007: 133).
During my fieldwork I utilised a mixture of qualitative methods, 
including participant observation, semi-structured narrative interviews, 
informal conversations and memory-guided city tours. The most com-
mon denominator running through my diverse research methods is 
‘listening to narratives’. Narratives were told to me in informal/private 
20 During my visit in 2014 I witnessed some of the protests that were staged in parallel to citizen 
plenums, demanding social justice in BiH. Although I conducted interviews with the protestors in 
Mostar, these findings could not be included in this book.
21 In 2007, the Federalni Zavod za Statistiku estimated the population of Mostar to be 111,198.
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and formal/public settings, for example, at universities or at commemo-
rations as well as during interviews and informal conversations, some-
times during a city stroll or while looking at photos and other artefacts. 
Public events such as book presentations and discussion rounds plus 
media representations are also included in the analysis. The focus is thus 
on oral (and to a lesser extent written) narratives.
I took ‘listening’ as a research method very seriously, and during the 
first months of my fieldwork I did not conduct formal interviews but 
decided to first see what material came from my interlocutors. Only at a 
later stage (if at all) did I ask about the ‘missing parts’ in their narratives. 
This was a highly sensitive endeavour in which I always had to keep in 
mind not to push too hard when my interlocutors signalled that they 
were reluctant to elaborate on a certain topic.
These initial unstructured conversations with a loose agenda helped me 
to identify silences, the periods or events my interlocutors opted to leave 
out in their narratives. Though most authors agree that memory cannot be 
studied without its counterpart forgetting, few studies explicitly deal with 
forgetting, gaps and silences. Dealing with gaps and silences confronts the 
researcher with methodological difficulties. It is not only hard to interpret 
silences but even harder to locate them. Passerini quite rightly asks: ‘How 
can we find traces of forgetting and silence since they are not themselves 
observable? We know that certain silences are observable only when they 
are broken or interrupted, but we want nonetheless to find them’ (Passerini 
2003: 239; see also Connerton 2008; Fabian 2007). It is true that the abil-
ity of researchers to identify and interpret silences is restricted, but long-
term fieldwork is a way of meeting this methodological challenge since 
relationships of trust often are achieved only after months or even years.
Although I tried to avoid leading conversations along a clearly defined 
agenda, my interlocutors sometimes pursued such an agenda themselves. 
In such cases, their narratives were ready-made and presumably had been 
told several times before. I gained the impression that during their narra-
tion they were not so much remembering the event they were telling me 
about, but rather the last occasion they had told the story (see Bloch 1998). 
In such encounters my interlocutors clearly had an interest in sharing the 
‘truth about the past’ and these discourses were hard to ignore. But nar-
rative abilities are not equally distributed, so it was particularly important 
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for me to listen carefully to those who were less articulate and often also 
less involved in political life (see Bourdieu 1999). This was in accordance 
with my aim of eliciting the views of ordinary people rather than just the 
opinion-formers in the community. Throughout my field research, I acted 
on the assumption that my interlocutors’ narratives would show which 
events were crucial in their lives and how they position themselves in rela-
tion to them (see Misztal 2003). Therefore, I first collected the narratives 
and only during the process of analysis did I identify the three generations 
and their particular differences (see Palmberger and Gingrich 2013).
One approach that proved invaluable for engaging interlocutors in a 
rather unstructured reflection on personal and local history was to ask them 
for memory-guided city tours. I left it to the person guiding me through 
the city to decide which places to visit. Often, the city tour was a stroll 
around Mostar where my ‘guides’ showed me places that they regarded as 
important. The sites were chosen either because of their national heritage 
value (e.g., the Old Bazaar, mosques or churches) or else because they pos-
sessed autobiographical meaning for my guides (e.g., schools, residential 
houses or other places with which they share a special history). Sometimes 
the sites shown to me were presented as important because of both, that 
is, valuable or meaningful for their national and personal autobiographical 
past, such as the Old Bridge.
Every tour through Mostar I was taken on was different in character, not 
only because of the different tour guides but also because of the different 
contexts within which the tours took place. Sometimes I explicitly asked 
Mostarians to show me around ‘their city’, and it was only they and I who 
strolled around Mostar. At other times when I had foreign visitors I used 
the opportunity to ask a local friend to show us around Mostar. Depending 
on whether we were only a small group of friends or a big group of foreign 
students, the tours had a more informal or formal character. Rather than 
using memory-guided city tours as a standardised method, I saw them as 
opportunities to hear Mostarians reflect on the history of their city and of 
their lives closely interwoven with it. The act of comparing post-war Mostar 
with pre-war Mostar was inherent in every tour I was given, with the excep-
tion of the tours given by my youngest interlocutors (see Chap. 6). The 
sites visited often reflected Mostar’s and my guides’ histories, ruptured due 
to the war. Sites were often destroyed, rebuilt or replaced, or at least their 
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meaning had changed during the course of the far-reaching changes expe-
rienced by Mostar’s society.
Two criteria were particularly important to me when choosing my meth-
ods and field sites (Map 1.3). Firstly, I aimed to find sites that would give 
me access to people of different ages, genders and national backgrounds. 
Since the great majority of Mostar’s inhabitants declare themselves to be 
either Bosniaks or Croats, almost all of my interlocutors belonged to one 
of these two groups; therefore I decided to focus first and foremost on 
them. However, some of my interlocutors did have Serb backgrounds, 
came from mixed marriages or declared themselves to be Yugoslavs. 
Secondly, I searched for field sites that would allow me to explore public 
memory discourses as well as individual narratives of the past.
During my entire field stay, but predominantly in my first year of 
fieldwork, I attended numerous commemoration events, reburials, anni-
versaries, demonstrations, relevant round tables and book presentations. 
Commemorations were attributed either to the victims and heroes of WWII 
or of the war in the 1990s and—to a lesser extent—to prominent local art-
ists. Since the annual calendar in Mostar is full of such commemorations, 
which are open to the public, these were good entry points for my research. 
At these events I learned more about public memory discourses and had 
the opportunity to talk to both the participants and the event organisers. 
Even if I also paid attention to ritual aspects of these ceremonies, they were 
not central to the focus of this research. Rather than simply assuming that 
commemorations are the prime means for maintaining and transferring col-
lective identity, I investigate these events in order to outline the wider social 
context in which they are embedded (see Vertovec and Rogers 1995).
All the people presented in this book are real, although I have changed 
names, places and other personal details where necessary in order to grant 
anonymity. Most of the interviews were conducted in the local language, 
and the interview citations presented in this book are English translations. 
If an interview was conducted in English, I indicate in a footnote that the 
citation is the original. All interviews (and other cited recordings) are in my 
possession. In this book, I can only present a small number of narratives 
that were shared with me; this is also the case for the commemorations I 
attended. Furthermore, it should also be said that none of the individuals 
discussed represents their generation or their nation as such; however, their 
individual narratives provide an opening through which we can explore the 
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central themes of the book. In the choice of individual narratives to present 
in this book I aimed to give voice to individuals of Bosniak as well as Croat 
national backgrounds as well as to those who do not identify as either/or.
 Structure of the Book
This book is organised around five chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 2 
provides a historical contextualisation of the field by providing the most 
important benchmarking data about the periods of which people I talked 
to have personal memories. Moreover, different ‘memory politics’ they have 
been exposed to during their lifetimes (from WWII to the present day) are 
discussed. In Chap. 3, the historical contextualisation is followed by ethno-
graphic data, based primarily on material gathered at the two universities 
in Mostar. By presenting this ethnographic data I reveal key representations 
found in the dominant Bosniak as well as Croat public history discourses. 
I pay particular attention to the historians’ discursive strategies in order to 
nationalise, legitimise and objectify the respective historiographies.
In Chaps. 4–6, the centrepiece of the book, each of the three genera-
tions identified is discussed. Not only are the particular features of each 
generation carved out but also each chapter tackles some theoretical issues, 
which are subsequently discussed. The analysis of the three generations 
starts in Chap. 4 with the First Yugoslavs. The First Yugoslavs, the oldest 
generation identified, form the generation that still has personal memories 
of WWII. Some experienced the war as children, some as young adults. 
The experience of WWII in this early stage of life was crucial and serves 
as an interpretative template for their later experiences, in particular for 
the war in the 1990s. Not only WWII but also the founding years of 
Yugoslavia were formative for this generation—a generation that to a great 
degree to this day remains loyal to Tito. The First Yugoslavs are, moreover, 
in a stage of life that allows them to delve most freely into the past and 
cherish memories shared with others of the same generation.
Although the recent war has certainly been experienced as a disruption 
in the lives of the First Yugoslavs, it is not the central reference point but 
rather is incorporated into a wider narrative, often a narrative of suffering. 
However, the recent war was not only linked to WWII in this narrative of 
suffering but WWII was also taken as an interpretative template to explain 
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the war in the 1990s. Thus, linking recent experiences to those early in 
their lives is a central discursive tactic employed in the narratives of the old-
est generation. In the second part of the chapter, the discussion moves from 
an individual/personal to a more collective/public level. Based on observa-
tions at a Partisan commemoration ceremony, I analyse how members of 
the First Yugoslav generation engage in keeping the memory of the Partisan 
fight alive even while it loses its once supra- ethnic character. The chapter 
ends with a discussion of WWII as an interpretative template and its uses 
in personal meaning making by the First Yugoslav generation as well as a 
political tool to strengthen the dominant Bosniak national discourse.
While the First Yugoslavs find themselves in a life situation which to a 
certain degree allows them to retreat into the past, the Last Yugoslavs, dis-
cussed in Chap. 5, are, so to say, in mid-life and the war in the 1990s for 
many of this generation changed their expected life course dramatically. 
The youngest of them were in their late teens when the war broke out, 
while the oldest had already established their own households. The Last 
Yugoslavs have no personal memories of WWII and few, if any, memo-
ries of the first years of Tito’s Yugoslavia. Social security and economic 
 well- being are central to their experience of Yugoslavia. As shown in the 
book, the lives of the Last Yugoslavs were shaken most by the rupture of 
the war in the 1990s and the end of socialist Yugoslavia.
Due to the life situations they find themselves in, the particular chal-
lenge for the Last Yugoslavs is to re-orient themselves in the new post-war 
socio-political context. The need to (re-)orient themselves after the war is 
most urgent and immediate for the Last Yugoslavs as they find themselves 
in the middle of their lives (including their working and family lives). 
The war not only took away their homes but also their future prospects. 
The discursive tactics of the Last Yugoslavs are characterised by oscillation 
between different discourses—old and new—and this generation strug-
gles to narrate their lives and the history of their society in a meaning-
ful and coherent way. Many of the Last Yugoslavs have incorporated key 
elements of the dominant public discourses into their narratives but at 
the same time maintain nostalgia for Yugoslav times. The main strands of 
discussion in Chap. 5 centre on the notion of nostalgia, the experience of 
loss of home and the subsequent difficulties in telling a coherent narrative.
In Chap. 6, I turn my attention to the youngest generation, the Post- 
Yugoslavs, who experienced the war in the 1990s as children. They have 
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either very few or no personal memories of Yugoslavia, and their mem-
ories are primarily located in the context of their families. The older 
generations perceive the Post-Yugoslavs as a generation that is spoilt 
by nationalist propaganda and one lacking the experience of pre-war 
Mostar (particularly the experience of good neighbourliness among the 
different national groups). Meanwhile, the Post-Yugoslavs present their 
relatively young age as a ‘shield’ that has protected them from bad expe-
riences. Due to their young age at the time of the war, the Post-Yugoslavs 
claim a neutral position for themselves. They argue that they are less 
affected by the negative feelings caused by war, such as hate and distrust 
towards the ‘other’. Thereby their discursive tactics are characterised by 
dissociating their lives from the wider societal (national) experiences 
concerning the war.
A vital discussion in Chap. 6 centres on the counterpart of remember-
ing: silencing. The Post-Yugoslav generation’s discursive tactics serve to 
silence the effect of the war on their lives. As such, the Post-Yugoslavs 
do not subordinate their lives to the wider narratives of victimisation 
and suffering of their respective nations so prominent in the dominant 
public discourses and in narratives of the two older generations. It is sug-
gested that they do so for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is a way to dis-
tance their lives from those of their parents and older family members, 
not least to maintain hope for their city to which their future is closely 
connected. Secondly, their silence can also be interpreted as a sign that 
this generation has not yet formed its own narrative of the recent past.
Although the Post-Yugoslavs do not indulge fully in the dominant 
public discourses when it comes to their lives, they have to a large degree 
accepted the national division as primordial, as is presently promoted 
within the school curriculum. The chapter includes a discussion about 
the way the Post-Yugoslavs give meaning to the experiences of the older 
generations and analyses processes of transmission of (collective) memory.
In the Conclusion, the central arguments of the book are summarised 
and conclusions are drawn from the analysis of the material presented 
and set in relation to relevant research in other regional and socio- historic 
contexts. Moreover, I point to areas of future research that could be 
explored in order to further develop theories on memory and genera-
tion, including the concept of ‘generational positioning’ developed in 
this book.
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Fragments of Communicative Memory: 
World War II, Tito and the 1992–95 War
Depending on their age, Mostarians have been exposed to different 
nationality politics, often in conflict with one another. We should not, 
however, imagine nationality politics as a top-down process whereby 
citizens are pictured as empty containers who passively accept these 
politics wholesale. This view has often directed the analysis of transient 
regimes, as Keith Brown points out:
Yet in a region of transient regimes, what is emphasised about the inhabit-
ants is their supposed willingness to adopt another national affiliation 
quickly. In parallel fashion, the new state is presumed to be ready and able 
to accept them as tabulae rasae and to inscribe national identity on them 
anew. […] What one might term ‘experienced’ history drops out of sight as 
the rhythm of every aspect of life is taken to be determined by the continu-
ities or disjunctures in ‘top-down’ history. (Brown 2003: 129)
This book counters such representations by demonstrating that individu-
als are shaped by the experiences of the different historico-political periods 
through which they lived. These experiences may show continuities and 
discontinuities and may agree or conflict with each other, but they have an 
impact on people’s perceptions of their society and their past.
In discussing the historical periods that can still be encountered in com-
municative memory (Assmann and Czaplicka 1995), this chapter shows 
how politically turbulent recent Yugoslav history has been. It provides 
insights into the historico-political periods Mostarians (depending on their 
ages, of course) have lived through and, more importantly, it discusses 
changing memory and identity politics individuals of different generations 
were exposed to as well as different forms of neighbourliness (komšiluk).
 World War II in the Territory of Present-Day 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Fighting within the territory of Yugoslavia during WWII—from the Nazi 
occupation of Yugoslavia in 1941 to their defeat in 1945—was extremely 
complex, especially when accounting for the various forces and oscillat-
ing alliances:
The history of the Second World War in Yugoslavia is the story of many 
wars piled one on top of another. First, of course, there was the initial war 
conducted by Germany and Italy against Yugoslavia itself. […] There was 
also the war of the Axis occupiers against Yugoslav resistance. […] And 
then there were at least two civil wars. One was a war conducted by 
Croatian extremists [Ustasha] against the Serb population of Croatia and 
Bosnia, a war of aggression on one side and sometimes indiscriminate retal-
iation on the other. And finally there was a war between the two main 
resistance organizations in which the Serbs from those areas enlisted: the 
Četniks and the Communist Partisans. (Malcolm 2002: 174)
The three key players—Chetniks (Četnici), Ustashe (Ustaše) and the 
Partisans (Partizani)—cannot be clearly distinguished along national 
lines, even if Serbs were predominant among the Chetniks and Croats 
predominant among the Ustashe. People of other nationalities joined 
them, though in far smaller numbers.
Germany defeated the Kingdom of Yugoslavia within 11  days,1 
a  campaign that exemplified the concept of blitzkrieg. Even before 
1 For a detailed discussion about the interwar period, see Lampe 1996.
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Yugoslavia surrendered, the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna 
Država Hrvatska, NDH)—a quasi-puppet state—had been established 
with the support of Germany and Italy in April 1941.2 The centre of the 
NDH, led by Ante Pavelić, was in Zagreb but the NDH also incorpo-
rated the whole of BiH, whereby Mostar came under Italian rule. Most 
Croats accepted the new regime and many saw it as liberation from Serb 
hegemony. Ante Pavelić became the declared Fuehrer of NDH and his 
Ustasha organisation started to ‘cleanse’ the territory of any non-Croats, 
mainly Serbs and Jews, since Muslims were perceived as quasi-Croats. 
The NDH’s population included 51 % Croats; among the remaining half 
30 % were Serbs and 12 % Muslims. In the territory of BiH, by contrast, 
the population was predominantly Serb and Muslim. But here, too, the 
NDH directed its aggressive activities against the Serb rather than the 
Muslim population. The Croat claim that the Muslims were of Croat 
and Catholic or Bougumil origin was countered by the Serb claim that 
the Muslim population was in fact Serb. These claims were significant 
because incorporating Bosniaks into the Serb or Croat nation had been 
practised since the mid-19th century by both Croats and Serbs in order 
to claim the territory of BiH, a practice that was to continue into the 
post-WWII period.
NDH terror against Serbs began soon after the German occupation. 
In June 1941 a mass arrest of Serbs occurred in Mostar; hundreds were 
shot and their bodies thrown into the Neretva River. ‘Anti-semitism was 
of only secondary concern to Ustaša ideologists. The main aim was to 
“solve” the problem of the large Serb minority (1.9 million out of a total 
of 6.3 million) in the territory of the NDH’ (Malcolm 2002: 176). The 
Ustasha set Croats apart from the Slav population by proclaiming them-
selves as ‘pure Aryans’ of Gothic or Persian descent. Most Serb men able 
to fight joined either the Chetnik led by Draža Mihajlović or the Partisan 
2 The Ustasha movement was almost unknown to the population before the war and in the begin-
ning found little support among the majority of Croats but received strong support from the local 
Catholic Church. When the NDH merged into BiH, it attempted ‘to eliminate from its territory 
the communists (of all ethnic backgrounds), Serbs who refused to convert into “Orthodox Croats”, 
the Jews, and the Gypsies (Roma)’ (Perica 2002: 24; see also Carmichael 2002). Muslims were not 
seen as a separate nation but were called ‘Muslim Croats’ (see Perica 2002: 22). On the church’s 
support for the NDH, see Jäger 2001. Cohen and Riesman (1996) provide insight into the gener-
ally unknown collaboration of Serbs in the destruction of the Jews.
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movement led by Josip Broz Tito to fight the Ustasha. The Chetnik reac-
tion against the Ustasha was particularly brutal in Herzegovina, where 
they killed Croat and Muslim villagers whose acquiescence in NDH rule 
they regarded as collaboration. There were also Serb fascist tendencies 
towards a ‘homogeneous Serbia’ including Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
other parts of Yugoslavia and directed primarily against Jews, but also 
Croats and Muslims (Velikonja 2003: 165).3
Although the majority of Muslims were opposed or at least indiffer-
ent to the Pavelić regime, some of the Muslim population supported it, 
particularly those who had been strongly pro-Croat during the interwar 
period (Tomasevich 2001: 491). A sizable number of Muslims joined 
Ustasha militia units and helped perpetrate atrocities against the Serb 
population. Gradually, however, more and more Muslims openly opposed 
the Ustasha regime and spoke out against the persecution of innocent 
Serb clergy and civilians. There were also those who joined the Partisans, 
thereby revolting against the Ustasha. This was also the case in Mostar 
(see Tomasevich 2001; Wilson 1979). The communist Partisans fought 
both against the Chetniks, who aimed for a rebirth of a Serb-dominated 
Yugoslav monarchy, and against the Ustashe, who were allies of Germany 
(see Pavkovic 1997; Schmider 2002; Schöpflin 1993).
At the beginning of WWII, the Partisans, who were fighting for a socialist 
Yugoslavia, fought independently and only later aligned with the Allies. At 
the first session of the National Antifascist Council of National Liberation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ZAVNOBiH—Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće 
narodnog oslobodjenja Bosne i Hercegovine) on 25 November 1943  in 
Jajce, the wartime Partisan parliament voted for a new Yugoslavia. It envi-
sioned this new Yugoslavia as a federation of six republics and two provinces. 
The future BiH was defined as one of the six republics of the three equal 
nations: Muslims, Croats and Serbs (Bougarel 1996: 92).
The Konjic Battalion (renamed Mostar Battalion in June 1942) was 
formed in September 1941. Although Muslims were in the majority, it 
was a multinational unit and included Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Jews 
and others (see Hoare 2005). When Nenad Vasić took over the role of 
3 Out of the around 14,000 Jews living in BiH, about 12,000 were killed during WWII (Malcolm 
2002: 176).
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command in January 1942, the Mostar Battalion turned to the extreme 
left and Vasić proceeded to terrorise his own Partisans:
In practice, the ‘revolutionary’ terror of the Mostar Battalion tended to 
resemble the terror practised by its ‘reactionary’ enemies, the Chetniks and 
Ustashas. Thus, in the words of a contemporary Partisan report, the battal-
ion ‘had from the start an unjust attitude towards Croats. During the sei-
zure of Croat villages unjust liquidations were enacted and a whole series of 
other errors committed. Captured Croats were subject to torture and later 
executed. All those steps had as a result the exodus of the Croat population 
from the territory held by the Partisans’. (Hoare 2005: 230)
When Vasić was finally removed as commander at the end of September 
1942, the Mostar Battalion was incorporated into the 10th Hercegovinian 
Brigade. Hoare concludes that ‘(d)espite of the traumas experienced by the 
Partisans of the Mostar Battalion, they proved to be the most reliable in north-
ern Hercegovina as those from urban backgrounds were immune to Chetnik 
agitation’ (Hoare 2005: 233). The urban origin of Mostar’s Partisans is still 
visible in their commemorations that take place to this day (see Chap. 4).
During WWII, losses were experienced on all sides, but among Muslims 
they were particularly high (Tomasevich 2001). Muslims fought—and 
were killed—on all sides. Altogether around 75,000 Bosnian Muslims 
died in the war. This represented 8.1 % of their total population and was 
the highest loss suffered by any people in Yugoslavia except for the Jews 
and Gypsies (see Malcolm 2002; Schöpflin 1993). It is also important to 
note that generally more Yugoslavs were killed by other Yugoslavs than by 
the occupying forces (Allcock 2000: 270), surely a difficult legacy for the 
second Yugoslavia. Mostar, however, not only saw conflict and atrocities 
during WWII; it was also an important centre of resistance (Bose 2002).
 The Second Yugoslavia and Memory Politics 
Under Tito
After the fascist occupiers had been defeated (which, as far as Mostar is 
concerned, was on 14 February 1945), the second Yugoslavia under Tito 
was established. The newly established BiH constituted a republic with 
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its Austro-Hungarian borders reinstated.4 This was not appreciated by all 
former war parties, least of all by Croat and Serb extremists, who longed 
for a Great Croatia and Great Serbia, respectively, incorporating the terri-
tory of BiH. They both rested their claims on history and, as noted above, 
each argued that the Muslim population was originally Croat or Serb (see 
Banac 1993; Cohen 1995).
The Partisans who assumed power after WWII were best positioned to 
present themselves as the winners of the war since they claimed to have 
expelled the foreign occupiers and to also have defeated their internal 
enemies (Schöpflin 1993: 179). To Tito, however, it seemed too difficult 
(and too dangerous due to the risk of renewed tensions) to address the 
period other than by speaking of the Yugoslavs as fighting collectively 
against the Nazis (see Palmberger 2006).
Josip Broz Tito became the central figure of the second Yugoslavia and 
established a cult around himself that would persist for some years, even 
after his death. Tito was portrayed as a ‘creator and saviour’, a ‘peacemaker’ 
and a ‘defender of truth’ (Perica 2002: 103). Central to the Tito cult 
was the annual Titova štafeta (Tito’s Relay), later called Štafeta mladosti 
(Youth Relay), which took place annually on 25 May. It was a race through 
Yugoslavia for Tito’s birthday and was taken to be a symbol of brotherhood 
and unity and of a shared Yugoslav dream. Titova štafeta outlived Tito and 
continued to take place until 1987. One could even say that it has outlived 
Tito to the present day, at least in the memories of many people.
Many of my oldest informants narrated the post-WWII period as a time 
of new beginnings rather than of persisting tensions between the former 
warring parties. Perhaps these memories are linked to my interlocutors’ 
young age at the time; many were teenagers and remember the economic 
hardship of that time rather than the national tensions. But after WWII 
Mostar was not a divided city in the way it is today, and from this perspec-
tive the tensions may in retrospect seem negligible. Presumably it was also 
Tito’s strong grip on the politics of memory that prevented persisting ten-
sions from becoming a subject of discussion.
4 Already in 1580 the province of Bosnia was created under Ottoman rule. It included entire 
present BiH and some neighbouring parts of Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonica and Serbia (see 
Malcolm 2002).
56 How Generations Remember
Tito’s patriotic education was not based on a melting-pot metaphor 
but, quite the contrary, stressed the distinctiveness of the different nations 
(in the meaning of narod) living in the territory of Yugoslavia. However, 
brotherhood and unity was the concept chosen to prevent more conflict, 
which would hinder Yugoslavia from prospering (see Perica 2002). This 
ideol ogy was also promoted by artists, for example, by the popular rock 
band Bijelo Dugme from Sarajevo who in one of their popular songs sang 
‘There is a secret link, a secret link for all of us’. Bijelo Dugme, together with 
a number of other rock bands from that time, still triggers strong sentimen-
tal emotions among many of the Last Yugoslavs who associate these bands 
and their music with their youth and the spirit of Yugoslavia (see Chap. 5).
Tito’s self-created myth fell on fertile soil not only in Yugoslavia, but 
also outside of it. He was often credited with bringing peace and rec-
onciliation to the region. Thus Tito’s admirers closed their eyes to his 
aspirations for power and the war crimes committed under his orders 
at the end of WWII. Between 1945 and 1946, up to 250,000 people 
vanished through Tito’s detention camps, death marches and mass shoot-
ings. One event still remembered today (mainly by Croats) is the tragedy 
of Bleiburg (Radonic 2010). When the Partisans met the British troops 
in this Austrian town in April 1945, the British handed over more than 
18,000 captured members of various anti-Partisan forces (Slovene home 
guards, Ustasha soldiers as well as Serb and Muslim Chetniks) who had 
sought refuge in Allied-controlled Austria. Most of them were massacred 
when they reached Yugoslavia (Malcolm 2002: 193; see also Pavlowitch 
1992). These war crimes were one of the best-kept secrets and what hap-
pened in the years of 1945 and 1946 became taboo. The same was true 
for the internal wars fought during WWII:
As Communist rule entailed ideological control over the representation of 
the past, those horrifying events that would disrupt interethnic coopera-
tion were not to be mentioned, except in collective categories, all ‘victims 
of fascism’ on one side, and all ‘foreign occupiers and domestic traitors’ on 
the other side. (Denich 1994: 370)
The Yugoslav people were portrayed as brave communist Partisan fighters 
who defeated the evil fascists. This image of the heroic Yugoslavs was 
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excessively repeated in school books and in movies (e.g., in The Battle 
of Neretva) (see Jäger 2001). All this was an act of memory politics that 
attempted to stop any further antagonism between the national groups, 
and aimed (at least in the initial years of Tito’s rule) to create a single iden-
tity in a unified state through a single memory. Brotherhood and unity 
was the ideology upon which the Titoist state claimed to be founded. It 
was the leitmotif to encourage people to live peacefully together after the 
atrocities of WWII.
Tito’s period of rule can be divided into two parts: a repressive regime 
and a relatively liberal regime. Depending on their age, my interlocutors 
experienced Yugoslavia in very different ways. Only the First Yugoslavs 
lived through the entire period of Tito’s Yugoslavia and thus experienced 
Tito as a strict dictator and as a ‘generous state father’ who brought eco-
nomic prosperity and peace to the region. It might be assumed that those 
who experienced Tito’s first period of rule show a more ambivalent atti-
tude towards the former statesman, but this is not necessarily the case. 
Among the First Yugoslavs are also those who show the greatest, most 
undivided loyalty to Tito (discussed in Chap. 4).
Within the repressive phase fall the above-mentioned atrocities in 
Bleiburg in 1945, as well as the detention camps, the most infamous 
of them being Goli Otok. It was a phase of strong centralism from 
Belgrade. After breaking with Stalin in 1948, all those who were rightly 
or wrongly accused of being Stalin supporters faced jail or detention 
camps. These atrocities committed during Tito’s period of rule (together 
with other atrocities committed during WWII) only became a subject 
of public discussion after Tito’s death. However, the atrocities were 
primarily discussed from a nationalist vantage point, with the aim of 
supporting the claim for the victimisation of one’s group—Serb, Croat 
or Bosniak—rather than as a criticism of socialism under Tito in more 
general terms (see Allcock 2000; Bet-El 2002; Denich 1994; Gilbert 
2006; Hayden 1994; Price 2002).
The post-WWII period was also a time of economic reconstruction 
with rapid industrialisation. This was tackled by financial aid from the 
United Nations, and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia organised 
youth brigades who participated in the radne akcije (working projects). 
Moreover, in 1946 the Yugoslav government turned over agricultural 
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land to those who tilled it in order to reward the peasants who were 
the backbone of support for the Partisan liberation. Not surprisingly this 
reform was greatly opposed by the former land owners (Donia and Fine 
1994: 165–166).5
The first period of Yugoslavia ends in the mid-1960s with an economic 
reform (in 1965) and the fall of the head of the police apparatus, Aleksandar 
Ranković (in 1966) (Lovrenović 1999: 170). In BiH this change went 
hand in hand with a transfer of leading positions from the old Serb elite 
to the young generation consisting also of Muslims and Croats. Gradually, 
more and more power was given to the six republics. The idea of self-
management, first introduced during the 1950s, was one aspect of this 
power transfer. ‘Self-management was a theoretically inspired response to 
Marx’s complaint that workers in a capitalist society are alienated from the 
means of production’ (Donia and Fine 1994: 171). Self-management was 
intended to grant more power to workers at the factories and enterprises 
and to reduce the power of state central planners. The former was realised 
by gradually establishing workers’ councils, but the latter did not follow 
(Donia and Fine 1994: 171; see also Dyker 1990). The one-party state 
also remained during the second phase, with Tito as the president-for-
life of Yugoslavia.6 In the second phase, however, Yugoslavia distinguished 
itself from Soviet-style communism due to its relative freedom of move-
ment and opinion (see Allcock 2000). Furthermore, Tito’s initial attempts 
to marginalise religion were no longer dominant in the second phase of 
his rule (see Velikonja 2003; Wilson 1979).
Tito is still remembered fondly by many Mostarians through the 
generations as shown in this book. Although so-called Tito-nostalgia 
can be found in all Yugoslav successor states, BiH had an extraordinarily 
strong relationship with Tito: ‘In no republic was Tito’s stature greater 
than in Bosnia, home of the Partisan movement and of his most disciplined 
5 For a long time the Muslims were in possession of the great majority of land, certainly under the 
Ottoman Empire, but this continued even into the Habsburg Empire era. ‘As late as 1910, more 
than thirty years after the end of the Ottoman presence in Bosnia, 91.1 per cent of the landed 
proprietors having kmetovi (tenant farmers with feudal obligations) were Muslims, while 95.4 
per cent of the kmetovi were Orthodox or Catholic’ (Bougarel 1996: 88).
6 In the early 1970s an amendment to the constitution was made to ensure that Tito would be presi-
dent for life. Moreover, Tito was so determined not to lose power that he refused to select or sup-
port anyone from among those close to him to become his successor.
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and Orthodox Party organization’ (Donia and Fine 1994: 191). Those 
who might be called Yugo-nostalgists primarily remember Tito’s second 
period of rule (Palmberger 2008). Their discourses emphasise how dis-
tinct Yugoslavia was from all the other socialist countries. It is true that 
Yugoslavs had much more freedom (e.g., of opinion, travel and religion). 
However, it was somewhat disconcerting that my interlocutors did not 
see any parallels with other socialist experiences.
During my fieldwork I realised that there still are great gaps of know-
ledge in regard to the crimes Tito committed, especially among young 
and middle-aged Bosniaks. There are few people who reflect on Tito’s 
period of rule in a somewhat balanced way, taking note of the achievements 
of the former statesman as well as of the atrocities that were committed in 
his name. This phenomenon can be traced to the general lack of critical 
political and civic engagement with the socialist period compared to that 
which has taken place in other post-socialist countries, for example, in 
East Germany. Instead of a critical debate, nationalist propaganda pre-
vailed in the immediate Yugoslav post-socialist years. To this day such 
a critical engagement has not yet been initiated since the crimes com-
mitted during the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s overshadow the crimes 
committed during socialist Yugoslavia (Gilbert 2006; Hosić 2014).
Although life in Yugoslavia cannot be compared to life in the 
Soviet Union, there was nevertheless a noticeable lack of democratic 
rights:
This was also connected to the fact that ‘the people’, in the sense of demos 
or plebs and as political subjects, have lost political influence and meaning 
in the Yugoslav constitutional system, while the nations and nationalities 
have become the main political subjects. (Stanovčić 1988: 26)
Its nations enjoyed more equality of rights in Yugoslavia than in any other 
socialist country, but there was a tremendous lack of universal democratic 
rights of individuals, uncoupled from the nation (Tepavac 2000: 76–77). 
This was one result of Tito’s ‘nationality politics’ that gave more and more 
power to the republics. Cohen calls this new outlook of the 1960s ‘pluralist 
socialism’, a period when Tito realised that he could and should no longer 
treat intergroup conflicts as taboo (Cohen 1995: 29).
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During his rule, Tito had to juggle promoting brotherhood and unity 
and a shared Yugoslav identity7 (which he actively did only in the beginning) 
with giving in to national claims for more rights and autonomy in order 
to prevent revolution and secession. In the early 1960s leaders claimed 
more power at the level of the republics and increasingly rejected the 
concept of Yugoslav nationality. In the constitution of 1974, Tito finally 
awarded the republics more autonomy and power. With the constitu-
tional changes in the 1970s, Yugoslavia moved from a centralised federal 
system to a confederal system (Cohen 1995). During the last decades of 
socialist Yugoslavia, people were also increasingly encouraged to identify 
themselves with a particular nation. For official purposes, such as census, 
citizens were discouraged from declaring their nationality as Yugoslav, but 
were pressured to choose one of the offered national categories. Parents in 
mixed marriages were advised to choose one of their nationalities rather 
than the category ‘Yugoslav’ when registering their children’s births (see 
Denich 1993).
In order to counter the dominant nations (first and foremost the 
Serb and Croat), Tito promoted the national identity of smaller groups, 
including the Muslims. Before looking more closely at the rise of nation-
alism, let us first turn towards the question of the extent to which a supra- 
national Yugoslav identity was accepted.
 National Identities and Nationality Politics
In retrospect it is difficult to assess to what degree the citizens of 
Yugoslavia identified themselves as Yugoslavs. One source we can turn 
to in this  matter is census data. When analysing such data, however, we 
should bear in mind that they only give a limited picture as identity 
issues in reality are complex, and multiple identities are likely to coexist. 
It may be safe to assume that the identity chosen in a census is often the 
one that is most politically useful. Furthermore, in order to interpret the 
choices made, we have to take into consideration the options given by the 
census. In the case of the Bosniak nation this is particularly important 
7 For a historical discussion of the idea of Yugoslavism, see Crampton (1997), Djokić (2003) and 
Djordjevic (1992).
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as Bosniaks were not able to choose their own nationality in any census 
before 1971.8
At the beginning of the second Yugoslavia, Muslims chose the category 
‘Muslim undetermined’ (read: religious Muslim of undetermined national-
ity) in the census of 1948 or ‘Yugoslav undetermined’ in the census of 1953 
when the former option was no longer available.9 The census of 1961 gave 
Bosniaks the option to declare themselves as ‘Ethnic Muslim’. Finally, in 
the census of 1971, they could identify as Bosnian Muslim by nationality 
(see Donia and Fine 1994; Lovrenović 1999). This late recognition of the 
Bosniak nation is remembered by Bosniaks—even by Tito-nostalgists—as 
one of Tito’s greatest mistakes.
Starting from the assumption that group identities are situational and 
context-based, it is clear that census data, however precisely they are 
conducted, are never able to show the complexity of everyday identifica-
tion. For example, a Herzegovinian woman with a Bosniak background 
may have stressed her Herzegovinian identity when travelling in Bosnia, 
her Bosnian (-Herzegovinian) identity when travelling in other repub-
lics of Yugoslavia, and her Yugoslav identity when travelling outside of 
Yugoslavia. If asked at home about her identity she may have referred 
to herself as Muslim. When not asked directly she may have presented 
herself as a Muslim, a Herzegovinian, a Bosnian (-Herzegovinian) and a 
Yugoslav in more or less the same terms, because these identities did not 
exclude one another.
National identity among many Croat Herzegovinians was more 
pronounced than among Bosniaks. While Croats in Bosnia have felt a 
stronger connection to BiH than to Croatia, in Herzegovina—owing 
to its geographical proximity to Croatia—Croats had stronger ties with 
Croatia. I have met Croats as well as Bosniaks who identify themselves 
as Herzegovinians; but I also noticed that for the former this was more 
than just a regional identity. In other words, the regional identity is not in 
addition to that of being a citizen of BiH, but rather stands in opposition 
to it. In the cases of most of the several Croats I have met who stressed 
8 In February 1968 the Central Committee of the League of Communists of BiH decided to 
grant the Bosnian Muslims a nationality status recognised by the federal constitution (see Perica 
2002: 75).
9 In the early post-WWII censuses some Muslims also chose the census categories ‘Serb’ or ‘Croat’.
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this, the emphasis on their Herzegovinian identity felt like a political 
statement declaring that if the Croats of Herzegovina could not be part 
of Croatia they could at least distinguish themselves from Bosniak- 
dominated Bosnia (and perhaps in the future win a separate Croat 
entity). I experienced this position most strongly among Herzegovinian- 
Croat academics who, when I said Bosna (Bosnia) instead of Bosna i 
Hercegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina) for the sake of brevity, told me 
I always had to include Herzegovina because I would otherwise be mak-
ing a political statement (see Žepić 2006).
In regard to questions of identification it was interesting to learn not 
only about my interlocutors’ present identity but also about their pre- war 
identifications. Most told me that they have always identified themselves 
as ‘Bosniak’ or ‘Croat’. Apart from a few exceptions, only those who still 
declare themselves as Yugoslavs told me about their former Yugoslav 
identification.
The percentage of cross-national marriages is often taken as proof that 
Yugoslavia overcame national cleavages. However, these numbers are 
interpreted very differently by different scholars of the region. Nikolai 
Botev and Richard Wagner (1993), for example, try to deconstruct the 
popular notion that national intermarriages increased during the post- 
WWII socialist period. Their analysis is based on data from 1964 to 1988. 
It shows that mixed marriages were not as common as often assumed 
and constituted only 12 % of marriages in Yugoslavia. ‘The major find-
ing from examining the resultant homogamy parameters is that endoga-
mous, rather than exogamous, marriages remain the norm in Yugoslavia’ 
(Botev and Wagner 1993: n.p.). However, in urban areas in BiH, such 
as Mostar, mixed marriages were much more common and constituted 
around 30 % of all marriages. The difference between rural and urban 
places is most likely linked to a process of increasing individualism in the 
latter: ‘Interethnic marriages are justified in terms of individualism, and 
the idea of individual uniqueness contradicts ideologies of ethnic loy-
alty and tight ethnic incorporation’ (Eriksen 1998: 130). This important 
factor helps explain why in cities, such as Mostar and Sarajevo, cross- 
national marriages were more common than in rural BiH.
Moreover, we have to ask ourselves what the number of mixed marriages 
tells us. Is a low rate of such marriages necessarily a sign of a distance 
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between the ethnic/national groups? Tone Bringa analyses the generally rel-
atively low intermarriage rate in a somewhat more positive way. Although 
she agrees that (especially in rural areas) marriage within one’s national 
group was a way to maintain group distinction, she does not conclude 
that this means an absence of tolerance or a rejection of the other group 
(Bringa 1993, see also Lockwood 1975).10 Mostar has had an exceptional 
position in Yugoslavia, which is also reflected in its incredibly high cross-
national marriage rate. This does not mean, however, that cross-national 
marriages were the norm and that they were not contested (e.g., by older 
family members). But, in contrast to the present situation, they were 
socially more accepted during the post-WWII socialist period, at least in 
urban areas and were taken as proof that Tito’s ideology of Brotherhood 
and Unity bore fruit.
Returning to Tito’s nationality politics, it is significant that as early as 
the 1960s the LCY (League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Savez komu-
nista Jugoslavije) stopped actively promoting the idea of Yugoslavism 
(Donia and Fine 1994: 177–178). This change in policy could also be seen 
in the media. Even though there were initial efforts to build a federation- 
wide media crossing the borders of the respective republics—for example, 
the Yugoslavia-wide broadcast of the evening news Dnevnik each day in 
another republic—the majority of media outlets soon focused reporting 
and broadcasting on their own republic, resulting in the absence of a 
federation-wide media scene (Milošević 2000: 109). This phenomenon 
could also be observed in the case of radio programmes/stations and the 
print media (Allcock 2000: 293). Education, which together with the 
media is a central tool for creating a shared identity, was also organised on 
the level of republics. Since the republics were in control of the curricu-
lum, the teaching of separate histories began even before the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, albeit in a diluted way (see Sekulic et al. 1994).
It can be concluded that initial hopes for a Yugoslav identity did not 
materialise, not even in BiH. The resistance to forming a Yugoslav iden-
tity may be better understood in light of BiH’s history, where all institutions 
10 This argument can be substantiated by the fact that in a peaceful and stable country like 
Switzerland, interethnic marriages are also not common. We should also consider that villages in 
BiH were often dominated by Bosniaks or Croats or Serbs.
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below the state were strongly tied to national affiliation, thereby prevent-
ing the development of a sense of citizenship (Allcock 2000: 277). The 
Bosnian political order structured along communitarianism has a long 
history. It can also be observed in the development of political parties 
that ostensibly represent the people of BiH but have actually been domi-
nated by national factions since 1910 (Bougarel 1996: 87).
 Questions Around Coexistence (suživot) 
and Neighbourliness (komšiluk)
Ottoman society, with its millet system, was constituted around religious 
groups who enjoyed semi-autonomy and who were ruled by their own 
religious leaders (Babuna 2004: 288). But even if ‘communitarian’ identi-
ties had structured political life in BiH since the Ottoman Empire (Banac 
1993), what can we say about coexistence in everyday life? The quality 
of coexistence is much harder to measure than political agendas. Tone 
Bringa, who conducted research in a Bosnian village in the years before 
the recent war broke out, provides us with important observations that 
may help to explain the discrepancy. Bringa recognised that in social inter-
actions, personality rather than nationality mattered (Bringa 1995: 151). 
This does not mean that nationality did not matter in the social structure 
of the village, but that in face-to-face contact it was the personality of the 
interlocutor that counted in the end. According to this interpretation, 
communitarism is a strong component of local politics, but is not neces-
sarily reflected in everyday encounters among people of different national 
backgrounds. Hence, there is a discrepancy between practices in everyday 
life and those on the political level. I believe it is crucial to be aware of 
this tension between politics and everyday life in order to understand the 
complexity of national coexistence in BiH, pre- and post-war (although 
in the latter there is far less room for cross-national interaction).
A central discourse about people’s coexistence (suživot) is the concept 
of komšiluk (neighbourliness). If people speak about komšiluk when 
narrating the past, they are usually referring to the good pre-war neigh-
bourliness. Even if Sorabji (2008) rightly reminds us that the concept of 
komšiluk cannot be reduced to cross-ethno-national relations, in discourses 
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about the past it is usually referred to in this meaning. Komšiluk is then a 
way to express what was and what no longer is, and to emphasise today’s 
corrupt relations between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. Pre-war komšiluk 
is narrated as the art of being neighbourly regardless of national affiliation 
(although Roma are usually excluded in this discourse), meaning neigh-
bours who help each other out (for example, during illness) but who also 
celebrate festivities together and share daily practices, such as drinking 
coffee with one another (see Helms 2010; Stefansson 2010).
In post-war times, discourses on komšiluk often also centre on the 
urban–rural division (see Jansen 2005, see Chaps. 4 and 5). Aspects of 
komšiluk feature in narratives about the Yugoslav period among all three 
generations identified but are most prominent among the First Yugoslavs, 
whose narratives often centre on the decay of good neighbourliness and 
family life, as well as on the decay of urbanity in Mostar connected to the 
war (as a result of population change). But it is also a theme present in 
the narratives of the Post-Yugoslavs as well as the Last Yugoslavs. The 
latter are likely to follow a nostalgic discourse on komšiluk, even if they 
otherwise often draw strongly on a nationalist discourse.
Before more fully exploring how the past is narrated from the present 
position, it is important to attend to the exclusive nationalism that came 
to the forefront in the 1980s. In the following section, I briefly outline 
the national mobilisation of Croats and Bosniaks and discuss the role of 
clerics in this process. I first focus on the Croat national mobilisation 
before turning to that of the Bosniaks.
 National Mobilisation and Instrumentalisation 
of the Past
The first great expression of a Croat national mass movement took 
place between 1967 and 1972 during the so-called ‘Croatian Spring’. 
The movement’s central demands were for more civil rights for Croat citi-
zens and more decentralisation of the economy. Among Croats the belief 
was strong that Croatia would only reach Western Europe’s level of pros-
perity without the rest of Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1971 the protests 
and strikes reached their peak and Croatia was on the verge of revolution. 
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Tito threatened military intervention and jailed a large number of the 
movement’s leaders and activists. In the subsequent period, the Roman 
Catholic Church took over the ‘national agenda’. It started by reintroducing 
the cult of the Virgin Mary as the major national and religious symbol of 
Catholic Croatia: ‘[D]uring the Great Novena (1975−1984) the Croat epis-
copate carried out ethnic mobilization and religious awakening of Catholic 
Croats under the symbolic guidance of the Virgin Mary, referred to as the 
“Queen of the Croats”’ (Perica 2002: 109). In 1981, six children from the 
village of Medjugorje (Western Herzegovina) stated that they had encoun-
tered a Croatian-speaking Madonna. Only seven years after the miracle had 
taken place, around 10 million people from all over the world had gone on 
pilgrimage to Medjugorje (see Bax 1995; Perica 2002; Sells 1996).
Perica (2002: 110) argues that the apparitions of the Virgin Mary at 
Medjugorje have to be understood in the context of the struggle of the 
Catholic Church with communism, the anti-communist backlash after 
Tito’s death, and the deep economic crisis as well as the growing ethno- 
political tensions. The cult of the Virgin Mary and the mass pilgrim-
age to Medjugorje worsened the already tense relationship between the 
Catholic clergy and the Orthodox as well as Muslim representatives in 
BiH. The last two groups viewed the Medjugorje movement as a fall-back 
into Ustashism, not least because Medjugorje was the headquarters of the 
Ustasha during WWII (see Bax 1995).11
Unlike their Christian counterparts, the Muslim clerics did not estab-
lish themselves as the guardians of national identity to the same extent. 
‘In contrast to Serbian and Croatian Christian clergy, Muslim clerics 
(hodžas, imams) and ulema did not systematically worship medieval 
native rulers, native saints, shrines, territory, and ethnic myths’ (Perica 
2002: 74). The top Muslim leaders were all Partisan veterans, and the 
loyalty of the ulema to the LCY was strong. But at the end of the 1980s 
nationalist goals found support among some anti-communist Muslim 
clerics who sympathised with Alija Izetbegović’s religious nationalism. 
Increasing anti-Muslim sentiments made it easy for Izetbegović to pres-
ent himself as the only defender of the Bosnian Muslim nation.
11 To show their disapproval, but also to find another way to reach their nationalist goal, the Serbian 
Church started a year-long commemoration of the victims of WWII (see Perica 2002).
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Izetbegović had already been on the political scene in 1970 when he 
wrote the Islamic Declaration: A Program for the Islamization of Muslims 
and Muslim Peoples. In this declaration, he envisaged the Muslims of 
the world uniting to launch a religious and social revolution. Although 
not explicitly referring to Yugoslavia or BiH, the text was critiqued by 
Izetbegović’s opponents who thought they could identify, embedded in 
the text, the claim that the Muslims, once they reached a majority, should 
establish an Islamic State. In 1983, the communists in power in Sarajevo 
took action by starting a massive propaganda campaign and arresting 
many of Izetbegović’s sympathizers. Izetbegović himself was sentenced to 
14 years in prison (of which he served five years) because of his declara-
tion (Meier and Ramet 1999; see also Hoppe 1998; Velikonja 2003). 
When the communists lost their influence, Izetbegović founded the lead-
ing Bosniak nationalist party SDA (Stranka demokratska akcije, Party of 
Democratic Action) in 1990 (see Babuna 1996; Perica 2002).
So, throughout the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s, Muslim 
identity (but also the identity of Croats and Serbs) was intensely dis-
cussed. A theory of common descent and a consistent Bosniak history 
was promoted. At the same time, however, Bosnian intellectuals revived 
the historical category Bošnjak (Bosniak) to include all three categories. 
This idea never succeeded. ‘Since Serb and Croat national identifica-
tion had won the day in Bosnia, Bošnjak had lost its meaning as an 
inclusive term for Bosnians of all three confessions’ (Bringa 1995: 35). 
Bošnjak then became a synonym for Bosnian Muslim, in contrast to 
Croat and Serb. The reinventing of the term Bošnjak can also be seen 
as an attempt by Bosnian Muslims to establish a more obvious histori-
cal link to the state and territory of BiH. At the same time the term 
Bosanac (Bosnian) as a regional identity for many people lost its meaning 
(Bringa 1995).
When national discourses became increasingly antagonistic, leaders of 
both the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs loudly proclaimed that 
the Muslim population actually belonged to them (but they had merely 
converted to Islam, an argument already taken up earlier in history) and 
that they were only an ‘invented people’ (Bringa 1995; see also Ivanov 
1996). When tensions intensified in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
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Bosniaks were in an exceptional position since, unlike their Croat and 
Serb compatriots, their regional and national identities were more or 
less identical, given the fact that they did not have a ‘mother country’ 
(see Calic 1995a: 158). For this reason, Bringa (1995: 30) argues that the 
Bosniak identity was conceptualised differently than that of the Croats 
and the Serbs. Bringa states that the Bosniaks’ collective identity was 
based on a shared environment, cultural practices and common experi-
ences. In contrast, the collective identities of Croats and Serbs focused on 
shared blood and a myth of common origins.
In conclusion, we can say that a good number of clerics in BiH did 
act as carriers of the ‘national idea’, although the extent to which they 
became involved certainly differs and also changed over time. When 
nationalist politicians were not able to operate freely during Tito’s rule 
and in many cases even were jailed, the churches (and to some degree also 
the mosques) took over and presented themselves as the only institutions 
capable of defending national interests. In the end, representatives from 
all three main religions in BiH fuelled tensions and mistrust.
The political involvement of religious representatives continued after 
the war, particularly before elections. In the 2006 pre-election period, 
for example, the Catholic Cardinal Puljić openly sided with the leading 
Croat nationalist party HDZ (Hrvatske demokratska zajednica, Croat 
Democratic Union). He made a plea to the Croat people to make their 
voices heard and to give support to those who were the only ones self-
lessly defending the interests of the Croat people, alluding to the HDZ 
(Slobodna Bosna, 8 September 2006). In a similar way, the religious 
head of BiH’s Muslims, Reisu-l-ulema Mustafa ef Cerić made a plea to 
the Bosniak population to vote for the Bosniak nationalist party, which 
claimed to end the ‘apartheid’ in Mostar: ‘We can see the establishment 
of Muslim ghettos in Mostar. Schools are divided and Bosniak children 
have to attend lectures in the evening hours. Unfortunately, we face apart-
heid in Mostar’ (Danas, 13 July 2006). This speech by Cerić triggered a 
radicalisation of nationalist discourses on both sides and culminated in 
several violent acts that reinforced mistrust in Mostar. These incidents 
and the atmosphere of mistrust helped nationalist parties (of both sides) 
to gain votes.
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 War in Mostar and Its Aftermath
It is a widely shared view that the break-up of Yugoslavia was launched 
‘from above’ by an inductive nationalism rather than by a spontaneous 
process ‘from below’. ‘Its function was in all areas more or less two-fold: 
first to provide legitimacy to the old and new elites in their battle to 
maintain or obtain power, and second to replace old collectivism (com-
munism) with a new form of collectivism (national homogenization)’ 
(Pantic 2002: 78; see also Gagnon 2004; Gingrich 2002).
The fact that around 10,000 citizens participated in a peace march 
organised by the SDP (Socijaldemokratska partija, Social Democratic 
Party) in Mostar on 6 March 1992 shows that there was, at least ini-
tially, strong opposition to violence. As history showed, the conflict 
escalated the day after the peace march.12 For most of my interlocutors 
the war came to Mostar unexpectedly. At the time war broke out in 
Slovenia and Croatia, most people in BiH felt sure that their country 
would not be affected. Even when the war finally did break out in BiH, 
many of my interlocutors still believed that Mostar would show resis-
tance because it used to be the city known for its peaceful coexistence. 
This belief had serious consequences because families did not flee in 
time and children were not sent to safer places before the openly violent 
conflict soared.13
The following sections, focusing on Mostar’s war and the aftermath, 
show that the war was the most ‘efficient’ means to achieve clear national 
cleavages; warmongers created (rather than drew on) clear-cut national 
identities in Mostar as elsewhere in BiH.
12 At this point it has to be pointed out that there were also ‘positive stories’ of neighbours helping 
each other out during the war, also across nations. One honourable project conducted by the 
Research and Documentation Centre (RDC) in Sarajevo is to collect these ‘positive stories’ by 
conducting oral history interviews with witnesses. I would like to thank the RDC staff for the time 
they granted me at their centre and for providing me with two ‘positive stories’, among other mate-
rial, from Herzegovina, even if these interviews are not directly used in this book.
13 For detailed analyses of the outbreak of the war in BiH, see Allcock (2000), Calic (1995b), 
Cohen (1995), Gagnon (2004), Meier and Ramet (1999), Melčić (2007), Ramet (2002), 
Ramet and Adamovich (1995).
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 The Course of the War in Mostar
In contrast to analyses of the war that have attempted to explain the war 
fought on the territory of BiH between 1992 and 1995 as a single war, 
Bjelakovic and Strazzari (1999: 73) suggest we speak of a collection of 
local wars.14 When we look at post-war BiH from this perspective, it is 
not surprising to find a very diverse picture across different parts of the 
country. Owing to particular war experiences (including demographic 
changes of various kinds) different places in the country faced different 
post-war contexts.
When people in Mostar talk about the war, they most often speak about 
two wars. They refer to the war when Bosniaks and Croats fought as allies 
against the mainly Serb-dominated JNA (Jugoslovenska narodna armija, 
Yugoslav People’s Army) as the ‘first war’ and to the war that then broke 
out between the former allies as the ‘second war’. In the beginning of the 
war, the main military formations were the JNA and three types of Croat 
units: the HVO (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane, Croat Defence Council), the 
HOS (Hrvatske obrambene snage, Croat Defence Force) and the regular 
troops of the Croat Army. After numerous small- scale military conflicts, 
the first war started at the beginning of April 1992 between the Serb-
dominated JNA and SDS (Srpska demokratska stranka, Serb Democratic 
Party) troops on the one hand, and various Croat troops (HVO and HOS 
forces, including many Bosniaks among the latter)15 supported by poorly 
armed units of the Territorial Defence (TO, loyal to the Sarajevo govern-
ment) on the other hand. Because of the latter grouping’s military mar-
ginality, the JNA, HVO, HOS and SDS forces remained the main actors.
When the war started, all healthy men aged 18–60 were banned from 
leaving the city. Despite this ban and the fact that Mostar was besieged 
(to the west and south by Croat-dominated troops and to the north 
14 The following overview of the course of the war in Mostar relies greatly on the article ‘The Sack 
of Mostar, 1992–1994: The Politico-Military Connection’ by Bjelakovic and Strazzari (1999), 
which provides a more detailed and balanced picture than most other literature on the Mostar war 
I am aware of (often written by former soldiers of one of the military forces involved). However, 
the description of the war events provided here makes no claim to be complete. More research on 
the course of the war is still needed.
15 Many Bosniak conscripts and volunteers joined the HOS owing to the lack of any Bosniak mili-
tary alternative.
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and east by Serb-dominated troops) people continued to leave the city 
(Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999: 82). Owing to the lack of a unified com-
mand system for the different Croat-dominated forces and the TO, the 
JNA achieved control over most of the city. However, in May 1992 the 
HVO assumed full military power and the JNA began to withdraw from 
BiH, but left 80 % of its personnel and nearly all its military equipment 
to the new VRS (Vojska Republike Srpske, Army of the Serb Republic). 
During the months of withdrawal, most of the Serb population fled the 
town and settled in eastern Herzegovina in places such as Bileća, Trebinje, 
Gacko and Nevesinje, or fled to Serbia and Montenegro. Even though 
the VRS had withdrawn, it maintained control over the surrounding 
hills where it stationed its artillery (see Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999; 
Yarwood 1999).
As soon as the former enemy left the city, a power struggle began 
among the former allies (Bosniaks and Croats). With the sudden retreat 
of the Serb troops, rumours persisted that Serbs and Croats had agreed 
on a secret deal to divide BiH between them at the Geneva talks. Even 
before war between the former allies had begun, there were signs that 
HDZ BiH was already preparing for secession:
On 3 July 1992 the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna (HZ Herceg- 
Bosna) was proclaimed. Already in this founding document Mostar was 
listed as the capital of the community. With this the town, the population 
of which was only to some one third Croat, attained a paramount impor-
tance in the thinking of Bosnian Croat separatists. They claimed that both 
Serbs and Bosniacs had their own towns. Mostar was to be theirs. (Gosztonyi 
2003: 132)
In August 1992, Bosniak soldiers in the HOS units were disarmed and 
expelled or brought to detention camps. In this mutual climate of distrust 
and with the refusal of the HVO to enter into a joint command with the 
TO, the Bosniak-dominated Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH, 
Armija Bosne i Hercegovine) was formed.
The Croats claimed their right to a Croat (West) Mostar by argu-
ing that it was the only Croat city in BiH (Sarajevo being Bosniak and 
Banja Luka, Serb) and that if they lost it the Croat nation would not 
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be viable (see Yarwood 1999: 5). In order to mobilise Croats, an anti-
Muslim propaganda campaign was launched with the active participa-
tion of Mostar’s Croat TV station ‘HTV’. The Bosniaks were presented as 
betrayers, as in this statement by Mate Boban, president of Herceg-Bosna 
and leader of the HVO:
It is simply incomprehensible and difficult to understand that those who 
have survived thanks to the Croatian people and the Croatian units […] 
those who have gained their strength their breath of life, thanks to 
Croats—have now turned against the Croats. (Mate Boban cited in 
Cohen 1995: 252)
Both this and similar statements fell on fertile soil after the military suc-
cess of the ABiH against the HVO during the autumn of 1993, when 
thousands of civilian Croats in central Bosnia were killed or forced to flee 
(Cohen 1995: 279).
According to Bjelakovic and Strazzari (1999) there are two factors that 
contributed to the ultimate military confrontation between Croat and 
Bosniak forces in May 1993. Firstly, the HVO changed its character from a 
military organisation to an administrative-political unit, which became the 
backbone of the proclaimed Herceg-Bosna. Mostar was the most impor-
tant city in BiH for the Croat goal to establish a mini Croat state—Herceg-
Bosna—within BiH, with future aspirations to annex it to Croatia proper. 
The second factor contributing to the escalation of the conflict was the 
prospect that BiH would eventually be divided along national lines follow-
ing the Vance-Owen plan which proposed the dividing of the country into 
several provinces (Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999: 85; see also Cohen 1995).
Until May 1993 the relationship between the Bosniak-dominated 
ABiH and the Croat-dominated HVO remained tense but relatively 
calm, even if at that time the two armies had started fighting regularly in 
Central Bosnia. But on 2 May 1993, the HVO imposed a blockade and 
snipers shot at people trying to cross from the Croat-dominated west part 
of the city to the Bosniak-dominated east part. Seven days later the HVO 
launched a full-scale attack on ABiH-held territories. The ABiH was 
seemingly not prepared for defence. Witnesses reported that the major-
ity of attackers were Croats from Croatia. This was seemingly confirmed 
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when the attackers became lost in the little streets of Old Town during 
the course of an attack they had themselves launched. But as Gosztonyi 
(2003) points out, and as I experienced during my stay in Mostar, there 
is also a Croat version of the outbreak of the Bosniak–Croat war. In this 
Croat version the ABiH launched a night offensive, which was only then 
answered by a Croat counter-offensive.
Even though the HVO became stuck in the city centre, it managed 
to completely encircle the Bosniak-held part of Mostar. The HVO used 
tactics similar to those of the VRS in Sarajevo (Gosztonyi 2003: 133), 
including the intensive use of sniper fire. Besieged, East Mostar was 
under bombardment by heavy artillery and inhabitants faced a lack of 
supplies of food, electricity, medicine and so on. Relief convoys did not 
get through to East Mostar, which in the preceding seven weeks had been 
cut off from any international presence and humanitarian aid. Thereafter 
the population of Mostar was supplied with food by relief convoys and 
by US aircraft, which dropped food over the besieged territory. This expe-
rience and the food that was provided still remains a central wartime 
memory for those who remained in Mostar during the war.
The siege also meant that the ABiH in Mostar was disconnected from 
other ABiH units in the country and from arms supplies. This resulted in 
the bizarre (but not uncommon) situation of Serbs in the surrounding hills 
selling their firearms to the ABiH. On the frontline—the Bulevar, which 
was perceived as no-man’s-land—Bosniak and Croat soldiers were separated 
only by a few metres. Across such a short distance, the fighters—some of 
them former schoolmates, neighbours or friends—were sometimes even 
able to recognise one another when firing from the other side. Throughout 
the 10 months of the Bosniak–Croat war, the frontline remained quite sta-
ble (see Bose 2002). The situation around the Bulevar is only one example 
of the immediacy of the war fought in BiH (see Sorabji 1995).
The Bosniak side had less heavy artillery and as a consequence was 
surrounded and suffered the highest number of casualties in Mostar. 
However, the ABiH launched several offensives against HVO positions. 
From Jablanica and Konjic it succeeded in pushing back the HVO in a 
southern and south-western direction. At the same time, operations were 
launched from Mostar by the ABiH Fourth Corps (Gosztonyi 2003: 139). 
Finally, Mate Boban was dismissed when his war against the Bosniak 
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population was no longer supported by the Croat leadership. He had to 
resign in February 1994. Shortly afterwards a ceasefire agreement was 
reached between the warring parties. This was achieved within sight of the 
Washington Agreement signed on 3 March 1994:
When the firing ended ten months later with the Washington Agreement 
(March 1994) establishing the Muslim-Croat Federation in BiH, Mostar 
was unrecognizable. The frontline had cut through the town centre, with 
Croat and Bosniac positions usually no more than twenty to thirty feet 
apart, often on two sides of the same street. (Bose 2002: 104)
Although peace had (officially) been achieved, the war had left a visible 
mark on the city and its people (CMMSM 2004).
 A City Left Divided
With the Dayton Peace Agreement, signed on 14 December 1995, the 
43-month-long war in BiH officially ended. From that day on, BiH became 
a shared state of the three constituent peoples—Bosniaks, Croats and 
Serbs—with Sarajevo as the remaining capital. But the country was split 
into two entities (and the special district of Brčko): the Serb Republic and 
the Federation of BiH with its 10 cantons. The Washington Agreement that 
established the Federation of BiH (which comprises 51 % of BiH’s terri-
tory as opposed to the Serb Republic constituting 49 %) foresaw Mostar as 
a united Bosniak–Croat city and as the capital of the Herzegovina-Neretva 
Canton (Canton 7). Together with the Central Bosnia Canton (Canton 6), 
both cantons were the only mixed Bosniak–Croat cantons. BiH became 
a decentralised state consisting of a complicated bureaucracy and an eco-
nomically untenable government with multiple layers of decision-making. 
The situation was further complicated by the far-reaching powers of the 
so-called ‘international community’16 (see Chandler 2000; Dzihic 2010). 
The Dayton Peace Agreement put into place an international peacekeep-
ing force to ensure security in the country and an international authority, 
the Office of the High Representative (OHR), to implement the civilian 
16 I use the term ‘international community’ in the manner that it is commonly used to refer to the 
various (military and civilian) international organisations active in BiH.
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dimension of the peace agreement. As will be discussed below, the OHR 
was a key player in post- war developments in Mostar.
During the war all 10 bridges in Mostar were destroyed by either the 
Serb or Croat forces, and only temporary structures were built for people 
to cross to the other riverbank. In the immediate post-war period, citi-
zens of both the eastern and the western parts were not allowed to cross 
freely between sides, and there was only one crossing point, which pro-
vided restricted access for women and children only. During this time, the 
eastern part still suffered from food, water and electricity shortages, and 
there were no jobs for people as most of the factories had been destroyed. 
Overall, the expulsion of non-Croats from West Mostar also continued 
(see ICG 2000). Until 1997, people were still being wounded and killed 
by grenades and expelled from their homes although the war was offi-
cially over. One such violent episode often remembered among Bosniaks 
is the fatal incident that took place on 10 February 2007 during Bajram 
festivities. A group of Bosniaks who visited a cemetery in West Mostar were 
attacked by the West Mostar police. One person (the husband of a woman 
I met at Otvoreno srce) died and several others were wounded.
The situation meant minority return remained a critical issue in Mostar 
for years after the war had ended. Annex Seven of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, ‘Agreement of Refugees and Displaced Persons’, ensures the 
right of all refugees and displaced persons to return freely to their homes 
of origin. Nonetheless, Mostar’s authorities delayed the processing of 
claims by minority members to return to their pre-war residences. In 
West Mostar, the Veterans Association HVIDR-a (Hrvatski vojni invalidi 
domovinskog rata, Croat War Invalids of the Homeland War) tightly 
controlled the housing stock and minority return did not fit with their 
aim of keeping West Mostar an exclusively Croat city. Likewise East 
Mostar was a hostile place for Croats in the immediate post-war years.
Between 1992 and 1995 around 2.2 million persons were forcibly 
displaced from their homes in the territory of today’s BiH. Of these 2.2 
million, around 1.2 million fled the country while around 1 million 
remained in BiH (see Kappel et al. 2006).17 Before the war, Mostar had 
17 ‘It is estimated that about 440,000 refugees have returned from abroad, 720,000 have settled in 
their host countries, and about 100,000 are still in need of durable solutions. Of the one million IDPs 
about 700,000 have either returned to their pre-war homes or settled at other places in the country, 
while some 300,000 people are estimated as still being internally displaced’ (Kappel et al. 2006: 9).
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a population of 126,628 with 34.8 % Muslims, 33.8 % Croats and 19 
% Serbs (Koschnick and Schneider 1995: 12). Presently, Mostar has 
around 111,000 inhabitants split almost equally between Bosniaks and 
Croats. Most of the Serb population (around 20,000) fled before the 
war between HVO and ABiH escalated, leaving only a small number 
of around 2000 Serbs who remained (or returned) to Mostar. Among 
those who left Mostar was a large part of the intelligentsia as well as 
middle-class professionals.
In 1998 and the years thereafter, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the American Refugee 
Committee (ARC) promoted a so-called ‘driven return process’. In 
those years, potential returnees were offered financial incentives to 
return. These funds are now exhausted and there is only some ‘spon-
taneous return’ to Mostar.18 Even those who returned to Mostar did 
not necessarily return to their pre-war homes. Instead, many flats 
were exchanged (or sold), especially between Croats and Bosniaks. 
Generally, elderly people of all three nationalities were more likely to 
move back to their old homes even if they were faced with the situa-
tion of being in the minority.
My elderly interlocutors felt strongly attached to their (pre-war) 
homes and preferred to return to them over moving to another part 
of the city. Although they expressed grief over missing their old neigh-
bourhood (komšiluk), they still preferred to return to (or remain in) 
their former flats or houses (see Chap. 4). Their children, however, pre-
ferred to exchange or sell their old homes in order to live on the side 
where they were in the majority. For some Mostarians, it was simply 
no longer conceivable to live in West Mostar because of the violence 
they had experienced there. This was the case for a Bosniak family I got 
to know during my stay, whose male family members had spent from 
several months to more than a year in different Croat detention camps. 
After this experience, they had to sell their houses since they no longer 
felt free to return.
Only a small number of the pre-war Serb population returned to 
Mostar. Most stayed outside the city to the north and south of it, not 
least because it was economically easier for them than in Mostar itself. 
18 I obtained the information on refugees and the return process during interviews with staff from 
the UNHCR Mostar field office.
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Unlike Bosniak and Croat politicians who encouraged co-nationals to 
return to Mostar in order to maintain or attain majority status, Serb poli-
ticians who claimed that Mostar was—like the Federation in general—a 
hostile place for Serbs discouraged Serbs from returning. Moreover, they 
argued that children would not be able to keep their Serb identity, for 
example, because of the Bosniak–Croat-dominated education system in 
Mostar. Even if returnees today no longer face security issues, and mili-
tary or police patrols in returnee areas are no longer necessary, they may 
still face discrimination, for example, through insulting statements in the 
media or from ignorant teachers in school. They may also feel unwelcome 
when confronted with insulting graffiti (Fig. 2.1) or, in the case of West 
Mostar, by the renamed streets and public places (Palmberger 2013).
Fig. 2.1 Graffito next to the Catholic cathedral stating: ‘Ante Gotovina heroj’ 
(‘Ante Gotovina is a hero’). This graffito appeared at several places in West 
Mostar in December 2005 when Gotovina, a Croat general, was arrested by 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Photo by 
the author
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 The Process of Unifying Mostar
For the first 10 years after the war ended, the HDZ was a strong opponent 
of a reunified Mostar. As discussed earlier, Mostar was seen as the only 
Croat city in BiH. Ideological as well as personal and economic interests 
factored into this stance. The absence of the state and the  proliferation 
of illicit activities helped to serve personal economic interests (see ICG 
2000: 2; see also Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999: 92).
Unlike Croat politicians, Bosniak politicians initially supported the 
idea of Mostar’s reunification. However, according to a report by the 
International Crisis Group (ICG) (ICG 2000) this was only so long as 
the Bosniak population in Mostar formed the numerical majority. In 
this respect, they shared the interests of the international community for 
whom the reunification of Mostar presented the only post-war solution 
and was seen as crucial for future development in BiH (see ICG 2000).
In the first six years after the war, the international community invested 
hundreds of millions of Euros in reuniting the city. The European Union 
(EU) alone spent approximately 200 million Euros (see ICG 2000). But 
the investment did not produce the results the international community 
had hoped for. Analysing the international post-war engagement in Mostar, 
Bieber (2005) reaches the following conclusion:
Ironically, the international presence reinforced the division between 
Bosniac and Croat parts of town. […] Rather than challenging the ethnic 
division of the city, the rigid power-sharing system—instituted by the 
international administrators—both accepted and perpetuated the post-war 
status quo. (Bieber 2005: 424)
The ICG came to a similar conclusion in its report when it accused the 
international community of having directly contributed financial aid to 
ethnically controlled municipalities rather than to the central administra-
tion (see ICG 2000).
Reflecting the Dayton Peace Agreement’s purpose as a cease-fire agree-
ment, the new municipal boundaries were drawn on the basis of the 
distribution of forces, not on economic, social or historical criteria. The 
city itself was divided into six municipalities, three Bosniak and three 
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Croat, with a small central zone to be administered by the joint city gov-
ernment. However, the EU reduced the size of the central zone following 
riots and attacks against Hans Koschnik, the first EU administrator, by 
supporters of the HDZ. This concession in the face of violent resistance 
undermined international efforts in Mostar for years to come (Bieber 
2005: 422).
As early as June 1996, the first post-war election for the municipal and 
city government took place. Unsurprisingly, the votes were split among 
the two major parties: HDZ and the Citizen’s List (a coalition party 
including the SDA), with the former winning 45 % of the votes and the 
latter 48 % (see Tomić and Herceg 1999). The two parties led opposing 
election campaigns. The Citizen’s List advocated the unification of the 
city, while the HDZ was in favour of leaving the city divided to ensure 
West Mostar remained the Croat capital of BiH (see ICG 2000).
With the Interim Statute imposed in 1996, the EU administration 
sought to install power-sharing mechanisms so that no community could 
gain an outright majority. Without the cooperation of local politicians, 
however, this power-sharing system was doomed to fail:
The leading Bosniac and Croat parties (the SDA and HDZ respectively) 
sought to get round the ethnic quota system by placing Serb (or other) can-
didates on their party electoral lists and thereby managed to ‘capture’ from 
non-dominant communities, resulting in vacant seats. (Bieber 2005: 423)
The city government, with a mayor and deputy mayor (in a rotating sys-
tem, one of them Bosniak, one Croat), was performing poorly. Instead of 
jointly governing the city, the mayor and his deputy governed only their 
‘own’ side of Mostar and city institutions ran in parallel. Another central 
problem was the veto right of the Bosniak and Croat nations, which 
could be used when ‘fundamental interests’ were endangered. Since 
national fundamental interests could be widely interpreted, the veto right 
was extensively misused to block decisions (Bieber 2005: 423).
In this political climate, the city was left separated in all aspects of 
life: politically, economically (e.g., parallel tax systems), culturally and 
also in terms of healthcare, education, the media and jurisdiction (see 
Bose 2002; ICG 2000). In Mostar everything was (and to some extent 
still is) duplicated. The city had two mobile phone providers, two post 
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offices, two electrical distribution companies, two public pension funds, 
two hospitals including two ambulance services, two bus companies and 
two main bus stations, two water and sewage companies, two companies 
for city cleaning and, of course, two football clubs (see ICG 2000, 2003).
The city’s unification proved to be harder than expected and reflected 
badly on the international community, which by 2004 (after almost 
10 years) had achieved little progress on the matter. So a new and perma-
nent statute was sought that would finally require that Serbs and ‘others’ 
enjoy an equal status in Mostar’s government and administration. Because 
the Interim Statute was aligned for the two main actors, Bosniaks and 
Croats, it no longer met the constitutional amendments on the entity 
level in 2002. For these reasons, from 2003 onwards Mostar received 
renewed attention from the international community and became Paddy 
Ashdown’s (High Representative between 2002 and 2006) priority. 
According to a report by the ICG (ICG 2009), at this time a notable 
shift took place in the attitudes and agendas of the main political actors 
in Mostar, the HDZ19 and SDA. The two parties seemed to have swapped 
their positions. Surprisingly, the HDZ expressed enthusiasm for unifying 
the city, while SDA became reserved and defended the status quo. Since 
this change in strategy, the Bosniak and Croat parties’ struggles have run 
contrary to those of their party representatives operating at the state level.
Although there was confusion about this turnaround, the reason for 
it, as given by the ICG (2009), is simple: the demographic composition 
had changed whereby Bosniaks had lost their majority status in Mostar. 
Therefore the SDA now feared subordination by Croats, while the HDZ 
were eager to unify Mostar once they had overtaken the formerly domi-
nant national group, the Bosniaks.20
After months of unsuccessful negotiations, the new city statute was finally 
imposed by the High Representative Paddy Ashdown in 2004. Although 
power-sharing rules were no longer as rigid, the new statute guaranteed 
national equality. The unification seemed to signal a final breakthrough 
towards normalisation. Even if a unified administration had not quite been 
realised, it could still be seen as a first step towards the city’s reunification. 
19 In 2006 the HDZ split into the ‘HDZ’ and the new ‘HDZ 1990’.
20 The new population figures from the national division in Mostar were a rough estimate from the 
list of registered voters made public by the BiH Electoral Commission. The ICG estimated the 
division to be around 58 % Croats, 40 % Bosniaks and 1.5 % Serbs (ICG 2003: 7).
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Through this move, more spaces of mutual interaction were created—for 
example, more civil servants of different backgrounds sharing a workplace.
Mostar’s citizens are generally tired of the endless quarrels among local 
politicians. Most long for what they call a normalan život (normal life), 
which refers first and foremost to better living conditions (jobs, education, 
city services and so on) (see Jansen 2015). In many respects, the unification of 
Mostar has only been superficial while in reality deep divisions remain. This 
is true, for example, of public services, which remain inefficient and costly. 
Even where the unification of public services has been officially achieved, the 
services are still provided along the lines of the old division. Presently Mostar 
faces the situation where services run under the same name but are operated 
separately (ICG 2009: 4). Rather than believing that politicians represent 
them and their needs, Bosniaks and Croats alike blame their respective poli-
ticians for being primarily concerned with their own privileges.
Five years after the official unification, in 2009, Mostar’s citizens were 
once more certain that the path to normalisation in Mostar remained long. 
More than a year after local elections Mostar’s politicians were still unable 
to elect a mayor (who is indirectly elected by the city council), having 
missed more than a dozen occasions to do so. This failure had far-reaching 
consequences for many people, as for many months employees of publicly 
owned companies as well as Mostar’s civil servants were not paid their sala-
ries. A friend from Mostar reported to me the following via e-mail:
Mostar still doesn’t have a mayor… and there is no prospect that we will get 
one any time soon. […] We could win the Guinness [book of] records with 
this situation since it will be one year in less than a month. The general state in 
the state is really awful and it is getting worse every day with all these political 
disputes and new threats of war… but I’m ignoring it… what can I do? : - )
This e-mail reflects very well how many Mostarians deal with the political 
quarrels in their city. Of course they take notice but face it with a kind 
of (black) humour. My friend’s statement ‘but I’m ignoring it’ cannot be 
taken literally since in the e-mail she reports on the issue she claims to 
ignore. It can instead be understood as an attempt to keep these issues 
away from her private life. Many of my informants told me that they had 
stopped reading local newspapers or watching the local evening news 
because they just do not want to deal with it any longer. Whether such 
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claims can be taken literally or not, I do not know, but nevertheless they 
are expressions of strong disapproval with local politics.
Since the day the leading Croats in Mostar learned there was a Croat 
majority in the city, they have demanded not only a united administration 
but also one that runs on equal terms with other city administrations in BiH: 
‘Croats point out that Mostar is the only city with a Croat majority and the 
only city in which the ethnic majority is limited by statute to a minority 
of council seats, so unable to elect a mayor on its own’ (ICG 2009: 7). 
Bosniak politicians, on the other hand, insist on Mostar’s exceptional posi-
tion due to their nation’s troubles during the war years, and they appeal to 
their pre-war majority position. They also blame Sarajevo for caring too little 
about Mostar, which they say is in danger of being taken over by Croats. In 
addition, they blame the capital for its limited financial investment in East 
Mostar. The unequal financial support for East and West Mostar, with the 
latter being supported by Croatia, is clearly visible in the cityscape.
 Reopening of the Old Bridge
The year 2004 was a year of reunification in Mostar, at least symbolically; 
the city was officially reunified with a shared administration and city 
council, but international media reports mostly focused on the recon-
struction and reopening of the Old Bridge (Stari most) that took place 
the same year (Fig. 2.2).
The old Ottoman Bridge that had been destroyed in 1993 was 
finally reconstructed in 2004 with the financial help of United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the 
World Bank. The reconstruction of the bridge with its grandiose reopen-
ing celebration carried a lot of symbolic meaning. Ten years after the war 
had ended in Mostar, the international community needed a showpiece 
of success to signal that the reconciliation process had progressed. In his 
lecture at the Examination Schools in Oxford on 23 July 2004, Paddy 
Ashdown spoke of the reopening of Mostar’s Old Bridge as a symbol 
that civilisation had prevailed over barbarism and that it was a clear sign 
of goodwill for a new start of multi national coexistence in Mostar. This 
assessment is not shared by all experts on BiH (see, for example Bougarel 
et al. 2007; Hoare 2004).
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Bosniaks and Croats differed on the importance of the reopening 
of the Old Bridge. While most of my Bosniak informants, who were 
in Mostar at the time of the celebration, joined the event, most of 
the Croats did not. Since the Croat army, the HVO, is considered by 
Bosniaks, as well as by the international community, to be responsible 
for the final destruction of the bridge (after numerous shells fired by 
the Croat and Serb army had damaged it), Croats often take a defen-
sive position when the subject of the Stari most comes up. Although I 
do not wish to question the reconstruction of the bridge, it is still not 
clear to what extent it has had an impact on the reunification of Mostar. 
Moreover, although often unmentioned, the Old Bridge does not con-
nect the Bosniak and Croat parts of the city (which are divided by the 
Bulevar west of the bridge).21
21 Stari grad (Old Town), where the bridge is located, made it onto the World Monuments Fund list 
of the 100 most endangered sites of historical and cultural significance (Grodach 2002: 66).
Fig. 2.2 Rebuilt Stari most (Old Bridge). Photo by the author
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3
Divided Education: Divergent 
Historiographies and Shared  
Discursive Practices
This chapter will show how the interpretations of the local past diverge 
between Bosniak and Croat historians. At the same time it will also reveal 
how historians on both sides draw on similar discursive strategies when 
narrating a national meta-narrative. These meta-narratives can best be 
described as goal-oriented, while Chaps. 4–6 will illustrate how the indi-
vidual narratives can better be described as target-seeking. The national 
and the personal narratives can only be analytically divided. In reality 
they are tightly entangled. The national narratives dominant in the public 
discourse serve as reference points for individuals in many specific ways. 
They support, manoeuvre around and/or contest them. On the other 
hand, the dominant public discourse is carried on and enacted by the 
same individuals.
A dominant public discourse has been described as a political practice 
that ‘establishes, sustains and changes power relations, and the collective 
entities (classes, blocs, communities, groups) between which power rela-
tions obtain’ (Fairclough 1992: 67). Discourses contribute to the construc-
tion of ‘social identities’, of ‘social relations’ and of systems of knowledge 
and belief (see Fairclough 1992). However, a discourse can never be 
entirely captured, since it is always in the making. It is a simplification to 
speak of the Bosniak or the dominant Croat discourse as ‘[c]apturing a 
discourse in its totality is impossible, both because it is circulated in differ-
ent kinds of written, oral and performed texts, and because it is continu-
ally evolving’ (Purdeková 2008: 509). This point is particularly relevant in 
BiH, where history is still, so to speak, in the process of being (re)written. 
Clearly, historiography is not static anywhere, but it is even less so after great 
political changes, such as those following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, 
where revising historiography has become a crucial way of legitimising new 
political elites. However, next to the dominant public discourses, voices of 
dissent can be heard. Even though these counter-voices are less powerful, 
they clearly matter, for example, within the media, academia, the arts and 
among different non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and less organ-
ised parts of civil society. In addition, there are dissenting or antithetical 
voices among the politicians themselves.
Referencing the local past is central to the dominant public discourses 
as it serves political goals. The past is used to legitimise certain ideologi-
cal views on the present and on coexistence in Mostar. For example, the 
way national groups are presented as primordial entities that are crucially 
different from one another leaves little space for Mostarians to define 
themselves other than along national lines (Palmberger 2013).
Nationalist politicians and the nationalist-orientated media continue 
to dominate BiH, fuelling distrust among people. But the nationalisa-
tion of history is not only promoted by the political elites and the media. 
What makes it so effective in BiH is the plurality of channels through 
which it is promoted (see Donia 2010; Torsti 2003). Besides the media 
and politicians’ speeches, the nationalisation of history is also very actively 
supported by a considerable number of academic scholars and through 
public commemorations, memorial culture and the education system(s). 
Education has been said to be one of the main state-controlled redistri-
butions of history (see Wertsch 2002); this is particularly obvious in a 
post-war context like BiH (see Hill 2011).
Still, we need to reflect critically on the influence education (including 
textbooks) has on the Post-Yugoslav generation. Even if we can clearly 
see how history is manipulated in the educational context, this does not 
mean that students fully surrender to the national discourses they are 
exposed to, as shown in this chapter and in Chap. 6. Vuckovic (2012) 
shows in the case of members of the Croat post-war generation that they 
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evaluate Yugoslavia mostly in positive terms, particularly regarding social 
life, despite the negative presentations of Yugoslavia in Croatian textbooks. 
This suggests that we should not underestimate memories transmitted by 
older family members (Vuckovic 2012: 197), especially memories con-
cerning social aspects of Yugoslavia that are widely omitted from textbooks.
 Institutionalising Mostar’s Division:  
Divided Education
In 2007, the University of Zenica in Mostar proposed plans to open a 
Department of Preschool Education within the Islamic teachers’ training 
faculty. This triggered a discussion on whether such a move was legitimate 
or if such early religious education constitutes indoctrination and is just 
another mechanism of national segregation. The debate between propo-
nents and opponents of religious pre-school education involved local as 
well as international actors, and attracted a lot of media attention. The 
international community, and in particular the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),1 expressed concerns over these devel-
opments. The OSCE justifies its active engagement in the education sector 
with its belief that the status quo has negative consequences for (re-)build-
ing a nationally diverse society, as expressed in the following statement: 
‘Children educated in monoethnic environments will likely be poorly pre-
pared for life in such a country, let alone in an increasingly diverse Europe’ 
(OSCE 2007a: 6; see also OSCE 2007e).2 The OSCE’s intervention trig-
gered strong reactions by Muslim clerics. Reisu-l-ulema Mustafa ef. Cerić 
accused the OSCE of interference in child education, which in his view 
should remain the business of the family (Oslobodjenje, 4 September 2007).
Even if the debate outlined above revolved around the subject of Islamic 
pre-school education, it was never much concerned with questions of 
1 The OSCE is the international organisation which most actively engages with the education sec-
tor in BiH. The head office in Sarajevo and the field offices, such as the one in Mostar, all had their 
own education departments until they became part of a larger ‘Human Dimensions’ department 
in 2010.
2 The idea that education is an instrument and a resource for promoting respect for diversity is 
regarded as a ‘Western’ idea rooted in the enlightenment tradition (Höpken 2002: 11).
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faith but rather—almost exclusively—with the question of nationality. 
This is because the education system in Mostar, as elsewhere in the coun-
try, is divided along national rather than religious lines. Even if the two 
(religious and national) identities often overlap, it is the national rather 
than the religious motivation that makes many politicians, teachers 
and parents support a separate education system. In the case of Mostar, 
the segregation of children and youth from kindergarten to university 
 institutionalises the city’s division and raises a generation with hardly any 
encounters with their national counterparts (see Chap. 6).
In order to maintain national separatism, pupils in BiH are taught 
in separated classes using different curricula. More than three different 
curricula exist; the Federation of BiH already has several curricula, with 
one issued by the Federation Ministry of Education and others issued 
by the ministries of different cantons. A separate curriculum exists for 
the Republika Srpska and Brčko District. With the exception of Brčko 
District, all curricula show a particular national orientation (OSCE 
2007a: 6; see also OSCE 2007d; Swimelar 2013). In Mostar, schools 
follow a curriculum either in the Bosniak or in the Croat language.3 Since 
there is no school following the curriculum in the Serb language, parents 
with a Serb background send their children to either a Bosniak- or Croat- 
dominated school. The choice is usually influenced by the location of 
the school, and as no Serb-dominated schools are provided, the school is 
often chosen based on proximity.4
In principle, children, regardless of their national background, may 
attend any given school. As most of the schools are dominated by one 
nation, minority pupils are usually expected to accept a nationally biased 
curriculum. Provided there is a sufficient number of minority students, 
students are entitled to attend separate classes for the national group in 
subjects such as language, history, geography and religion.5 However, this 
3 Staff of the OSCE education department told me that the politically correct way to differentiate 
between the curricula is by referring to the language they are based on. This was also confirmed to 
me by students who used the terms Bosniak/Croat/Serb curriculum.
4 Serb students are offered Orthodox religious education by a mobile teacher responsible for Serb 
students in the region.
5 ‘The Implementation Plan of the 5 March 2002 Interim Agreement on Accommodation of 
Specific Needs and Rights of Returnee Children stipulates that all schools shall organize classes 
from the national group of subjects, provided that parents and students opt to have the national 
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separate teaching is provided only in rare cases. For this and other rea-
sons, parents of minority status prefer their children to attend schools run 
by co-nationals, even if they have to accept long commutes. But there is 
also a small number of parents whose children attend classes with pupils 
of other national backgrounds. In conversations with parents, I learned 
that the reasons for such a decision are manifold and range from practical 
considerations to issues to do with the reputation of the school. In this 
discussion on separate education systems, it is important to remember 
that there are children from mixed marriages or children of parents with 
weak national identification, although far fewer than in pre-war Mostar 
(see Palmberger 2013).
Returning to international actors’ engagement with questions of edu-
cation in Mostar once more, it is interesting to note that the international 
community has not always propagated a common education system in 
the way it does now. In the immediate post-war years, the international 
community saw the provision of a separate education system as a nec-
essary prerequisite to motivate refugees to return to their hometown. 
Although this was regarded as only a temporary solution, it showed 
how long-lasting the effects were for segregated schools but also for ‘two 
schools under one roof ’. The latter have two directors, two teacher coun-
cils, two student councils, two curricula and separate textbooks in the 
respective national languages (Ashton 2007: 11).
The staff of the international organisations who were involved in sup-
porting two schools under one roof are aware of the paradoxical situation 
they have created. Over coffee, two local OSCE staff joked about it and 
one of them told me: ‘Here in Mostar we do not have problems with two 
schools under one roof because we have two schools under two roofs.’ It 
is true that in Mostar (unlike, for example, the nearby town of Stolac) 
the ‘two schools under one roof ’ model has not been applied very much. 
Still, the most famous school that is structured on this model is situated in 
Mostar. The Old Grammar School, Stara gimnazija, was—as all schools 
were in pre-war BiH—a mixed school before the war. With great effort 
and the support of the international community, in particular the OSCE, 
group of subjects taught according to a curriculum that is different from that already being taught’ 
(OSCE 2007a: 5).
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attempts were made to reunite the school after the war (see Hromadžić 
2015). Because the case of Stara gimnazija exemplifies the deadlocked situ-
ation so well and also because some of the Post-Yugoslavs introduced in 
Chap. 6 attended the school, I will briefly introduce the school here.6
Opened in 1898, Stara gimnazija has been housed continuously in a 
lovely Habsburg building, with an interruption during and shortly after 
the war. Before the war the school’s excellent reputation was known in 
BiH and throughout the other republics of Yugoslavia. To this day, its 
pupils are proud to be a part of this school. Situated at the former front-
line, Stara gimnazija was destroyed during the war. A few years after the 
war ended, the Croats rebuilt a few classrooms and claimed ownership 
of the school. The pre-war Bosniak students were taught in one of the 
primary schools instead, taking shifts with the primary school children 
(Ashton 2007: 8). Today, Stara gimnazija is administratively unified but 
students are still taught under two curricula. However, the school offers 
joint extra-curricular activities and recently the first integrated classes 
were launched (Ashton 2007: 4).
Hromadžić (2008) describes the school as an outcome of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement:
The school embodies the paradoxical spirit of the Dayton Peace Agreement, 
where simultaneous segregation (in the name of ethnic groups’ survival) 
and unification (in the name of democratization, reconciliation, and the 
common national identity) of citizens take place. New forms of schools 
and youth—not fully integrated but not segregated, either—emerge from 
the collision. (Hromadžić 2008: 20)
Even if the Dayton Peace Agreement does not name the right to sepa-
rate education, the agreement nevertheless leaves the central government 
in a weak position and the constitution emphasises national prerogatives 
rather than individual rights. Nevertheless more integration and mixing 
among the pupils of Stara gimnazija could be observed in the last couple 
of years. In an interview survey (Ashton 2007) with students from Stara 
6 I obtained information on recent developments of Stara gimnazija as well as on grander developments 
in the education sector of BiH in interviews with staff from the OSCE education department in 
Sarajevo and Mostar.
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gimnazija, those surveyed expressed little concern over mingling with 
students from the other curricula. Most students, moreover, did not per-
ceive the prospect of united classes as a threat to their national identity. 
The report concludes:
The Gymnasium Mostar students interviewed had moved over three 
years from support of separate languages to believing that language was a 
‘silly’ thing to be fighting over. This did not happen because they were 
forced to integrate language in school, but because they made contact 
with each other and, over time, began to accept each other’s language. 
(Ashton 2007: 39)
The fears, the author of the report suggests, come more from the parents 
than from the students, so in fact joint activities among the parents would be 
needed to help overcome the barriers and scepticism (Ashton 2007: 32).7 
These observations support the idea that encounters between Bosniaks 
and Croats—be they as limited as in the case of the pupils at Stara gim-
nazija—do make a difference.8 Conversely, the lack of possible encoun-
ters and contact is likely to foster prejudices and mistrust (see Hewstone 
et al. 2005; Lederach 1997) (Fig. 3.1).
Stara gimnazija is an isolated case in Mostar. The remaining schools 
keep to the separation promoted by the political elites, particularly by 
Croats. The language issue is taken as the core argument, whereby it is 
claimed that children can only learn proper Croatian if taught in mono- 
national schools. In this discourse, the right to be taught in Croatian is 
a necessity in preventing assimilation. The OSCE counters such claims 
by referring to the Dayton Peace Agreement, which—although based on 
national rather than individual rights—does not include a right to be 
7 I was also able to observe how the fears and barriers rather were on the side of the parents than the 
teachers during my previous research in Brčko. Since the 2002 school year, in Brčko, students are 
together for more than 80 % of the time and only national group subjects are taught separately (see 
OSCE 2007d: 29). After overcoming initial difficulties, Brčko’s education system today has a very 
good reputation and even students from across the border come to Brčko for their education.
8 Creating opportunities for young people to meet is a central aim of some of the youth NGOs in 
Mostar, such as the youth centres OKC Abrašević, Nansen Dijalog Centar (Nansen Dialogue Centre) 
and Mladí most (The Young Bridge)—as I learned in interviews with these youth centres’ staff and 
from regular visitors. The events I attended at these centres proved successful, even though only a 
small percentage of Mostar’s youth participated in their projects.
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taught in one’s language: ‘While the right to learn one’s own language 
is guaranteed, there is no guarantee in any convention or in the BiH 
and Entity constitutions that peoples have the right to be taught in a 
particular language’ (Ashton 2007: 9). Yet we should be aware that the 
position of the international community towards the language issue is 
itself ambivalent. For example, on the one hand the OSCE does not sup-
port the idea that children should be taught in their respective languages, 
while on the other hand all official OSCE documents (and its website) 
are written in all three official languages: Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian. 
This OSCE practice strongly signals the need for linguistic separatism.
Aside from language, the curriculum acts as another strong boundary 
marker. Even if textbook commissions have ‘cleansed’ the textbooks of 
obvious offensive content towards co-nationals, it does not mean that 
current textbooks are not biased. In 2008, an analysis of 20th-century 
Fig. 3.1 Stara gimnazija, the Old Grammar School in 2008. Photo by the 
author
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history textbooks for the final primary school grades was launched by 
the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research. The report 
of the analysis reveals that the quality of the textbooks differs greatly in 
respect to the Guidelines for writing and evaluation of history textbooks for 
primary and secondary schools in BiH adopted in 2006. One of the cen-
tral  principals of the Guidelines states that the region and the country 
of BiH have to be the main reference points in the textbooks (see Karge 
2008: 22). The selected textbooks used for the curriculum in Croatian 
and Serbian ignore this guideline and instead take as their reference point 
Croatia or Serbia, respectively. Textbooks taking BiH as their reference 
point, however, are similarly biased by tending to focus on Bosniak 
history rather than presenting a balanced account of the history of all 
the nations in BiH. This analysis also corresponds with my observa-
tions during history lectures at Mostar’s two universities discussed later 
in this chapter.
At present, the war of the 1990s is not part of the curriculum in most of 
the cantons of the Federation of BiH, but is part of the curriculum in the 
Republika Srpska (Karge 2008). Most of the cantons of the Federation 
of BiH follow a recommendation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe expressed in 2000 that suggests excluding the war of 
1992–1995 from the schools’ curriculum. This does not mean, however, 
that textbooks do not deal with the recent war at all, but they do so 
in very different ways. The space provided for such a discussion varies 
greatly, as does the quality of historical analysis. The fact that even the 
date given for the outbreak of the war in BiH differs says a lot. While the 
textbooks identifiable as Bosniak-biased and Serb-biased date the out-
break of the war to the day of the EU’s recognition of BiH, the textbook 
identifiable as Croat-biased gives a much earlier date, namely 5 October 
1991, when an attack against the Croat-dominated village of Ravno in 
Eastern Herzegovina was launched by JNA forces (see Karge 2008).
Even if the war in the 1990s is not covered in the curriculum of 
Canton 7 (the canton to which Mostar belongs), it is likely that discus-
sion of the war finds its way into the classroom. Regardless of the content 
of the textbook, its use is up to the teacher. We can assume that in both 
directions—towards a balanced understanding or towards separatism—
teachers find a great spectrum of possibilities in what and what not to 
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teach their students.9 As I observed in Mostar, teachers would often bring 
a whole school class to attend a commemoration ceremony, most of which 
were in remembrance of the 1992–1995 war. This was, for example, the 
case in Mostar on 14 June 2006 when an exceptional history lesson took 
place under the Old Bridge. In order to illustrate the way in which his-
tory is taught to students at commemorations and how memories are 
transferred from the older generations to the younger, let us take a closer 
look at this particular commemoration ceremony.
My notes from my Mostar field diary on 14 June 2006 state:
An exceptional history lesson is taking place under the Stari most today. 
What makes it exceptional is not only the location but the choice of ‘history 
teacher’. The event is being organised by the Army of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (ABiH) and the ‘history teacher’ is one of the former soldiers 
who fought for the ABiH during the war between 1992 and 1995. The 
event is one of a series of events to celebrate the liberation from Serbian- 
Montenegrin aggression and is announced as a ‘history lesson’.
It is a bright, sunny day and I arrive a bit early at the Šehitluci (martyrs’ 
cemetery, Fig. 3.3) waiting for the pupils and teachers to arrive. All the 
children who arrive have a red carnation in their hands. Soon the crowd 
grows and it becomes a noisy, cheerful gathering. Kids are very excited, 
talking to each other, giggling and waving their flowers in the air. The 
excursion seems to be a welcome change; nothing yet reminds us of the 
serious purpose behind the event. A handful of soldiers and the imam 
stand out amid the cheerful youngsters. A few children have wreaths in 
their hands, waiting to lay them on the martyrs’ graves.
The cheerful noises quieten down once the official ceremony begins 
and a soldier lays a wreath at the martyr’s grave while the imam says a 
9 Although this section has concentrated on the aspects of a divided education system, it does not 
mean that this is the only problem students face. Students and parents have expressed to me great 
dissatisfaction with teaching methods as well as school facilities. One tremendous shortcoming is 
the lack of space, and it is not uncommon that secondary school children are taught in primary 
schools, especially in East Mostar (see OSCE 2007c, n.d.). Despite the defects of the education 
system in BiH, there are also pupils from families in economically disadvantaged situations who are 
not able to attend school at all (see OSCE 2007b).
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short prayer. Afterwards the imam addresses the children by telling them 
that the soldiers of ABiH gave their lives for their future, for their tomor-
row and their fortune. ‘We will never forget them!’ he announces with 
such pathos that it comes across rather as, ‘We are never allowed to forget 
them!’, pointing towards the graveyard where these words are inscribed on 
a plaque. ‘You have to listen carefully to what you hear in school and you 
should never forget!’, he tells the young audience. ‘It does not matter if it is 
written down in books or not, Tuđman was our enemy!’, he concludes and 
invites the pupils to join him in the history lesson under the Stari most.
The crowd moves from the cemetery through Stari grad (Old Town) 
to Stari most. The long caravan of children wave their red carnations in 
excitement. Arriving on top of the bridge, they let the carnations sail 
down into the Neretva River, which soon turns into a sea of red flowers.
After crossing the bridge, the pupils pass the stone-carved sign, 
‘DON’T FORGET ‘93’ (written in English, Fig. 3.2). The memorial 
Fig. 3.2 A memorial stone at the Old Bridge. Photo by the author
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stone reinforces what the imam has just told them. Not all pupils seem 
to notice it, but some do and point in the direction of the stone with 
their carnations. The caravan moves down to the riverbed to a stage from 
which loudspeakers burst out popular folk music. The children’s excite-
ment increases from being so close to the water. Some of them have little 
BiH flags in their hands. Listening to the music being played, I notice 
that it is a song about Tuđman, accursed enemy of beautiful BiH. After 
two men dive from the bridge into the river (an old tradition associ-
ated first and foremost with Mostar’s pre-war identity and which today is 
almost exclusively practised by Bosniaks), the ceremony reaches its peak, 
the announced history lesson. A man in his early 50s takes the stage and 
address the audience:
I wish to tell you a story (priča) today. A true story with a beginning and an 
end. So far you have heard different kinds of stories. Stories that began 
Fig. 3.3 The imam with pupils at Šehitluci (martyrs’ cemetery), 2006. Photo 
by the author
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with ‘once upon a time, behind seven mountains and seven seas’. This kind 
of story you will not hear from us today. Our story has a real beginning, has 
a date, a day and time: 14 June 1992, one of the most important days in 
the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the entire thousand-year old his-
tory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The soldier continues by introducing himself as one out of many ABiH 
soldiers. By claiming that he is only one of many, he suggests that soldiers were 
not fighting as individuals but as a collective; from this point his story is 
the story of the ABiH or of ‘the’ brave soldier. From the  beginning, the 
speaker makes clear that he is not only a teacher of history but, more 
importantly, a participant (učesnik) of history. This gives him the legiti-
macy to speak about the past. Moreover, his words seem to suggest that 
he, as a frontline soldier, really saw what happened, in contrast to those 
civilians who stayed at home. He embeds the day, 14 June 1992, within a 
question about the wider history of BiH. The day of the liberation from 
Serbian- Montenegrin forces occupying Mostar is described as one of the 
most meaningful days in the long struggle for independence of BiH and 
the freedom of the Bosniak nation. But before finally achieving indepen-
dence, the Bosniak nation once again became a victim. The victory of 
the day in question against Serb forces is narrated by the speaker as the 
beginning of Croat aggression:
The entire left bank of our beauty [Neretva River], meaning this part 
which lies behind us, was occupied and all people, good people, had to 
leave their homes. On 13 June 1992, the first crossing of the River Neretva 
succeeded. When we arrived, our two blessed [here the old Turkish expres-
sion rahmetli is used] friends waved their flags with the lilies on it, flags 
which I see in your hands. And we thought that it was the end of aggression 
against our city. But as we soon learned it was the beginning, the begin-
ning of a heroic fight […].
In this part of the speech, it becomes clear that the Bosniaks are portrayed 
as the victims but also that the soldiers fighting back against the aggres-
sors are the new heroes. When referring to the beauty of the Neretva, the 
speaker anchors the nation’s identity in nature. The Neretva River is the 
natural beauty that persists even when dark forces are trying to destroy it. 
It is ‘our’ (the Bosniaks’, not the Croats’) Neretva, which, together with 
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the Stari most, constitutes two strong identifiers for the Bosniak nation. 
The flags in the children’s hands serve as the symbolic link between the 
children and the past. Although the speaker refers to the lilies on their 
flags, the lilies are no longer on the official flag of BiH, the flags the chil-
dren hold in their hands. Since the fleur-de-lis is closely associated with 
the Muslim population it could not remain on BiH’s flag, so it gave way 
to a nationally neutral flag that was adopted in 1998 under the authority 
of the High Representative.
The day in question was the beginning of a heroic fight for liberation 
to allow the young generation to live a free life, the soldier continues. 
Only owing to the heroic deeds of the battalion ABiH 401, 41st brigade, 
can the pupils live in a free city. It soon becomes clear, though, that this 
privilege is not free of demands, but requires responsibility and gratitude 
from the youngest generation. The mission that the youngest generation 
is entrusted with is formulated by the soldier in an authoritarian tone: 
‘You should never allow anyone to do to you what was done to us!’—
suggesting that the war affected only the older generation and at the same 
time asking for lifelong gratitude towards the veterans and martyrs. In 
the speech, the speaker indicates that not only the ABiH but also the 
Islamic faith saved the Bosniak nation and therefore the youngsters are 
asked to pray whenever they pass martyrs’ graves.
At the end of the speech, the soldier appeals to the young genera-
tion to listen to their parents and teachers (implying that they know the 
truth, unlike some books, as suggested earlier) and to take it into their 
own hands to fight against evil and dark forces (sile zla, sile mraka) so that 
history does not repeat itself. Although the dark forces are never named, 
it is clear throughout the speech where they are located, and in order to 
erase any remaining doubts, the song with the words ‘Tuđman is our enemy’ 
in its refrain is played at full volume once more at the end of the speech.
The central message of the soldier to the pupils was simple: there 
are good people (we Bosniaks) and there are bad people (Serbs and 
Croats), and even if we have won the fight we have to remain vigilant 
in the future. The entire history lesson had one clear goal, namely to 
strengthen the sense of a Bosniak nation and to reinforce the division 
between Bosniaks and Croats (and Serbs). Although it was (at least in 
104 How Generations Remember
the announcement) intended to be a commemoration celebrating the 
end of Serb-Montenegrin aggression, the event was clearly used first and 
foremost as a reminder of the Croat aggression that was portrayed as a 
danger until this day.
Dubravka Ugrešić, a Croat writer who in 1993 went into exile to 
escape nationalist politics in her home country, refers to such com-
memorations as ‘terror[s] of memory’. Such events are evoked in order to 
re- install the continuity of national identity (Ugrešić 1998: 123; see also 
Van der Veer 2002). The national memory is thereby narrated through 
the central dichotomy of a collectively threatened body (us) versus a 
collectively threatening body (them) (Ugrešić 1998: 117). Considering 
the riots that took place the night before the commemoration—when 
Croat hooligans, after losing against Brazil in the World Cup champion-
ship, rioted around the Bulevar and eventually picked a fight with their 
Bosniak counterparts—it was probably easy for the pupils to make the 
connection to where the ‘dark forces’ might be located. Although this 
incident was clearly related to hooliganism, the local and international 
media described it as renewed ‘ethnic violence’ in Mostar, reinforcing fear 
and division in the city.
In order to further analyse the national dominant discourses and the 
discursive strategies employed to support it, in the remainder of the 
chapter I mainly draw on material gathered from a range of different 
university lectures on the history of BiH (and Croatia) in the 20th cen-
tury held at the Bosniak-dominated Univerzitet Džemal Bijedić Mostar 
and the Croat-dominated university Sveučiliste u Mostaru in 2006. My 
data is also based on conversations and interviews I conducted with 
historians and students of history. So far, research on the role educa-
tion plays in propagating nationalist thinking in BiH has concentrated 
on textbooks (see, for example, Karge 2008; Torsti 2003) rather than 
the way in which history is taught in the classroom. While in text-
books only the historiography presented by a particular author can be 
analysed, in the classroom we can observe rhetorical means as well as 
moments of contestation. By including the interaction between lectur-
ers and students at the two universities, we can also learn more about 
cross-generational dialogue.
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 Rewriting History and Placing the Nation
In the foreword to his book Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe 
Pål Kolstø writes:
Groups that share the same history often interpret their common experi-
ences in radically different, sometimes diametrically opposite ways. The 
stories they tell about themselves and others—autostereotypes and hetero-
stereotypes—may all be based somehow on historical ‘facts’, but are so 
radically embellished that they hardly resemble each other any longer. 
(Kolstø 2005: vii)
This description greatly resembles my experiences when attending lec-
tures on the history of BiH (and Croatia) in the 20th century at the 
two universities in Mostar, when I participated in commemorations, 
and the observations I made through reading local newspapers and 
watching TV reports on the local past. During my participant observa-
tion at the two universities, I sometimes had to hurry from one univer-
sity to the other between lectures. On arriving at the university on the 
‘other side’, it felt as if whole worlds lay between the historiographies I 
heard in the respective lecture halls.
As briefly mentioned above, two universities have existed in Mostar 
since the war: Univerzitet Džemal Bijedić Mostar (mainly referred to as 
Džemal Bijedić here) on the east side, and Sveučiliste u Mostaru (mainly 
referred to as Sveučiliste, meaning ‘university’ in Croatian) on the west 
side. At the former, the majority of students are Bosniaks and a number 
of the professors are affiliated with the University of Sarajevo. At the lat-
ter, most students are Bosnian Croats, but there are also a number of stu-
dents as well as professors from Croatia. From the Bulevar dividing East 
and West Mostar, a street lined with old trees leads to Sveučiliste. Many 
cafés are situated along the street and posters adorn the old trees, mak-
ing students aware of upcoming student parties and pubs with special 
student offers. Sveučiliste is located only around 50 metres away from the 
Partisan memorial cemetery and some hundred metres from the football 
stadium, which in the eyes of the Bosniak population was unjustly taken 
away from Mostar’s pre-war football club Velež (previously a  multinational 
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club and today Mostar’s Bosniak football club; see Mills 2010). 
In the meantime it has become the home stadium for the West Mostar 
football club Zrinski, the arch-rival of Velež. Due to its national affiliation 
Zrinski had been forbidden and disbanded in socialist Yugoslavia but was 
re-established in 1992 with a ceremony held in Medjugorje, the Marian 
pilgrimage place.
So Sveučiliste is in-between two highly contested places, the Partisan 
memorial cemetery and the football stadium. The former is contested 
first and foremost by Croats because it ‘worships’ the socialist heroes, 
while the latter is contested mainly by Bosniaks who claim entitlement 
to the place. The third highly contested place is the building of Sveučiliste 
itself. Sveučiliste is based in the pre-war university building whose premises 
were used as a prison camp during the recent war.10 Although this part 
of the building’s history is not visible, other signs of its past are recognisable. 
For example, one of the lecture halls at the time still housed a world map 
in Cyrillic letters, a leftover from the old university. It seemed even more 
out of place when considering the pictures on the wall next to it, display-
ing Christian themes central to Croats’ self-understanding. For example, 
one of the pictures was titled, ‘Pokrštenje Hrvata’, meaning ‘Baptism of 
Croats’.
Sveučiliste, which prides itself as being the only Croatian-language uni-
versity in BiH, sees its roots in the Franciscan Theological School, which 
was founded in the late 19th century and closed in 1945. This affilia-
tion with the Franciscans is also visible in Sveučiliste’s logo, which shows 
the building of the Franciscan Monastery in Mostar. Sveučiliste receives 
considerable financial support from Croatia and is therefore much better 
equipped than its Bosniak counterpart. This close relation with Croatia 
was expressed in and reinforced by the large-scale reconstruction of the 
university buildings—begun at the end of my fieldwork—which was 
extensively funded by Croatia.
It is on the premises of Sveučiliste where the pre-war university (and 
Mostar’s only university back then) was located. When in 1993 war 
began between Croats and Bosniaks, the Croats took over the univer-
sity building and equipment. A group of Bosniak staff and students who 
10 This information I received in an interview with staff at one of the Bosniak detention camp 
victims organisations in Mostar.
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were able to flee to the left bank of the Neretva meanwhile continued to 
work in the memorial house Džemal Bijedić11 under extremely hostile 
conditions (Univerzitet Mostar 2002: 18). In 1994 the University Džemal 
Bijedić was relocated to the former Yugoslav Northern Camp army barracks 
(sjeverni logor), which had been heavily damaged during the first year of 
war. Thus the war was also tangible to me, not only in the presentations 
of the lecturer—where history was often examined from the perspective 
of the recent war—but also on the university’s premises. The classrooms 
only have basic equipment and do not provide sufficient heating during 
wintertime. On a rainy day, looking at the ruins through the barred win-
dow of one of the lecture halls is rather depressing. But when the sun is 
out, the former military camp turns into a lively university campus with a 
café packed with students in its centre and loud local rock music bursting 
from the speakers.
The history department was still very new when I did my fieldwork and 
the first students were expected to graduate in 2006. This relatively short 
history of the department, as well as the university as a whole, and its dif-
ficult start, were still noticeable during the time of my fieldwork. For exam-
ple, several times during my fieldwork, classes were cancelled without the 
students being informed in advance or indeed being informed at all. I had 
plenty of opportunities to interact with students outside of the classroom, 
joining them during coffee breaks and even making friends with students 
from different faculties. In these informal settings I also gained insight 
into the less enjoyable parts of their academic lives, which had to do with the 
poor university infrastructure (practical issues such as insufficient heating in 
classrooms, and more substantial concerns such as restricted access to litera-
ture) and the absence of some professors over long periods (as they often 
teach at other universities and only come to Mostar for limited periods).12
Although the two universities are divided along national lines, a group 
of minority students from the respective other side does exist. This ‘cross-
11 Džemal Bijedić was prime minister of Yugoslavia from 1971 until his death in an airplane crash 
in 1977. Born in Mostar, he had felt a special responsibility to put his home region back on the 
map. Under his influence, significant progress regarding the economy and higher education was 
made in Herzegovina. Due to his patronage, Mostar’s university, opened in 1977, was named after 
him.
12 For a critical assessment of the university system in BiH, see Weber 2007.
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ing’ is an academically strategic choice students make rather than a choice 
based on political considerations. For example, Sveučiliste did not offer 
computer sciences at first. So, the only option for students with a Croat 
background wanting to stay in Mostar but hoping to enrol in computer 
sciences was to study at Džemal Bijedić. From conversations with such 
students, I learned it was not always easy for them to convince their fami-
lies that this was the right thing to do. Parents were afraid that they would 
face harassment and discrimination on the ‘other side’. Another reason 
students gave for studying on ‘the other side’ was to avoid having to take 
a difficult entry exam. In the case of national subjects (such as Bosnian or 
Croatian language and history), however, the barrier seems insuperable 
even if it conflicts with personal interests. One young history student I 
met at a seminar for multi-perspective textbook writing told me he is 
most interested in the Ottoman period. But I was surprised to learn he 
was studying at Sveučiliste because I had thought that this period would 
be taught in more detail at Džemal Bijedić. Although the young historian 
confirmed my assumption, he made it very clear that he, as a Croat, 
would want to study history at Sveučiliste.
 Objectifying History
As Borneman states, historians are granted exceptional authority in 
speaking of the past:
Unlike an individual, a state has, of course, no memory by which it can 
reconstruct anything. It cannot at any point in time tell you its history, 
though historiographers may take it upon themselves, often with state 
approval, to do so. (Borneman 1992: 42–43)
In BiH, historians are the spokespeople not of the state, but rather of 
their respective nations. They are central actors in providing proof of 
the nation’s legitimate existence. For that reason, authors critical of such 
historians have referred to them as ‘ethno intellectuals’ (see, for example, 
Sekulić 1999: 283) or ‘national historians’ (Donia 2000: 358). They are 
given authority to speak about/for the nation’s past, and what they say 
possesses a strong normative value. Their authoritative power makes it easy 
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for their words to be exploited for political means. Following Bourdieu 
(1992: 116), I suggest we speak of the symbolic efficacy of the words of 
those people recognised by others as individuals holding authority:
The power of words is nothing other than the delegated power of the 
spokesperson, and his speech—that is, the substance of his discourse and, 
inseparably, his way of speaking—is no more than a testimony, and one 
among others, of the guarantee of delegation which is vested in him. 
(Bourdieu 1992: 107)
This authority to speak in the name of the nation was also emphasised by 
lecturers I encountered at the two universities. Generally a rather positivist 
approach towards history was taken. The lecturer has the authority to tell 
the students which historical interpretation is right and which is wrong.
This became most clear when a student’s view on history diverged from 
that of the lecturer. This was, for example, the case when a student at 
Sveučiliste compared the crimes committed by the NDH regime to those 
committed by the German Nazis. This caused the lecturer to interrupt 
the student by asking what literature he had actually consulted. The stu-
dent mentioned that one of his references was a source from the internet 
and the other a book, the title of which he read to the class. Thereupon 
the lecturer reprimanded the student for not having been critical enough 
in his literature review, claiming the literature and website consulted were 
nothing but propaganda. Trying to persuade his students to be more crit-
ical when consulting books, the lecturer explained that a book is not 
authoritative per se. He then began asking students whether they 
thought a nation’s fight for its rights was understandable. It was true that 
crimes were committed by the NDH, he admitted, but added that every 
national liberation struggle in history had been bloody: ‘What do you 
think? What would you do if you had to defend your nation?’ He then 
explained that the Serbs had positioned themselves against the Croats in 
WWII, while the Partisans had fought against the Nazis only to proclaim 
a communist revolution. The lecturer continued by saying that one can-
not only look at what had happened but always had to ask why some-
thing had happened as well. At the very end of the lecture, he once again 
looked straight into his students’ eyes and repeated his plea for a critical 
reading of historical documents.
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The lecturer made it clear to the student that his representation of his-
tory was not acceptable at all, first by criticising the choice of literature, 
then his uncritical reading of it, and finally the presenter’s analysis itself, 
as the student had only looked at the events and had not asked why the 
NDH had resorted to violence. In his explanation, the lecturer partially 
admitted that what the student had said was correct, although his inter-
pretation was not. In a conversation outside the classroom, the lecturer 
once told me that national identity becomes most important when it is 
threatened and that in contrast to well-established nations, such as France, 
nationalism in former Yugoslavia was still in its infancy. ‘How can one ask 
a 10 year old to behave like a 20 year old?’ he rhetorically asked me.
The lecturer’s unequivocal reaction shows that only one interpretation 
of history is acceptable in the class. This interpretation of history stands in 
stark contrast to the one taught in socialist Yugoslavia, where the NDH 
regime was referred to as the enemy within who collaborated with the 
Nazi oppressors (see Chap. 2). Instead, the lecturer’s interpretation is in 
line with that of the first president of Croatia (also a historian), Franjo 
Tuđman, who downplayed the number of victims of the NDH (see 
Campbell 1998). Similar to the lecturer’s argument above, Tuđman had 
stated that when looking back in history, one could see that all national lib-
eration movements were violent to some degree (the same argument is often 
made to justify or at least downplay the crimes committed by the HVO 
in the wars between 1991 and 1995).13 At the same time, when crimes 
committed by Croats are downplayed (or whenever possible, silenced) 
the victimisation of Croats is emphasised. For example, the dominant 
Croat public discourse claims that Tito discriminated against the Croat 
people because of the crimes committed by the NDH.
History was taught in a similar authoritarian and positivist fashion at 
Džemal Bijedić, even if there the opinion was upheld that history teach-
ing in BiH does not need to be separated along national lines. In an inter-
view I conducted with a lecturer of the history department at Džemal 
Bijedić, teaching 20th-century history, he clearly positioned himself 
13 With the election of Croatia’s new Prime Minister, Ivo Sanader, in 2003, and the political changes 
that followed his assumption of office, Croatia has taken a clear position regarding Jasenovac, con-
demning the crimes committed by the NDH regime. In 2004 a memorial site in Jasenovac was 
officially opened and representatives of the church, the Jewish community, as well as the Serb 
minority and the highest politicians of the country, were present (Melčić 2007: 558).
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against nationally biased historiography without questioning the idea of 
‘objective history’ as such. The lecturer promoted a history without 
(national) emotionality, based purely on facts. He indeed argued that 
science has to aim for objectivity and should not be misused for national 
chauvinistic purposes. He indicated that he had no categorical objections 
about the two universities in Mostar as long as they were not oriented along 
national lines. This lecturer’s perception was crucially different from that 
of the Croat lecturer’s discussed earlier in this chapter, who viewed the 
existence of a Croatian-language university as a crucial precondition 
for the national survival of the Croat people in BiH. However, it soon 
became clear that it is the historian who has the authority to claim his-
toric objectivity. In order to make the Bosniak lecturer’s position clearer, 
here is an excerpt from my interview with him:
Are there Croat students at your department?
I think we have some, but only a small and insufficient percentage. Why 
do I think this? History is a national subject and when it comes to national 
subjects like language, history and culture, students mostly believe that they 
can only study this subject at one of the two universities. My opinion, 
frankly, is that students of every nation, not only Croats or Serbs but other 
nations too, Jews… why not? They are welcome to study at this faculty. We 
are gaining knowledge of the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We 
decided right from the beginning that our knowledge of history has to be 
based on documents, not emotions. I’m always telling my students to 
exclude emotions. […] History is really sensitive in that sense and we are 
really trying to be careful not to include those emotions, no matter if this is 
a national subject; we have to analyse our history, our culture, and tradition 
on the basis of real facts. I don’t think only of Bosniaks in BiH, but of all 
nations, why not? All of that is our historical-cultural surrounding in which 
we have developed. We don’t gain knowledge of the history of Bosniaks or 
of Bosnian culture, we don’t have those subjects, our subject is history […].
Do you think objective history is possible?
Yes, why? Absolutely yes, why not? History is beautiful, if it is not mis-
used… could we have objective history? Well, if we are going to consider 
only science, only science and facts, if we are building only on these prem-
ises, we could reach objective history. We cannot have objective history if it 
is based on emotions without facts. I can say that I’m a Bosniak and I love 
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my nation and I will now write against the other nations and for my own 
people without any facts. If I don’t have documents for that or evidence, 
my writing is worthless. […] Here we have one true historical tragedy 
when we talk about Bosniaks, objectively one true tragedy that was always 
created by groups that didn’t have good intentions, not complete ethnic 
groups, but from those radical chauvinistic groups of the Serb and eventually 
the Croat nation. I will briefly go through the history […].
In this excerpt, the lecturer reinforces his disapproval of nationally divided 
universities. He claims that even so-called national subjects do not have to 
be taught separately so long as they are based on objective science. In the 
case of history, the lecturer argues that objective history is possible only if 
one excludes (national) emotions. If history is based on facts and excludes 
emotions, it can be objective and therefore attractive to all students regard-
less of their nationality. However, when we examine the last paragraph of 
the interview cited above, it becomes evident that the decision of what is 
defined as an objective fact lies solely with the respective historian. It is 
the authority his words are granted that enables him to claim objective 
history for himself while denying it to a national counterpart.
As will be explored further in the remainder of the chapter, the victi-
misation of the Bosniak people is at the centre of the Bosniak local his-
tory representation. This is also the point from which the lecturer begins 
his narration, as indicated in his last paragraph cited above, in which he 
legitimises what happened to the Bosniaks as objective historical fact by 
using phrases such as ‘historical tragedy’, a ‘true tragedy’ and ‘objectively 
one true tragedy’ in the same sentence. As I will explore in the next sec-
tion, the Bosniaks, unlike the Croats, do not draw the same conclusion 
about their perceived historical role as victims.
 National Aspirations and Connecting Different 
Historical Periods
At the university lectures I followed, generally little attention was paid to the 
atrocities committed by one’s own national group or to the atrocities expe-
rienced by others, while the victimisation of one’s own group took centre 
stage. ‘National historians have a propensity to characterize perpetrators 
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from their national group as renegades committing isolated acts, while 
perpetrators from rival groups are portrayed as acting out the historical 
will of the offending nationality’ (Donia 2000: 358). While the Bosniaks 
locate their victimhood first and foremost in the war of 1992–1995 and 
in the WWII period, the Croats locate it first and foremost in the time 
of Tito’s Yugoslavia, the 1992–1995 war and the post-war (post- 1995) 
period. Although I will focus on the accusations made by Bosniaks and 
Croats against each other, it is important to stress that Croats as well as 
Bosniaks make strong accusations against Serbs, too. The Serbs are pre-
sented as the initiators of the war by Croats and Bosniaks alike. However, 
since the present conflict lines in Mostar run between Bosniaks and Croats, 
little attention is paid to the third warring party, the Serbs. This is because 
the battle with the Serbs lies more in the past, while for people in Mostar 
the battle between Bosniaks and Croats is clearly situated in the present, 
refers to events in the past, and is all about the future.
In contrast to Sveučiliste where national liberation was proposed as the 
only path towards democracy, strong scepticism was expressed at Džemal 
Bijedić over the feasibility of constructing BiH as a nation-state. The 
claim that BiH has always been a multinational place and must remain 
one is central to the Bosniak-dominant public discourse. In the interview 
I conducted with the lecturer introduced above, this position becomes 
very clear:
Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be constituted as a nation-state. Persistent 
attempts to create a nation-state here caused problems; today we have one 
monster of a state just because of this idea to create a nation-state. We can-
not create a nation-state because history doesn’t allow us to do that. We can 
create a civil state and that is the only way, there is no other!
In the Bosniak-dominant discourse, BiH is presented as a state that always 
has been and should therefore remain multinational. Faruk, another 
Bosniak historian, teaching history in one of Mostar’s secondary schools, 
put it in these words in an interview I conducted with him:
In reality, Bosnia has always been a multilateral community. What the 
European Union is today, a mixture (mješavina) of different nations, a 
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mixture, Bosnia has always been. Bosnia never has been unilateral. She has 
always been multilateral. […] The recent war put Bosnia in great danger. 
Why? Because a great percentage of local Serbs—Bosnian Serbs—and a 
great percentage of Bosnian Croats during this war began to turn against, 
to destroy and to fire at their mother, their Bosnia, their mother, their 
land, with the goal of killing an entire people, the Bosniaks. And that is a 
historical fact.
In this narrative, the Croats as well as the Serbs are polemically represented 
as traitors who have no respect for the nature of BiH, which is portrayed 
as multinational (see Alićehajić 2004). Croats and Serbs—or a great per-
centage of them, as Faruk put it—viewed the loss of the Bosniak people 
with complacency simply in order to achieve their goal of becoming a 
nation-state. Faruk backed up his last statement with the words ‘and that 
is a historical fact’.
A multinational and centralised state, supported by the two historians 
discussed above, is a central claim in the Bosniak-dominant public dis-
course, which is supported by the Bosniak politicians in power. A multi-
national and centralised state would also ensure Bosniaks, who are in the 
numerical majority, a privileged status. In addition, the desire for more 
centralisation is in line with EU regulations that also demand a more 
centralised state. On the other hand, the notion of such a state is heavily 
contested by BiH’s Croats as well as Serbs, who are afraid of losing power 
to the Bosniaks. While the Serbs insist on the continuation of the Serb 
Republic, key Croat political players demand more independence for 
the Croat population, sometimes expressed in the insistence on a Croat 
republic modelled after the already existing Serb Republic. The lecture 
series I attended at Sveučiliste communicated the opposite message from 
the one promoted by Bosniak historians: Croats have been suppressed 
throughout history and only national liberation ensures the freedom of 
the Croat nation. Thus local history was taught as a narrative of Croat 
suppression and their struggle to overcome it.
At Sveučiliste the period of Yugoslavia was central to the lecture series 
I attended; it was presented as a dark period that needed to be overcome 
in order to achieve national liberation. The lecturer who taught the lec-
ture series was not cagey about his negative feelings towards Yugoslavia. 
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He once told his students that one can only laugh at people who remem-
ber Yugoslavia nostalgically as he was sure they did so only because they 
were sentimental about the time they were young and healthy.
For the lecturer, the period of Yugoslavia was only about the sup-
pression of the Croat nation. He holds Tito responsible for trying to 
eliminate national identity through attempts to create a meta-ethnic 
nationalism. ‘Such a nationalism is a nice idea’, the lecturer said some-
what sarcastically, ‘but impossible to realise’. He told the students that at 
the beginning of the 1960s Tito gave in to political pressure and spoke 
publicly about nationalism for the first time although he was afraid that 
nationalism would lead to secession movements. Shortly afterwards, in 
1967, Tito granted the Muslim population a national identity.14 For 
the lecturer, this move by Tito, together with Serb dominance, further 
strengthened the oppression of the Croat nation. Another example he 
provided to underline the institutionalised disempowering of the Croat 
people was Tito’s apparent gerrymandering of municipality borders in 
order to prevent Croats from gaining a majority. The lecturer presented 
Tito to his students as a statesman who sought to erase national feelings; 
yet, so the lecturer argued, nationalism (national liberation) is crucial for 
achieving democracy.
In both the Bosniak- and Croat-dominant public discourses, the past is 
presented in such a way that it serves to legitimise the respective national 
aspirations. Therefore, as argued earlier in this book, representations of the 
past are likely to tell us more about the present state and about aspirations 
for the future than they actually tell us about the past itself. This is true in 
both Bosniak- and Croat-dominant discourses, where not only is the past 
represented in often diametrical ways, but so are the future aspirations of 
the respective nation. In order to validate the suffering of their own nation, 
different historical periods are strung into one coherent narrative, a narra-
tive of victimisation and suppression. It is indeed a central discursive strat-
egy in the Croat- as well as the Bosniak-dominant public discourse, and is 
also a tool heavily drawn upon in school history textbooks in BiH:
14 From then on people could choose the category Muslim (national) in the census while before 
they could only choose between Muslim (religious), undeclared or Yugoslav. Tito’s motivation for 
granting Muslims a national status was to counter-balance the nationalism of the two big nations 
(Serb and Croat) (Isakovic 2000: 80–81).
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Generally entire chapters […] could have been analysed from the point of 
view of how they serve to make the present more understandable by equal-
ising the past and the present. Numerous direct and indirect references 
across time construct the idea of historical continuity and reoccurrence 
when the construction of representations of nation, war and peace in the 
history textbooks is in question. This is true among all three communities. 
(Torsti 2003: 253)
Among local historians, a central discursive strategy was the linking of 
the recent with the more distant past, even if the latter was not officially 
the object of study. Numerous connections to the distant past were made 
in order to reinforce the ancient history of the Croat nation and to point 
out the animosities that Croats have faced throughout time. At the end of 
one lecture in which the national movement was discussed, the lecturer 
suggested a topic for the students’ final paper: the oppression of the Croat 
people, from the Ottoman Empire through to Tito’s Yugoslavia.
The lecturer painted a picture of the Croats as ‘a nation in captivity’ 
during the socialist era. The Croats are presented as a suppressed and dis-
criminated nation that was also economically exploited. This discourse is 
also dominant in Croat history textbooks (Dimou 2007: 131). Moreover, 
Croats are presented as truly liberal:
Croatian political identity is portrayed as primordially liberal and con-
versely, liberalism is identified as the essential political orientation of the 
Croatian nation. As a narrative strategy it is inserted with the intention to 
individualize Croatian history and remove any common frame of reference 
to the second Yugoslavia. (Dimou 2007: 140)
This strategy pointed out by Dimou implies that the Croats did not par-
ticipate in Tito’s socialist project whatsoever. In this national master nar-
rative, Croat liberation was realised with the Homeland War 1991–1995 
(domovinski rat) that led to Croatia’s independence (although indepen-
dence was only fully realised for the Croats in Croatia and not for the 
Croats in BiH). As evident later in this chapter and in some of my inter-
locutors’ narratives in Chaps. 4–6, the fear is that owing to the numerical 
minority of Croats in BiH, Croats will not be able to maintain their 
independence as a nation and, in the worst-case scenario, will disappear 
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altogether (through emigration and assimilation). This fear is taken as jus-
tification by Croats for claiming further national independence. From the 
time the Bosnian Croats gave up their hopes of joining Croatia, claims 
have been made for a separate Croat republic.
In the Bosniak-dominant public discourse, the linking of different 
historical periods is enacted in order to prove the continuous victimisa-
tion of the Bosniak people since the decline of the Ottoman Empire, 
with a short interruption during Tito’s Yugoslavia. Bosniaks are ascribed 
a victim status, while Croats and Serbs are presented as perpetrators 
who disregarded the Bosniaks as a distinct people and aimed to con-
quer them. In order to validate past Bosniak victimisation, the historians 
linked different historical periods. Sometimes the links are explicit, while 
at other times the leaping between different historical periods implies 
that there should be a correlation between them. The war in the 1990s 
thereby is presented as if it were only the latest historical example of 
Bosniak suffering and victimhood. In this narrative, the Croats and Serbs 
are perceived as threats to the Bosniak nation because of their denial of 
the latter’s independent existence. In contrast, Bosniaks present them-
selves as a nation that respects the other nations. Particularly prominent 
is the linking of WWII with the recent war. I will use one specific nar-
rative conveyed to me by the history teacher Faruk to demonstrate this 
linking strategy.
When narrating the local history of the 20th century, two concepts 
were predominant for Faruk: fascism and genocide. He made an explicit 
connection between WWII and the recent war, which for him were both 
initiated by Croat and Serb fascists who committed genocide but were 
finally defeated. Faruk told me that his elaborations on WWII were neces-
sary in order for me to understand the recent war in BiH. At one point 
during his narration he stated:
Serb nationalists, a horde of Chetnics, a fascist unit started a massive 
slaughter (klanje) against the Muslim residents. That was indeed awful; 
unfortunately it repeated itself 50 years later […].
Faruk cemented this link between the two wars because of the recurring 
importance of a specific date, which he took as proof that the recent 
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war was a repetition of WWII. He underpins the connection between 
the aggression against BiH/against the Bosniak nation (he uses the two 
interchangeably) by fascists during WWII and the war of 1992–1995, by 
calling attention to the date of 9 November:
Mostar first went through destruction performed by the Serb fascists, and 
then it went through destruction, an urbicide committed by HVO. And in 
this phase of aggression it came to the final destruction of the Old Bridge, I 
told you already a few days ago, 09 November 1993. This date is deliberately 
chosen. On the same day 60 [55!] years earlier, on 09 November 1938, the 
Kristallnacht (Night of Broken Glass) had taken place in Hitler’s Nazi 
Germany, which marked the beginning of the Holocaust against the Jews 
and everything that took place thereafter in occupied Europe. And on that 
date [09 November 1993] the Old Bridge in Mostar was destroyed! […] The 
destruction of the Old Bridge indeed was a sign for the Croat fascists that the 
Holocaust of the Bosniaks had begun like the Kristallnacht in Nazi Germany 
signalled the beginning of the Holocaust of the Jews. The destruction of the 
Old Bridge for them meant the elimination, the extermination of Bosniaks 
at the riverbank. But that is monstrous, because the Old Bridge is a symbol 
of Bosniaks, but also of Serbs and Croats and Jews and of the entire world!
The close connection Faruk draws between WWII and the recent war, 
and the way he presents Bosniaks as the victims (like the Jews during 
WWII), while presenting the Croats and Serbs as fascist aggressors 
(like the Nazis), is characteristic of the dominant Bosniak public dis-
course.15 In this discourse, the term ‘genocide’ is used freely for different 
kinds of atrocities committed against the Bosniak population. This is also 
common practice in Bosniak history textbooks (see Karge 2008: 15; see 
also Torsti 2003). The term genocide in textbooks is used not only for the 
killing of Bosniaks during 1992–1995, but also for the Ustaša policy that 
aimed to assimilate Bosniaks. Even the early years of the interwar king-
dom (1921–1929) are described as ‘political genocide of the Muslims’ 
(Ramet 2007). It is a common discursive strategy in Bosniak as well as 
in Croat and Serb textbooks to describe local history by using the same 
15 The close link drawn between the recent war and WWII also becomes visible in the commemora-
tions held on 9 May in East Mostar, at the so-called Victory Day over Fascism (Dan pobjede nad 
fašizmom).
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terms for different historical periods. In the case of the Bosniaks, text-
book authors suggest that the recent war can be explained (and perhaps 
could even have been foreseen) by events in the past, by the decade-long 
(or even century-long) hostility of Croats and Serbs against Bosniaks (see 
Torsti 2003: 255).16
 Towards Multi-Perspectivity
As has been shown, while Bosniak and Croat historiographies could hardly 
be more antithetical, the central discursive strategies employed by the his-
torians are similar in many ways. This is particularly true for the discursive 
strategy of linking different historical periods in order to achieve a coher-
ent national narrative that serves present political purposes. This linking is 
used to incorporate the war of 1992–1995 into the meta-narrative, even 
if it is not an explicit subject of discussion, as well as to justify aspirations 
for the nations’ respective futures. In this sense, the way that history is nar-
rated by the historians presented in this chapter is strongly goal-oriented. 
Michael Bakhtin’s notion of chronotope (Bakhtin 1981) is illuminating 
since it pays attention to specific configurations of the time/space rela-
tionship in discourse and ‘(…) the artful interwining of chronotopes can 
create discursive connections among moments presumed to be differently 
located in time and space’ (French 2012: 346). As Bauman reminds us: 
‘Connecting events that are separated in time and often space involves an 
active social process of extracting discourse from one setting and inserting 
it into a new setting’ (Bauman 1986: 22).
Besides linking different chronotopes, discursive strategies of claim-
ing authority and objectivity over history were enacted at both the 
Bosniak- and the Croat-dominated universities. Rather than providing 
sources on which a specific interpretation is based, the lecturers made 
claims that were based on their own authoritative position as historians. 
The lecturers largely gave direct instructions to the students on how 
local history should be understood. Rather than being based on a critical 
16 Such strategies are also prominent in textbooks of other similarly divided societies. In Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot textbooks, for example, national narratives present the future as historically deter-
mined (Papadakis 2008).
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reading of texts, the lecturers gave the students ‘historical facts’. This is 
the way that history is taught to younger pupils as well, as I learned dur-
ing a workshop on multi-perspective textbook writing organised by the 
OSCE together with the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook 
Research. History textbooks used in BiH are often written in an ency-
clopaedic style (listing historical ‘facts’) and do not encourage pupils 
and teachers to engage with different perspectives of historical events. 
There is little room for either interpretation or  discussion, and the his-
tory of everyday life (e.g., from the period of Tito’s Yugoslavia) is entirely 
excluded from most textbooks.
This workshop had invited potential history textbook authors who were 
interested to rethink traditional textbook writing and to investigate new 
ways of teaching history (see Stradling 2001, 2005). Its main aim was to 
discuss multi-perspectivity in textbooks, the goal of which was to create 
room for discussion in the classroom and enable students to judge where 
to locate historical truth themselves.17 Although university students are 
sometimes invited to participate in such discussions in their classrooms, 
they are quickly reprimanded if their representations of history do not 
correspond with the one authorised by the lecturer. Notwithstanding this 
bias, or perhaps precisely because of it, the objectivity of historiography 
is constantly emphasised by Bosniak and Croat historians. Nationalising 
the past goes hand in hand with a coherent authoritarian narration, 
which does not allow any room for multi-perspectivity.
Even if in this chapter the Bosniak and Croat public dominant dis-
courses were discussed separately from the narratives of the three genera-
tions, I am by no means suggesting that we can clearly delineate between 
the two types of narration. The differentiation I make is an analytical 
rather than a real one, as it were. As pointed out in the Introduction, 
the differentiation between discursive strategies (identified in the domi-
nant public discourses) and discursive tactics (identified in the narratives 
17 One project aiming for multi-perspectivity was initiated in 2003 by a group of historians from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia under the umbrella of EUROCLIO (the European 
Association of History Educators) and resulted in a joint textbook Obični ljudi u neobičnoj zemlji, 
svakodnevni život u Bosni i Hercegovini, Hrvatskoj i Srbiji 1945–1990. Jugoslavija između Istoka i 
Zapada (Ordinary People in an Extraordinary Country—Every Day Life in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia and Serbia 1945–1990. Yugoslavia between East and West). In a conversation with one of 
the authors, I was told that until today only a small number of copies have found their way into the 
classroom.
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of  the  three generations) makes clear that individuals who are not pro-
fessionally involved in (re-)writing the past locate their narratives and 
interpretations of the past in a field predefined by the dominant public 
discourse, but at the same time they are not fully determined by it. There 
is no direct transmission between teachers/professors and pupils/students 
nor is there a direct transmission of ‘collective memories’ from genera-
tion to generation. As will be shown in the following chapters, individ-
uals make use of the dominant public discourses in different ways and 
their narratives are never independent from them (even if they position 
themselves strongly against them). The process of making meaning of 
past events and periods is socio-culturally situated and is always co- 
constructed and dialogical (Bakhtin 1981). Personal narratives are informed 
(but not determined) by current dominant public discourses as well as by 
past dominant public discourses that individuals of different generations 
have been exposed to (particularly during formative and educative years).
Even if this means that personal narratives cannot be neatly separated 
from the dominant public discourses promoted by professionals involved 
in the ‘national project’, an analytical differentiation helps to carve out the 
particular ways by which individuals of different generational positioning 
reposition themselves vis-à-vis the past after great political changes have 
occurred. Moreover, it allows us to take into consideration the impact on 
and responses to dominant public discourses by individuals, who draw 
on a specific range of personal experiences and share a certain stage of life, 
a certain life situation.
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Two Wars and Tito In-Between:  
The First Yugoslavs
This chapter focuses on the First Yugoslavs, the oldest generation. The First 
Yugoslavs were born before WWII and were adolescents or young adults 
when Tito’s Yugoslavia was established. The First Yugoslavs’ discursive 
tactics show that the suffering caused by the war of 1992–1995 is likely 
to be embedded in a wider narrative of suffering, which starts before 
that war. Interpretative templates from WWII are taken to make sense of 
experiences during the recent war.
Owing to the experience of WWII early in their lives, the war in the 
1990s did not seem to come as a total surprise for the First Yugoslavs. 
Even if it cannot be claimed that this generation expected the 1990s war, 
they were still more ‘prepared’ for it; they also knew that national identi-
ties can be radicalised and komšiluk (neighbourliness) endangered. One 
of my younger interlocutors once told me that her grandfather insisted on 
building concrete walls in their house to provide shelter in case of a future 
war. The younger family members always teased him about his quirky 
behaviour, but today they believe that he was actually right in distrusting 
peace. In addition, he had insisted that WWII was much worse in nature 
than the recent war my young interlocutor, his granddaughter, had expe-
rienced; nevertheless, this difference as a result of life experience does not 
change the fact that the First Yugoslavs also suffered greatly during the 
1990s war. I by no means suggest that there is a scale of suffering according 
to generation.
Moreover, the First Yugoslavs’ narratives are characterised by a reluc-
tance to refer to clear-cut national identities and instead to retain other 
social demarcations, such as along a rural–urban divide. This will be 
discussed in relation to the idea of pravi Mostarci (true Mostarians). In 
the second part of the chapter, the discussion moves from the individual 
to a more collective level. Based on observations at a commemoration 
ceremony, I analyse how members of the First Yugoslavs generation 
engage in keeping the memory of the Partisan fight alive, while at the 
same time linking it to the recent war. At this commemoration cer-
emony, victims of the Croat NDH regime of WWII and victims of the 
Croat quasi republic Herceg-Bosna in the 1990s merge together as ‘vic-
tims of fascism’. Thus the once multinational character of the Partisan 
commemoration has increasingly become a Bosniak commemoration, 
even if this is not at the attention of its key proponents. By supporting 
the Bosniak-dominant public discourse, the Partisan commemoration 
runs the risk of failing in its self-declared aim to fight not only fascism 
but also nationalism.
 Otvoreno srce
At Otvoreno srce (Open Heart), a centre mainly funded by foreigners but 
locally run,1 is a place where elderly people can socialise and share a hot 
meal. Otvoreno srce is located in Zalik, a neighbourhood in East Mostar.2 
Although it is situated in East Mostar, Otvoreno srce is explicitly open to 
people of all nationalities. A shuttle bus serves everyone, those living in 
the eastern as well as those living in the western part of Mostar. Otvoreno 
srce makes announcements on public radio stations to inform all elderly 
1 Based on an interview conducted with staff at Udruženje Žena B&H (Association Woman B&H), 
which runs Otvoreno srce.
2 In 2010 Otvoreno srce moved to bigger premises in Tekija.
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people in Mostar of their activities. Although Mostar has several klub 
penzionera (senior clubs), these are mostly attended by men and are not 
nationally integrated. During weekdays, the elderly arrive at Otvoreno srce 
around 10 a.m. and spend their day socialising. They engage in exercises 
for the body and the mind, play cards, drink coffee and enjoy an inexpen-
sive hot lunch. There is also some exchange of home-made goods, from 
knitted socks to milk and bread. In the early afternoon the shuttle bus 
drives them back to their homes.
Otvoreno srce was clearly a place dominated by women, although a few 
men were present too. One can also tell that women had taken over the 
place by the way the walls were decorated with their hand-made embroi-
deries and other handicrafts. Popular topics of discussion were prices (from 
that of vegetables to renting flats) and diseases and their cures. Personal 
problems and family issues, as well as local politics were also spoken about.
I received a very warm welcome at Otvoreno srce, where it seemed 
everyone was happy to have a new (and young) face around. From the 
beginning, the elderly people literally took me by the hand, patted my 
shoulder, whispered little secrets into my ears and invited me for coffee. 
Without expecting much in return, besides my presence, they almost 
treated me as if they were my grandparents. The staff also welcomed me, 
treating me like a new staff member. I was invited to lead the morning 
gymnastics and to introduce new games and other activities. Here, I was 
able to conduct participant observation in the full sense of the meaning.
 Nostalgia for Tito
One day in March 2007, when I visited Otvoreno srce, I found five elderly 
women sitting on the big comfortable sofa, singing the following lines of 
the famous Tito song:
Druže Tito, mi ti se kunemo, mi ti se kunemo. Da sa tvoga puta ne skrenemo, 
puta ne skrenemo. Druže Tito, preko Romanije, preko Romanije. Ti odvodi 
svoje divizije, svoje divizije.
(Dear friend Tito, we swear an oath, we swear an oath. That we will 
not turn away from your path, we will not turn away from your path. 
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Dear friend Tito, over Romanija [mountain in Bosnia], over Romanija. 
You take your divisions, your divisions.)
The women remembered the words as if they had rehearsed them every 
day over the past 17 years, dating back to when the statesman to whom 
this song is a tribute died. While singing it, their faces brightened and 
the song seemed to fill them with energy and joy. It obviously triggered 
strong emotions, coupled with memories of the ‘good old days’. Research 
on musical memory has shown that older people in particular use famil-
iar songs to revive moods from the past, which may intensify feelings of 
nostalgia (Van Dijck 2006). This was clearly the case with the women 
at Otvoreno srce. Immediately after the singing stopped, however, these 
pleasant memories became overshadowed almost, as if the women once 
again realised that these days were gone. A lively conversation arose 
among them:
Woman 1: There were Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Tito’s army. 
Together they fought for justice. That justice remains and we remain!
Woman 2: And if this would not have come over us, it would still be…
Woman 1: And until today… we would be together. But they came 
here and divided us. The Croats left there, the Serbs there. We… we 
were left to go nowhere.
Woman 3: Says a Mostarian [laughs].
Woman 2: A powerful state [Yugoslavia], the third most powerful in the 
world. And that had to be razed. And when it disintegrated… because 
there were Slovenes, Macedonians and all the others in Yugoslavia. And 
of course Croatia with Zagreb. This all was Yugoslavia.
I: Did you travel a lot?
Woman 2: Yes, of course, always! I still travel around today. One could 
go everywhere, everywhere, of course! One could go to Zagreb, one 
could go to Belgrade, to…
Woman 3: Back then there was no visa. There was no visa. There was…
Woman 2: There was no visa!
Woman 4: You could sleep on the bench on the street. Nobody would 
have done anything to you, not ‘ha’, not ‘mu’, even in the deep forest. 
Nothing would have happened to you, no one would have attacked you, 
let me tell you! And now you cannot even sleep peacefully in your house. 
You wait until someone comes for you, kills you. That’s the way it is.
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Woman 1: There is no work. If there were jobs, if they would open factories, 
everything would be a little different. If one would care. […] If the 
world would care! If people would have jobs, if factories were opened, I 
tell you how much more Mostar would be united.
Woman 4: I have three grandchildren. Not one of them works. No one 
works! Only their mother works, she cares, she cares, of course, what else 
could she do? What else could she do, she wants to provide her children 
with university education. What can you do?
This conversation came quickly, just after the cheerful singing had ended. 
It seemed as if the women felt a great urge to share their thoughts and 
opinions. The Tito song was a powerful trigger for memories as well as 
for immediate statements on present-day developments. As is made clear 
throughout, the narratives about Yugoslavia are never only ‘memories’ but 
always position the speaker in relation to recent developments. Whether 
the speaker wishes to make a political statement or not, the way one posi-
tions oneself vis-à-vis Yugoslavia always refers to the state of the present 
political and economic situation.
Let us now examine more closely the themes that were brought up in the 
conversation among the women at Otvoreno srce. The conversation started 
with praise for a strong and powerful Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is remembered 
as a state that was strong to the outside world (in terms of international 
power relations) and strong within as it kept the different nations together. 
But then the women said that its strength was a thorn in the side of other 
powerful national and international actors, making it a target for destruction.
My question about travel, however, turned the conversation towards 
the women’s personal experiences. The women stressed repeatedly that 
during the time of Yugoslavia there were no visa requirements, so they 
could travel freely. The freedom of movement associated with the red 
(Yugoslav) passport is sentimentally remembered by all those who today 
possess a (blue) BiH passport. Those of Mostar’s Croats who hold a 
Croat passport face far fewer visa requirements than those who only 
hold a BiH passport, and are free to travel and to enter the EU. In 2009 
the EU granted visa liberation to Serbia (but not to BiH), which also 
allowed Bosnian Serbs holding a Serb passport freedom of movement. 
This development left those who were only citizens of BiH—mostly 
Bosniaks—at a great disadvantage. The visa liberation granted to Serbia 
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and other Yugoslav successor states, but which excluded BiH, fuelled 
the visa debate and provoked strong emotions. In this debate Bosniaks 
reacted to their disadvantageous position and claimed that these develop-
ments have led to a state where former war criminals (who are mostly still 
at large) are allowed to travel freely to EU countries, while victims of the 
war are locked inside their non-functioning country. Although I sym-
pathise with Bosniaks’ feelings of unfair treatment, it has to be said that 
these visa regimes actually create an ‘atmosphere of entrapment’ (Jansen 
2009: 819) for anyone who is affected by it, regardless of nationality.
Returning to the women’s conversation at Otvoreno srce, we see that 
the claim of freedom of movement previously experienced is immedi-
ately followed by their claim of now being fearful in their homes. I do not 
know how many times I have heard statements like this; that in the time 
of Yugoslavia you could sleep on the park bench, in the forest and so on 
and nothing would have happened to you. Such statements are commonly 
employed by the First and Last Yugoslavs, and serve as a metaphor to illus-
trate the feelings of security experienced during the time of Yugoslavia. I 
assume, however, that it is more than a metaphor for just physical security 
(in contrast to the physical threat of the wartime) but is rather an expres-
sion of an overall feeling of security (physical, social and economic).
At the end of the conversation cited, the women refer to the bad eco-
nomic situation Mostar faces today. Here, again, the present situation is 
compared with Tito’s Yugoslavia. Interestingly, one speaker draws a direct 
connection between the weak economy and high unemployment with 
the tensions between Bosniaks and Croats. This connection is interest-
ing insofar as international observers more often than not simply reduce 
the dire relationship between Bosniaks and Croats to hatred. When we 
remember that Tito’s goal of Brotherhood and Unity was coupled with 
the goal of prosperity, the women’s awareness of this correlation may 
come from their experience of socialist times.
 Displacement and Loss of Family
Although the subjects of children and family were often an easy way to 
engage in conversations with elderly people, I soon realised that talk-
ing about family could be a sore point in the elderly women’s memories. 
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Similar to the destruction of good neighbourliness, good family life was 
greatly interrupted and families were often dispersed on account of the 
war. Indulging in a conversation about children and grandchildren was 
likely to bring to the surface stories of loss and suffering. Many close 
family members, such as children, spouses and siblings, died during the 
war; most of the deaths were directly or indirectly caused by war. As I 
soon realised, even seemingly shallow conversations had the potential to 
reveal great wounds. Once, for example, I was sitting with a small group 
of people at Otvoreno srce when one woman said she liked the necklace 
with the small blue stone I was wearing. Thereupon another woman 
announced that she had a similar piece of jewellery that was stolen dur-
ing the war. When she noticed my concerned look, she added that mate-
rial things are unimportant and the only thing that counts are loved 
ones. She then recounted with a shaky voice and tears in her eyes that 
she originally came from Goražde and had lost her husband and one of 
her two sons during the war. The dead bodies of her loved ones had been 
thrown on a rubbish dump, so she was unable to say goodbye to them, 
and only saw on TV the mass grave where they found the remains of her 
husband and son.
When the woman from Goražde ended her story, another woman 
from Mostar followed on with hers. Her story started with the loss of her 
brother around 40 years ago. At that time she was pregnant, and the sad 
news about her brother’s death caused the premature birth of her baby. As 
there were no incubators in Mostar’s hospitals, the baby was transported 
to Sarajevo but did not survive the journey. Thereafter she lost three more 
babies. During the last war she also lost her husband. The ‘Chetnics’ 
killed him, she told us, so the only family she has left today is her father. 
Only when I got to know her better after several visits to Otvoreno srce did 
I learn that her husband was not actually killed by a Serb soldier, which I 
had assumed from her previous statement. She also later told me that she 
was in a mixed marriage, since she was a Bosniak and her husband a Serb 
(or at least these were the identities ascribed to them), while they actually 
saw themselves as Yugoslavs. During the entire war, her husband had to 
hide in their flat in West Mostar. According to her description, he was in 
constant fear for his life, which made him sick and resulted in his death. 
Although his death was not directly caused by the war, in her opinion the 
war nevertheless killed him. I heard similar stories from other bereaved 
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people about deaths that were linked to the war even if the war did not 
directly cause them.3
It needs to be added that the stories about broken families revolved 
not only around the death of close family members, but also the 
absence of family members as a result of emigration (forced or other-
wise). There is hardly a family in Mostar whose members all still live 
in BiH. Many fled during the war to other Yugoslav successor states 
(especially to Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia) but also to other European 
and non-European countries. Many of them never returned to BiH, 
especially the children and grandchildren of the First Yugoslavs. The 
wish to return was stronger among the First Yugoslavs themselves, and 
many of this generation said they were unable to learn the language 
or to become accustomed to the different mentality and climate with 
which they were confronted. Moreover, elderly people who fled the 
Yugoslav wars very much depended on their children, with whom they 
usually shared an apartment in exile, and their decision to return has 
also been affected by their concern not to become a burden to younger 
family members (see Leutloff-Grandits 2006).
The First Yugoslavs’ longing to return home was so strong that they 
often grasped the first chance to do so once the war was over, hoping 
that the family they had left behind in the host country would eventu-
ally follow them. Many people of this generation moved back to their 
pre-war homes, even if it was now on the ‘wrong’ side. This is mostly 
true for Bosniaks who moved back to their flats in West Mostar. Overall, 
they said that they feel safe today but that komšiluk (neighbourliness) 
has changed (see Chap. 2). Their relationship with their neighbours has 
become superficial and is reduced to simply exchanging greetings. The 
pre- war coffee visits common among neighbours and the support they 
once gave one another is now lost, they say.
3 During my stay in Mostar I became friends with a young Bosniak man whose parents had died 
shortly after the war ended. He blames their death on their strong political commitment to a united 
Mostar during the war in the 1990s and them holding on to the ideal of Brotherhood and Unity at 
a time when it was already clear that this would not be realised, even once the war was over. When 
they saw that even their closest friends had betrayed the ideal of a multinational Mostar, they 
became extremely depressed and lost their will to live.
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In order to reveal the specificities of the First Yugoslavs generation 
further, two persons, Danica and Armen, and their narratives will be 
introduced in the following sections.
 Danica: More than One Rupture in a Lifetime
I met Danica at Otvoreno srce. Born in 1926, Danica was the oldest of the 
women I met at the centre. Only quite a while after I first met her did I learn 
that she is a Catholic. Interestingly, she did not refer to herself as ‘Croat’ 
but only as Catholic. It is not uncommon among the oldest members of 
the population to refer to the three ‘nations’ according to their religion—as 
Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox—as had been common before the rise 
of nationalism. While younger generations still use the term ‘Muslim’ and 
‘Bosniak’ alternately, they no longer refer to Croats and Serbs as Catholics 
and Orthodox, respectively. This linguistic usage manifests clearly how 
identity categories have changed their meanings even within a lifetime.
Danica’s parents migrated from Czechoslovakia to Sarajevo at the 
beginning of the 20th century, where she lived until she married a 
Mostarian and moved to his hometown. Today, she feels closer to Mostar 
than to Sarajevo since she has spent more than 50 years in Mostar. When 
Danica and I sat together, she liked to talk about the beautiful Mostar 
of the time when she was young. Central to her narratives were places 
where young people liked to spend time, among them the Old Bridge 
and šetalište (pedestrian street) at Rondo (today in West Mostar), and sto-
ries of a happy family life. In 1992, Danica lost most of her closest kin, 
including her husband, father, mother, brother and sister. A couple of 
years later one of her two daughters died. All of them, she said, died of 
a ‘natural’ death. Now she lives together with her daughter’s former hus-
band and her grandson.4
Danica’s grandson is an active figure in a well-established youth NGO 
in Mostar. She is very proud of his being a public figure in Mostar, where 
4 In BiH, where it is still relatively uncommon to move older family members to an old people’s 
home. The elderly either still live in their own homes where they are looked after (mostly by a 
daughter or daughter-in-law), or if they cannot live independently anymore they move in with the 
family of one of their children or other younger relatives.
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he is even present in the media. Danica once told me with pride that 
both were asked by a local radio station to appear in one of its shows. 
They invited her to sing a traditional Sevdalinka. Danica had taken sing-
ing lessons and voice training when she was young and still likes to sing. 
Sometimes, she also sings for her friends at Otvoreno srce and they like to 
join in. She is most successful in animating others to join in her singing 
when she intones Tito songs.
For Danica, Mostar is closely linked with Tito, whom she will never 
stop admiring for what he achieved for her country, Yugoslavia. For her, 
like for many others of her generation, Tito is more like a saint than an 
ordinary mortal. When I once asked Danica what Tito meant for Mostar, 
she answered:
Everything, just everything! He was an extraordinary man, everyone 
thought that! Everyone liked him, everyone! He was, I don’t know, I don’t 
know, and he indeed was, also for the others, a brilliant man. Tito! They 
made a beautiful mausoleum for him. He truly was a man for the people, 
for the poor ones, for the gypsies. He did not care who was who but just 
cared for everyone, helped everyone as much as he could. He really was a 
great man! And as long as he was alive we lived, how do you say, ‘ko bubreg 
u loju’ [‘like a kidney in lard’, meaning they had plenty of everything, simi-
lar to the English expression ‘like a bee in clover’].
In Danica’s eyes, Tito had committed his life to helping people live a 
worthwhile life and treated everyone equally, regardless of their ethno- 
religious background. This is why she describes Tito’s death as a great 
drama with one straightforward, unhappy consequence: the end of 
peaceful coexistence.
It might be easy to think that Danica must be very pessimistic about 
her country’s future since the man who in her opinion held every-
thing together had died. Interestingly, however, this is not quite true. 
Sometimes, I had the feeling with Danica that she somehow stands 
‘above politics’. When talking to her, I gained the impression that she 
did not consider the recent war was any of her business. Once, she said 
she still did not see why she should not be friends with a Muslim or an 
Orthodox. Indeed, Danica’s best friend, who is also a regular visitor at 
Otvoreno srce, is Muslim. What binds them together is that they both 
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grew up in Sarajevo and they both perceive themselves as true city dwell-
ers; religion or national background to them is secondary.
Danica feels empowered enough to at least improve her life by coming 
to Otvoreno srce every morning to socialise with other women. Although a 
lot of her optimism is likely due to her personality, I observed that the First 
Yugoslavs compared to the Last Yugoslavs actually expressed fewer feelings 
of despair (see Palmberger 2008). As will become clear in Chap. 5, the Last 
Yugoslavs feel much more at the mercy of history and as if they have been 
caught off-guard by history more so than the generation discussed here. 
Moreover, it seemed to me that Danica also realised that, because of the 
long life she already has behind her, national categories are less primordial 
than they are said to be, but are instead artificial creations. She herself has 
seen how national categories suddenly appear (e.g., the category ‘Muslim’ 
in the national census) or change their meaning. It is the second time that 
she has experienced a war in her home country, including war among the 
Yugoslav people. While the situation looked grim after WWII, people 
somehow found a way to live together. Perhaps this experience gives her 
hope that what has been possible once will be possible again.
When Danica told me about the recent war, she often linked it to 
WWII. This she did in two ways. Firstly, through her personal experiences 
she remembers WWII as more threatening than the recent war. Secondly, 
she saw that the fight against fascism had to be fought twice, during WWII 
and during the recent war. Generally, WWII took a more prominent role 
in her narratives than the war in the 1990s. Moreover, it was interesting to 
note that Danica often misunderstood my questions if they concerned the 
war in the 1990s. When, for example, I asked her a question related to the 
recent war but only referred to it as ‘the war’, she assumed I was asking her 
about WWII and not about the war in the 1990s. During that conversa-
tion, I was speaking with her about Otvoreno srce when she said that it had 
become her second home; she always finds nice people there to talk to, 
regardless of their religious affiliations. When I asked her what they liked 
to speak about, she answered ‘just about everything’. When I asked her if 
this included the war, she affirmed it and added:
I have to tell you, I remember this time better… and how it was during the 
war than let’s say what happened here yesterday or the day before yesterday. 
It is just like that, that I simply remember it better!
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Were you in Mostar during the war?
Yes I was, yes I was. Half of the time in Sarajevo and half of the time in 
Mostar. In Sarajevo I met my husband. He was a sports official. And I mar-
ried him, he was a Mostarian. And when I married him we moved to 
Mostar and there I stayed.
From her last sentences I realised that Danica was elaborating on WWII 
and not on the recent war. I realised that I had to explain myself better 
when speaking with someone who was old enough to hold vivid memo-
ries of WWII. In contrast, in conversations with the younger generations 
it seemed self-explanatory to them (and to me) that ‘the war’ referred to 
the war of the 1990s. For Danica, memories of WWII are very present, 
often more present than the immediate past.
While the narratives of the Last Yugoslavs all circle around the turn-
ing point of the 1992–1995 war and are classified either as stories of 
‘before the war’ or ‘after the war’, this is not the case, at least not to the 
same extent, among the First Yugoslavs generation. This is because the 
war in the 1990s is not the only disruption in the oldest generation’s 
lives around which their narratives are structured. Most of them possess 
very vivid memories of WWII. In conversations with Danica, I realised 
that WWII and the fear she went through during that time occupied her 
thoughts more than the recent war.
That the memories of the Last Yugoslavs were less marked by the war in 
the 1990s became also visible when initiating an activity at Otvoreno srce, 
asking the participants (including Danica) to name the most important 
places in BiH and later in the entire former Yugoslavia. In a second round 
I asked them to tell me their memories of these places from the time 
when they were young and their associations with the cities and towns 
I had drawn on the board. In a third round I asked how these places 
had changed in the intervening time and how they look now. The elderly 
people were all women, aside from Adis, a self-declared Yugoslav and athe-
ist. All were very engaged in the activity and first named many cities and 
towns spread all over Yugoslavia. These places were then associated with a 
lot of different things, for example, nature (vegetation, mountains, lakes 
and so on), the local industry or local specialities. When I finally asked 
them how these places had changed since when they were young, their 
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answers were strikingly apolitical. For example, they said that one place 
had become more polluted or another place had more car traffic now than 
when they were young. Only at the end of the exercise did Adis, who 
stood slightly apart from the others, say that one of the towns is now 
populated mainly by Serbs while before the war the Muslim population 
had been in the majority. I was amazed that this was the only politically 
critical contribution during the entire exercise, since many of the places 
written on the board have seen extreme violence and severe population 
shifts. I, for my part, had associated many of the places with the war 
in the 1990s, for example, with detention camps, which I had learned 
about through news coverage during the time of the war or from reading 
about them later.
One could argue that the older people had purposefully avoided asso-
ciating the places with war and atrocities in order not to offend anyone in 
the room. However, I had listened to politically controversial conversa-
tions at Otvoreno srce before, when I was amazed by how openly people 
attacked one of the former war parties. While not precluding that this 
was one of the reasons for the participants’ apolitical behaviour, I strongly 
believe that it is neither the only reason nor the most decisive one and 
that it is first and foremost connected to their generational positioning as 
will be discussed below.
The second of the three individuals belonging to the First Yugoslavs 
I discuss in this chapter is a man whom I met during my first visit to 
Mostar and with whom I kept in contact over several years. From his 
narrative we learn about his powerful identification with Mostar and its 
history, which was particularly strong among those belonging to the First 
Yugoslavs generation.
 Armen: A ‘True Mostarian’ Embedded in Local 
History
I met Armen for the first time during my first visit to Mostar in 2003, 
when I rented a room from him. When I finally moved to Mostar with 
my husband and our twin sons, he eventually hosted all of us. It was a 
pleasure to live at his house for several weeks because of his kind and 
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humorous nature, and because of the many stories he shared with us. 
As I soon found out, Armen’s house has an open door policy, not only 
welcoming foreigners but also German language students studying at the 
nearby university Džemal Bijedić. His young friends provide him with 
company and he in return provides them with local culinary treats as 
Armen is a gifted cook. As a former German teacher, he was also able to 
help with language issues.
Armen has spent his entire life in Mostar, with only a short interruption 
during the 1990s war when he first fled to Croatia for a few months and 
then to Turkey where he stayed until 1996. He is still grateful to Turkey for 
hosting him during the time of war. Armen originally studied German and 
his German is still excellent even if some words sound antiquated. It must 
be said that Armen is no exception among his generation, one that still feels 
a strong bond to the former Austrian-Hungarian monarchy. I encountered 
a man in Sarajevo who illustrates this connection very well. He was a child 
during the end of the Habsburg occupation and was sent to Austria by his 
father every summer to improve his German. When sharing his memo-
ries with me, we shared a Viennese Sachertorte (typical Viennese chocolate 
cake) and drank coffee in a café in Sarajevo’s Old Town called Wiener Café. 
It was touching for me, as an Austrian, to see these old bonds between 
Austria and BiH still sustained in this old man who spoke old-fashioned 
Austrian German and incorporated the so-called Viennese-School in the 
way he conducted himself. The Viennese café, on the other hand, I recog-
nised as a place for reviving old bonds for a ‘new’ Sarajevo identity.
Armen’s strong bond to the German language is also connected to the 
Habsburg history, which he ‘remembers’ as a good period for Mostar and 
all of BiH, although, in contrast to the man I met in Sarajevo, he holds 
no personal memories of it but only memories transmitted to him by 
older family members. Armen is an experienced city guide and several 
times I had the pleasure of walking around Mostar with him. It was fas-
cinating to see how he revived the history of the buildings and places we 
visited. It must be said, though, that his tour always only covered East 
Mostar. He did not make this an issue, as if it was self-evident why we did 
not cross over to West Mostar.
According to Armen, Mostar has a long history of occupation that 
continues to this day. ‘We have always been under occupation’, he said, 
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‘first under the Ottomans, then under the Habsburgs, then under the 
fascists and now under the Europeans!’ Of the first two occupiers—the 
Ottomans and Habsburgs—he painted an entirely positive picture. 
He emphasised their achievements, especially the harmonious coexistence 
of BiH’s different religious groups during the Ottoman occupation and 
the great architectural realisations of that time. He praised the Habsburgs 
first and foremost for the construction of public buildings (e.g., schools 
and hospitals) and infrastructure (e.g., roads and railways). When he 
spoke of Kaiser Franz Josef and his heir to the throne Franz Ferdinand, 
he almost sounded sentimental. He still remembered the positive feelings 
old people held for the Kaiser. He also told me that Mostarians warned 
Franz Ferdinand not to travel to Sarajevo but that he, unfortunately, did 
not heed their advice. Armen is sure that a great number of Mostarians 
were deeply upset when they learned about the assassination of Franz 
Ferdinand and his pregnant wife by ‘Serb terrorists’.
When on our tours we finally arrived at the Stari most (Old Bridge), 
Armen revealed a great repertoire of stories about it including legends about 
its construction (and destruction) and its meaning for Mostar. He made it 
clear that he was still upset about its destruction. Stari most survived WWII, 
Armen told me. When the Italian fascists planned to blast it the Partisans 
prevented the demolition by cutting the fuse just in time. To his great sor-
row, the Croats managed to destroy the bridge in November 1993. The stari 
(as he sometimes liked to address the Old Bridge as if it were human, an old 
man) was a place of his youth. This was a common sentiment among many 
others of his generation (regardless of their nationality) who remembered 
the Old Bridge as a meeting point for young people, where often memories 
of first romances are tied to the famous bridge. As we have seen in the case of 
Danica, for Croats of this generation the bridge is likely to possess a similar 
importance as it does for Bosniaks. As such, it is clear that Croats of this 
generation have not taken on the dominant Croat discourse that distances 
itself strongly from the Ottoman past. The importance of the Old Bridge 
among members of this generation, regardless of their national background, 
suggests that the emotional bond that connects Armen with the Stari most 
cannot be reduced simply to his Bosniak identity (Fig. 4.1).
Armen perceives and presents himself as a pravi Mostarac (true 
Mostarian). He has a long family history in Mostar. When he talks about 
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pravi Mostarci (true Mostarians) he does not refer to everyone born in 
Mostar but only to those belonging to the well-educated pre-war elite. 
Most of them left the country during the war and did not return, but there 
still is a small number who remained. Armen often expressed his dislike 
of present developments in the city in statements such as ‘Mostar used 
to be a small city but today it is a big village!’, an expression I have often 
heard from so-called pravi Mostarci. With such statements my interlocu-
tors blamed the refugees who came from rural BiH to settle in Mostar for 
spoiling the city with their uncultured behaviour. They also linked the 
decay of good neighbourliness to the newcomers. This is a phenomenon 
not restricted to Mostar, but one that can also be found in other places 
in BiH (see Helms 2008; Jansen 2005; Maček 2009; Stefansson 2007).
The group identity of pravi Mostarci is strengthened through local 
activities, such as celebrations of local artists. One of these celebrations 
I joined was dedicated to Aleksa Šantić (1868–1924), a Bosnian-Serb poet 
Fig. 4.1 During one of the memory-guided city tours with Armen, at Stari 
most. Photo by the author
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who lived most of his life in Mostar. Through his poems he attempted to 
overcome national boundaries and provide a pan-Slavic vision. Although 
at the ceremony in question that took place on 2 February 2006, the 
wreath ceremony was organised by the head of Mostar’s Serb cultural 
centre (Srpsko prosvjetno i kulturno društvo prosvjeta), the small group of 
people who attended were of different national backgrounds. The people 
present were in their 50s to 80s. From an earlier conversation with the head 
of the Serb cultural centre, and from an Orthodox Christmas celebration I 
had attended, I knew that the Mostar’s Serb cultural centre viewed itself as 
a place open to all nations interested in Serb culture and arts.
The ceremony in question took place on the 82nd anniversary of the 
writer’s death. But before commemorating Šantić, another local poet, 
Osman Đikić, was remembered at his honorary grave, which is located close 
to the Old Town in East Mostar. Šantić’s grave, which was visited next, 
is located at the Orthodox graveyard on the hills in East Mostar, close to 
Mostar’s Orthodox cathedral which was destroyed during the war (Fig. 4.2).
Fig. 4.2 At the anniversary commemoration of Mostar’s poet Aleksa Šantić, 
2006. Photo by the author
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After the ceremony, which I attended together with Larissa Vetters, 
another anthropologist, we conversed with the participants. They were 
very open and interested in our research projects and particularly liked 
the idea that I was interested in memories of Mostar. Without further 
questioning, our interlocutors were sure that I was interested in learning 
about the true Mostar, ‘Mostar’s soul’ as they put it. This, they assured 
me I would only find if I spoke with public figures who had been active 
in politics and culture in pre-war Mostar. My interlocutors became so 
excited about this that they wrote down a list of people whom I should 
contact. This list solely included public figures from pre-war Mostar, such 
as mayors, poets and artists. Afterwards, they took us on a tour through 
the Old Town where they introduced us to several artists. On this occa-
sion, we also visited the studio of Jusuf Jusa Nikšić, a local painter, who 
invited us for a drink (local rakija). At the end of our tour visiting pravi 
Mostarci one of our ‘guides’ told us in a dramatic voice that it will take 
decades to educate the rural newcomers on how to behave in a city. 
Thereupon he said that Mostar experienced something like Hiroshima 
and, accordingly, will take a long time to recover.
Although Armen did not take part in the particular ceremony described, 
it is the same ‘Mostar’s soul’ that he and the participants at Šantić’s com-
memoration cherish. Even if this local identity is not confined to the First 
Yugoslavs, it is possible to say that it is particularly strong among them. 
In the cases of Armen and Danica, local identity, at least at times, even 
overcomes national identity. This shared local time also implies a shared 
generational past crossing ethno-national borders.
Summarising, we can say that the First Yugosalvs’ narratives show more 
coherence and are less ruptured than the narratives of the Last Yugoslavs 
discussed in the next chapter. Furthermore, they are less penetrated by 
the present dominant public discourses than the narratives of the younger 
generations, the Last Yugoslavs and the Post-Yugoslavs. Due to the far- 
reaching experiences connected to their age, the First Yugoslavs have a 
sense of the constructedness of nationality. This gives them—at least at 
times—the possibility of resisting the present rigid use of national cat-
egories. For example, religious and local identities among this generation 
are still prominent, but a Yugoslav identity, tightly connected to Tito, 
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also prevails among the First Yugoslavs. Moreover, the First Yugosalvs are 
more optimistic that the different groups will live peacefully together in 
the future. This more optimistic outlook than their younger co-patriots 
is likely to be connected to their experiences of the post-WWII period, 
when the different ethno-national groups found a way to live together 
peacefully. Furthermore, nostalgia among First Yugoslavs for a shared 
time was less painful than for the Last-Yugoslavs and gave the narratives 
of the former a potential optimistic outlook that things will improve.
The First Yugoslavs’ reluctance to current national politics and develop-
ments is also related to the particular life situation they find themselves 
in. In contrast to the Last Yugoslavs, who are in mid-life, have to make a 
living and often are responsible for caring for children (and for their par-
ents too), the First Yugoslavs are not entangled in local post-war everyday 
politics in the same way. The First Yugoslavs find themselves in a period of 
their lives that allows them to delve into the past much more than the two 
younger generations, resulting in a strong feeling of a shared generational 
past (with special emphasis on Tito’s early Yugoslavia). They also felt freer 
to return to their pre-war homes (even if they were on the ‘other side’ of 
the city) and to find spaces to cherish the (multinational) past with others 
of their generation, as at Otvoreno srce or at the Partisan commemoration 
day that is the subject of the rest of the chapter.
Of course, we have to consider that I met many of this generation at 
Otvoreno srce, a place where all nationalities are welcome. It therefore 
attracts people who do not perceive nationality as a strict line of division 
and this means that I was likely to meet a disproportionately high num-
ber of people of this generation who resist rigid national categorisation. 
Moreover, none of my key interlocutors of this generation was loyal to 
the Croat NDH regime of WWII. Notwithstanding all this, it became 
clear that for the First Yugoslavs national identity is not such a power-
ful categorisation as it is for the Last Yugoslavs and the Post-Yugoslavs, 
even if compared to those of younger generations who I met at places 
as mixed as Otvoreno srce. It is certainly not the exclusive privilege of the 
First Yugoslavs to resist and challenge Mostar’s national division. ‘Border 
crossers’ can be found among all three generations as shown elsewhere 
(Palmberger 2013a).
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 Remembering the Partisan Past: Old Form, 
New Meaning
Mostar still has a Partisan association with mainly elderly members.5 It is one 
of the SUBNOR (Savez udruženja boraca Narodno-oslobodilackog rata, 
The Federation of Associations of Veterans of the National Liberation 
War) that existed in former Yugoslavia. The president of SUBNOR of 
Herzegovina-Neretva Canton is Alija Bijavica, a man in his 80s who is 
easily identifiable from his appearance and the way he acts and commu-
nicates as a member of the pre-war urban elite. He has been president 
of the canton corpus of anti-fascist fighters for the last 15 years and was 
a president at the city level before. As I learned during a conversation 
with him, the Partisan ceremony has taken place every year since WWII, 
with the only exception being the years 1992–1995 when the war made 
it impossible to organise the commemoration. Although it was contin-
ued after 1995, today it receives little media attention in contrast to the 
newly established national commemorations for victims and heroes of 
only one nation. Still, I noticed an increase in media presence at the com-
memoration compared to 2006, perhaps a sign of its increasing political 
relevance. Interestingly though, the Partisan commemoration attracted 
more participants than some of the newer commemorations I attended 
during my fieldwork. Notes taken from my Mostar field diary on 14 
February 2008 read:
Arriving at the meeting place shortly before the official opening of the cer-
emony at 10:30 a.m., I see only a few elderly people gathered around the 
bust of Mustafa Čemalović Čimba (1919–1943). Čimba is one of the peo-
ple’s heroes who lost his life fighting against the Nazis. His bust is situated 
on the western bank of the Neretva River, but just below the Bulevar and so 
is still located on the Bosniak-dominated east side. Another 15 people are 
waiting at the other side of the road, chatting and laughing. The commemo-
rators are predominantly elderly people, some of them in festive, others in 
casual, clothes. Most of them are in their 70s, 80s or even 90s, which means 
5 In present BiH about 25 Tito associations exist including around 8000 members (Halder 
2013: 280).
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they were teenagers or young adults during WWII. A few minutes after my 
arrival, pupils from the school located just next to the bust join us with two 
teachers. The pupils, around 10 years old, queue neatly behind the bust.
After the children have organised themselves, a man rises to speak. He 
extends welcoming words, followed by a brief introduction of Čimba 
and his struggle against fascism. We learn that the German army entered 
Yugoslavia in 1941 and from this day until the liberation in 1945, 70 
Partisan fighters received the honorary title narodni heroj (people’s hero), 
one of them being Čimba. During those four years, 800 soldiers gave 
their lives for Mostar and its people in order to obtain freedom, the 
speaker tells the audience. The youngest generation, he says, has to learn 
about Yugoslavia’s history and must not forget it because today Mostar 
is again confronted with these ‘roots’ of fascism. At the end of his rather 
lofty speech, a pupil lays a wreath before the bust.
The next speaker is an elderly woman. She is small and wears her white 
hair unconventionally short. Although still agile, one can see by the wrin-
kles on her face that she has a long life behind her. I later discover that 
she is 84 years old and head of the local Partisan women’s organisation. 
She begins her speech by loudly calling out the well-known Partisan slo-
gan: Smrt fašizmu, sloboda narodu! (‘Death to fascism, freedom for the 
people!’), whereupon the children are urged to applaud. She continues 
that Čimba, like all the other soldiers, did not fight for his own benefit 
but for Bosnia and the entire Yugoslavia. Then she tells the pupils about 
life in Tito’s Yugoslavia where everyone lived together and people did not 
odmiksali (separate themselves, literally ‘de-mixing’) like they do now. 
She stresses the importance of history and, while pacing slowly, step by 
step, she addresses the pupils:
Step by step. We can learn what we have already learned. History can teach 
us. We have learned once already from history and today we have to learn 
from history again. In order to know who we are, what we are and where 
we are. We are the people (narod) of Bosnia and Herzegovina!
At the end of the speech, she calls upon the teachers to teach their pupils 
how people lived together during the time of Yugoslavia and not to teach 
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them to live divided. To loud applause, she is warmly received by her 
female friends who start greeting her with a well-known Tito song. The 
friends hug and kiss each other, obviously entertaining memories of 
Yugoslavia. The atmosphere is cheerful, with the singers clapping their 
hands to the rhythm of the song. Some pupils look bewildered by the 
singing women, while some start cheering. Before the crowd moves on 
to the next stop, a friend of the female speaker shouts once again: ‘Smrt 
fašizmu, sloboda narodu!’ and everyone claps their hands. When we leave 
the first stop I spy a fleur-de-lis at the back of Čimba’s bust. Someone 
must have drawn the symbol (closely associated with the Bosniak nation) 
on the bust of the Partisan hero.
I am surprised to see the next stop is not a Partisan commemoration 
site but the martyrs’ cemetery. At Šehitluci, as it is commonly referred 
to, (Muslim) ‘martyrs’ who fought ‘for the liberation of Mostar’ between 
1992 and 1995 are buried. Before the war there were only a few old 
Muslim tombstones. Today, Šehitluci is the central place in Mostar for 
commemorating the Bosniak victims of the 1990s war. More than a hun-
dred additional commemorators are already waiting at Šehitluci, among 
them the organiser, Alija Bijavica. Two buses have been provided for the 
participants—a yellow bus donated by Japan usually in service for regular 
public transport—and one from the delegation from Konjic, a town an 
hour from Mostar on the way to Sarajevo. Behind the windscreen of the 
latter bus I see a somewhat oversized photo of Tito, a suggestion perhaps 
that the former leader is overlooking the ceremony from a distance. Some 
of the people carry Tito closer to their bodies, like an elderly man who 
has Tito’s portrait pinned on a button to his coat. Two elderly men (both 
from the Konjic delegation, as I later learn) are leaning against the wall 
at the entrance to Šehitluci, distributing little Tito card calendars. On the 
front of the card is a Tito portrait and on the back a calendar of 2008 
with a logo of Forum Mladih SDP BiH (Forum of the Young Social 
Democratic Party BiH).
The head of the local Partisan women’s organisation now holds a big 
Bosnian flag in her hand, which she then wraps around her shoulders and 
wears like a big cape. The blue and yellow flag with the white stars suits 
her well and she does not take the flag off again during the entire cer-
emony. She is very cheerful and obviously enjoys being unconventional. 
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But the other commemorators also enjoy her entertaining contribution. 
Together with the other commemorators I gather around a commemo-
ration stone (the same stone where the school classes met before they 
attended the history lecture under the Old Bridge; see Chap. 3). Alija 
Bijavica addresses the commemorators with only a few words, saying that 
now the victims of the second fascism will be remembered; his words are 
followed by a ‘slave mu’ (‘slave mu’ ends Muslim prayers, like amen ends 
Catholic ones). The people next to him assume the Muslim prayer pose. 
In front of us a quote from the Qur’an is inscribed in the stone:
I ne recite za one koji su na allahovom putu poginuli: ‘mrtvi su!’ Ne; oni su 
živi, ali ne osjećate (Kur’an: 154).
(Do not say of those who are killed in the cause of God, ‘They are dead.’ 
They are alive at their Lord, but you do not perceive (Qur’an: 154).6
Above the text a fleur-de-lis has been inscribed. It is similar to the one 
I identified on the back of Čimba’s bust. On my way to the bus I pass a 
reporter from Federation TV who asks Alija Bijavica to provide a message 
to the people of Mostar. I find it remarkable that the head of the Partisan 
association is given the opportunity to make a statement to the people of 
Mostar this way.
The next stop is Musala Square, a central square located in East Mostar, 
bordering a bridge over the Neretva River. Several significant buildings 
around Musala Square have been ruined during the war, such as the 
Hotel Neretva, the music school and the city’s swimming pool. All were 
buildings from Austro-Hungarian times and all apart from the pool are 
still in ruins. Musala Square is a small renovated park which hosts several 
memorials erected in different decades. Considering the small size of the 
park, far too many memorials are placed there. The commemorators pass 
the Partisan memorial at the entrance to the park and continue to the 
two busts of Partisan fighters behind it, where flowers are laid. On the left 
side stands the bust of the narodni heroj Mladen Balorda (1921–1945) 
and on the right side the bust of narodni heroj Hasan Zahirović Laca 
(1920–1943). The busts of the two Partisan fighters face another, very 
6 English translation retrieved at http://www.submission.org/suras/sura2.html [12.09.2010].
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modern memorial with the inscription: ‘Commemorating the friendship 
between the people of Kuwait and of BiH’.7
Finally, the buses drive the commemorators to the biggest Partisan 
commemoration site in Mostar, the Partisan memorial cemetery built 
between 1960 and 1965.8 During the entire bus ride several of the pas-
sengers sing Tito songs at the top of their voices. The atmosphere is lively 
and one woman intones one song after another, all the while waving her 
red carnation out the open window. The bus passes heavily shelled build-
ings on the Bulevar and then crosses to the Croat-dominated part of the 
city. Just when we enter West Mostar, the woman with the carnation in 
her hand starts a new song with the refrain saying: A na drugoj strani, a 
na drugoj strani, a na drugoj strani. Napred partizani! (‘But on the other 
side, but on the other side, but on the other side. Move ahead Partisans!’). 
She almost screams the words out of the windows, making clear who she 
means by ‘the other side’. Pedestrians passing by look either bewildered 
or amused when they notice the bus full of elderly people singing old 
Partisan and Tito songs. The bus stops close to Sveučilište’s campus and 
we only have to cross the street to enter the Partisan memorial cemetery.
In pre-war Mostar the cemetery was one of the main tourist sites. A 
travel guide (Njavro 1985) of Herzegovina published in 1985 even sug-
gests that tourists join the celebration on 14 February. During my stay 
in Mostar, I met several elderly Bosniaks who told me about the Partisan 
memorial’s former beauty and how proud they were to present it to foreign 
visitors. Today, many people do not even want to be seen there because it 
is said that only drug addicts frequent the place. One of my young Croat 
acquaintances even refused to enter the memorial site when he took a group 
of Viennese university students on a guided tour through Mostar.
The procession slowly approaches the top of the memorial as the path 
is uneven and difficult for the elderly participants. On the way we pass 
much graffiti sprayed on the surrounding walls, among them Ustasha 
7 The memorial was erected in 2001, after the city of Mostar received a loan from Kuwait for 
rebuilding its infrastructure, including Musala Square.
8 The initiative for the memorial came from former prime minister Džemal Bijedić. It was then 
realised by Bogdan Bogdanović, an architect, artist and mayor of Belgrade from 1982–1986, who 
designed numerous Partisan memorials in former Yugoslavia (Mutevelić 1980). Bogdanović left the 
country in protest against Milošević’s politics.
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symbols. The ground is covered with splintered glass from broken bottles 
and with every step I make I hear glass grinding between my shoes and 
the ground. On the way, I take the opportunity to speak to Alija Bijevica, 
the organiser of the ceremony. With a sigh he tells me that before the 
war there were 18,000 Mostarians present at this ceremony, while today 
there are only about 150 people. I also learn from him that the Partisan 
memorial cemetery was the site of big protests against the upcoming war 
in March 1992. After telling me about the beginning of the war in 1992, 
he returns to WWII. Back then, every third Mostarian fought for the 
liberation, he says, and every eighth did not see the day of liberation. 
‘This is why we are fighting against fascism, because the fascists ruined 
everything’, he concludes.
At the top of the hill I meet his wife, a well-dressed woman, like her 
husband easily recognisable as a member of the pre-war urban elite. I stand 
next to Mrs. Bijavica, both of us looking down at the Partisan site when she 
tells me about the way the Partisan memorial looked before the war. It used 
to be one of the first sites tourists would visit, she assures me like many oth-
ers before. ‘And look what happened to it!’ she says in a sad tone, pointing 
towards the memorial. Indeed, the memorial site is in poor shape: the path 
is dirty and covered with pieces of broken glass, the stones of the memo-
rial are covered with moss, many are loose and there is offensive writing on 
the walls. It was the architect’s purpose to integrate the memorial into the 
landscape, but now it seems as if the landscape is taking over the memorial.
The 750 white headstones have softly curved shapes, as do the inscrip-
tions which give the names of the dead and their places of birth and 
death. But even the stones have not been spared decay and vandalism. 
Many of them have been broken and forcibly removed from their origi-
nal places. One old man is obviously disturbed by the bad shape they are 
in. In a seemingly endless attempt to restore the site back to order, he 
gathers piece upon piece of broken headstones to set them together again. 
The woman who gave the speech at the first stop searches for the stone of 
one of her relatives but does not find it. Other commemorators who are 
lucky enough to find where their loved ones are buried put red carnations 
on their stones (Figs. 4.3 and 4.4).
At the top of the memorial some 150 people gather in a semicircle. 
After some commemorators lay down flowers and wreaths (some of them 
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pausing for prayer), Alija Bijavica begins his speech in which he calls for 
‘the sons of our town’ who fought for its liberation never to be forgot-
ten. Alija continues to praise the great solidarity Mostarians showed with 
Serbs, Jews and Roma who became victims of genocide. This Partisan 
memorial used to be our national memorial, he says, until the nationalists 
came in March 1992 and started to shell Mostar. At the end of his speech 
Alija appeals to those present to fight for a secular state. In his view BiH 
Fig. 4.3 Partisan commemoration ceremony, 2008. Photo by the author
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is only a step away from becoming a religious state. But the future of 
BiH, he says, is as a secular state that becomes a member of the European 
Union. At the end of his speech, Alija tells the audience about his plans 
to maintain the memorial site by building a fence around it and install-
ing big floodlights to make it secure, although he faces obstacles since all 
energy is now put into erecting nationalist memorials. But one day, he 
says, the memorial site will look like it used to, and at these final words 
he receives resounding applause.9
The final stop is the alternative youth cultural centre, Abrašević, where 
we are invited into the theatre hall. When we enter the hall, which has 
been painted black, Tito songs blast out of the speakers, occasionally 
9 During my last visit to Mostar in 2010, the Partisan memorial cemetery finally was in the process 
of being renovated.
Fig. 4.4 Partisan commemoration ceremony, 2008. Photo by the author
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interrupted by short sequences of one of Tito’s speeches. Obviously rec-
ognising the songs, the old people smile, clap or sing along. I realise 
that a woman sitting in the row before me has tears in her eyes. On one 
occasion, at the end of a sequence of Tito’s speech where the audience on 
the recording applauds, people in the present audience applaud, too. I 
feel somewhat uncomfortable because the old recording of Tito’s speech, 
spoken in a very ‘authoritarian’ tone, reminds me too much of totalitar-
ian political propaganda. After some 10 minutes, the music is turned off 
and the young host of Abrašević starts his speech by wishing the audience 
a happy holiday (sretan praznik). He says that we should never forget the 
war of liberation fought in WWII and that the fight against fascism is 
also a constitutional part of the youth centre’s identity. But he says that 
he is aware that the participants at the centre are in the minority, so he 
invites the audience to tell young people about the way they used to live 
under Tito and the ideals they lived for. The generations should not stay 
divided but should engage in exchange with each other, he concludes 
and then gives the floor to Alija Bijavica, who ends the ceremony with a 
meticulous description of the Partisan fight for Mostar’s liberation. At the 
end of the speech and three hours of the programme, the participants 
seem tired and glad to enjoy themselves over a drink in the company of 
old friends.
Remarkably, during the entire ceremony there was no explicit explana-
tion or even the attempt to explain who the ‘new fascists’ are, i.e., who this 
frequently used term refers to. Although the organiser and central figures 
of the commemoration made relatively clear in their speeches that fascism/
exclusive nationalism is not restricted to one of the national groups in BiH, 
the strong link to the ABiH found in the same commemoration gives room 
for other interpretations. When the woman in the bus waved her red carna-
tion out of the window screaming ‘But on the other side, but on the other 
side, but on the other side. Move ahead Partisans!’, it was also clear that to 
her the enemies (fascists) were on the Croat-dominated west side while the 
(new) Partisans were on the Bosniak-dominated east side.
Every speech given at the ceremony included an element (in the speech 
itself, in the choice of venue or location, or in the symbolism employed) 
linking the recent war with WWII. Starting at the first stop, the speakers 
established a direct connection between the atrocities Mostar witnessed 
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in the 1940s and those of the 1990s. This comparison is made twice: 
first, to warn the pupils present at the ceremony about the fascism Mostar 
again faces today and second to convince them that BiH can overcome 
national divisions as it has done so once already in its history after WWII. 
The organiser and head of SUBNOR makes this comparison again in his 
final speech at the Partisan memorial cemetery, where he indicates that 
the Partisan struggle against fascism has not yet ended.
During the ceremony I noticed many ‘identity markers’ that made 
it an event primarily intended for Bosniaks. First, the event visited 
Šehitluci, which is the place where most commemorations for Bosniak 
war victims take place. For example, I had previously attended three 
other  ceremonies clearly Bosniak-led at Šehitluci: the commemoration 
on 9 May, a reburial of fallen ABiH soldiers and a protest rally against the 
ruling of the International Court of Justice on the charges brought for-
ward by BiH against Serbia and Montenegro for committing genocide.10 
Already during the war, fallen Muslim soldiers were increasingly referred 
to as šehids (religious martyrs). Bougarel interprets this upcoming šehid 
cult as a political strategy by the SDA leaders ‘to use the war dead to 
homogenize the Muslim community and to claim a monopoly on the 
interpretation of the war itself […]’ (Bougarel 2007). Beside the Muslim 
martyrs’ cemetery I noticed other signs during the Partisan commemo-
ration suggesting that it is losing its multinational character. At almost 
every memorial site a ‘slave mu’ was spoken after the wreaths had been 
laid down or after a minute’s silence had been observed. I never heard the 
Croat equivalent of ‘amen’.
Another symbol strongly associated with Bosniaks is the fleur-de- 
lis that was drawn on Čimba’s bust and also inscribed on a gravestone 
together with a quote from the Qu’ran about the immortality of martyrs. 
This fleur-de-lis was chosen as a supra-ethnic symbol for BiH’s coat of 
arms in 1992 due to its pre-Ottoman origin in the Bosnian Kotromanić 
Dynasty which represented no particular ethnic group. During the war 
10 In April 2006, BiH presented evidence against Serbia and Montenegro in the first trial on genocide 
held before the International Court of Justice. When the judgement was announced in February 
2007 acknowledging genocide only for the killing of around 8000 men and boys in Srebrenica in 
July 1995 and did not find Serbia-Montenegro responsible for the actions of the Army of the Serb 
Republic (VRS), several protest rallies were held all over BiH, including Mostar.
4 Two Wars and Tito In-Between 155
it became a symbol strongly associated with the ABiH, which used the 
fleur-de-lis as its official sign (Kolstø 2006: 6).11 The fleur-de-lis not only 
became the sign on the ABiH’s coat of arms but also that of the SDA’s, 
whereupon it lost its supra-ethnic meaning. Therefore we can assume that 
by drawing a fleur-de-lis on the bust in green, the colour of Islam, the 
depicted Partisan is marked as a hero of the Bosniak nation, rather than as 
belonging to the Bosnian nation, i.e., of all Bosnians and Herzegovinians 
including the three constituent peoples plus others. This symbolism—
even if the Bosniak participants are unaware of it—is clearly visible to 
those who do not identify themselves as Bosniaks (here the territory- or 
identity-marking works in the same way as the new street names in West 
Mostar; see Palmberger 2013b).
During socialist times, Partisan commemorations were a fixed part of 
the annual events calendar and were held several times a year, some state- 
wide, some only in certain republics or towns. The main purpose of these 
commemorations was to strengthen a united Yugoslav identity for which 
the Partisan myth was crucial (see Chap. 2). Today only a small number 
of such commemorations is still carried out. The Partisan commemora-
tion with which we are concerned here continued to take place, even in 
the post-socialist period, every year on 14 February, the day of Mostar’s 
liberation from the Nazis in 1945. This change in context is important 
to consider when analysing the commemoration because as Olick rightly 
states: ’The past includes not only the history being commemorated but 
also the accumulated succession of commemorations, as well as what has 
occurred between those powerful moments (Olick 2007: 58).
Although nowadays 14 February is a day like any other for most 
Mostarians, members of the generations educated during Tito’s period 
of rule are still familiar with its former meaning. Present-day Mostarians 
in their teenage years or early 20s often associate 14 February only with 
Valentine’s Day. An age difference of only a few years can be significant 
here. The education of those born in the 1970s was still concentrated 
on the anti-fascist fight and important dates related to it were learned 
by heart and are surprisingly well remembered even today. On the other 
hand, those born in the 1980s (especially in the late 1980s) experienced 
radical educational change (see Chap. 3). It seems, however, that initia-
11 The golden fleur-de-lis became ABiH’s highest order of distinction.
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tives are being undertaken to revitalise 14 February as a day of commemo-
ration on the Bosniak side. For example, one of the young lecturers at the 
Bosniak-dominated university told me that she had scheduled the final 
exams for 14 February. I first assumed this was unintentional, but she told 
me that she did it on purpose because 14 February was an important day 
in Mostar’s history and students should not forget about it. The question 
remains as to why the lecturer finds it important to revitalise knowledge 
about 14 February. Is it only because of the crimes committed in Mostar 
during WWII, or is the awareness being raised first and foremost because 
it supports the Bosniak claim of victimisation followed by present-day 
political and academic elites? This discourse of victimisation is coupled 
with the Bosniak claim to have acted as the liberators of Mostar from fas-
cism twice in history.
14 February is not a day of celebration in Croat-dominated West 
Mostar, where 14 February 1945 is remembered first and foremost as the 
day on which 12 Franciscans were executed. The execution took place at a 
monastery in Široki Brijeg, a village close to Mostar, where a bitter battle 
had been fought between Ustashe and German forces on the one side 
and Partisan brigades on the other. According to Perica (2002: 110), the 
Partisans, after great casualties on their own side, captured the stronghold 
and executed 12 clerics.
The conflict between Bosniak and Croat historiographies today is not 
about historical facts but primarily about their interpretation. While in 
the Bosniak historiography the execution of the clerics is marginalised 
or even silenced as the clerics are viewed as collaborators with the fas-
cists, the execution is central to local Croat historiography because the 
Franciscans are seen as legitimate supporters of the Croats’ struggle for 
an independent state. This interpretation has also found expression in the 
new street names in West Mostar. Since the official Croat commemora-
tion of 14 February 1945 is not a day of celebration but of mourning, the 
former street Avenija 14. Februar (Avenue of 14 February) was renamed 
Avenija Kralja Tomislava).12 In Bosniak-dominated Sarajevo, on the other 
hand, the street in memory of this Croat ruler of the Middle Ages was 
renamed. Additionally to renaming Avenija 14 Februar and in order to 
remember the execution of several clerics by the Partisan, for each of 
12 See Slobodna Dalmacija, 24 February 1995.
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the clerics a street has been renamed. With this commemorative street 
naming, elites attempt to ‘introduce an authorized version of history 
into ordinary settings of everyday life’ (Azaryahu 1996: 312). But, as 
argued elsewhere (Palmberger 2017), even if the renaming of streets is 
a manifestation of the dominant public history discourses, perceptions 
and representations of the past are more manifold and overlapping than 
depicted in the topography of street names.
Returning to the linking of the ABiH with the Partisans as in the 
commemoration described above, this linking of two histories is not eas-
ily accepted by all, even if they have a favourable view of Tito and the 
Partisans. This became evident in an interview with Miloš, a 40-year-old 
man who grew up in a Yugoslav family with a Partisan history. Since his 
parents are Orthodox, the members of his family today are identified as 
‘Serbs’ although they still refer to themselves as ‘Yugoslavs’. Before the 
war Miloš lived in West Mostar with his family, but when the war broke 
out he and his sister were evacuated by a JNA helicopter. His parents were 
allowed to stay on the west side only because they had agreed to cooper-
ate, his mother serving as a nurse and his father fighting for HVO. They 
only did so because they were forced to, Miloš reassured me. When I told 
him that I participated at the Partisan commemoration (the first one 
I joined, in 2006) just a few days ago and had been surprised by the large 
number of commemorators, he gave me his view of the event:
The only objection I have is that I would really like to keep it separate from 
this conflict that we had now. That’s something else and that was the fight 
of all the peoples and all the nations against the common enemy, against 
collaborators that we had before, as that we had now. But the thing is, you 
cannot compare anybody’s fight in this war to the Partisan movement 
because here even though some people prefer to believe differently, it was 
clear that you had three ethnic armies. There was the Croat HVO, the 
Serbian Army of Republic Srpska and the so-called Army of BiH; I like to 
say ‘so-called‘, because 90 % of it or more were Muslims. In their rows they 
had Mudžahedin, holy warriors from eastern countries, Arabs, coming to 
fight here, internationally known terrorists, war criminals. People that cel-
ebrate February 14 in Mostar put flowers on monuments for Muslim fight-
ers and then go to the Partisan cemetery. How could you? Don’t do that 
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because it’s wrong! History will show what you were fighting for and who 
was fighting for what.13
We gain a better understanding of Miloš’s resentment of comparing Tito’s 
Partisans with the ABiH when looking at the historical development 
of the structure of Bosnia’s Partisans and the ABiH (Hoare 2004). The 
Partisans formed a guerrilla movement and were locally organised. Only 
towards the end of WWII did the federal Partisan army become organ-
ised into a centralised army, the JNA. But with Tito’s break with Stalin, 
the potential need for guerrilla defence was high again. This led the com-
munists to organise a system of territorial defence for which the local 
population could be mobilised at any point. When socialist Yugoslavia 
dissolved these territorial defence units, they fell into the hands of the dif-
ferent nationalist parties (the Serb SDS, the Bosniak SDA and the Croat 
HDZ), depending on which party held the respective territory. The ter-
ritorial defence units controlled by the SDA, together with the Patriotic 
League (a Bosniak paramilitary force), eventually formed the Bosnian 
Army ABiH. At its founding on 15 April 1992, ABiH was—although 
dominated by Bosniaks—still a multinational army, but at the end of 
1993 it became:
the party political army of the SDA, in much the same way as during World 
War II the Partisans had been the party-political army of the Communist 
Party. Just as the Communists had indoctrinated the Bosnian Partisans with 
the ideology of Brotherhood and Unity of Serbs, Croats and Muslims, now 
the SDA indoctrinated the Bosnian Army with the opposite ideology—the 
ideology of Bosniak-Muslim nationalism. (Hoare 2004: n.p.)
Viewed from the angle of historical analysis by Hoare (see also Žanić 2007: 
488), who outlines the different ideological orientations of the ABiH and 
the Partisans, it is curious to see how today the fallen of the ABiH and of the 
Partisans is now commemorated within the same ceremony.
13 Unlike most of the other interviews cited in the book which were conducted in the local lan-
guage, the interview with Miloš was conducted in English so the quotes are from the original 
interview transcription.
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 Interpretative Templates for Personal 
Meaning-Making and as Political Tools
As has become clear from the First Yugoslavs’ narratives, the 1992–1995 
war is not as central for this generation as it is for the Last Yugoslavs. 
WWII and the early years of Yugoslavia experienced during youth and 
early adulthood have a formative potential and serve as interpretative 
templates for experiences later in life (see Schuman and Scott 1989). 
Looking at the data presented in this and in the previous chapter, reflect-
ing on the individual as well as collective levels, we can clearly see how 
the two wars are linked both in the discursive tactics of the First Yugoslavs 
and in the discursive strategies employed in the dominant Bosniak public 
discourse. Despite this conformity, the agendas of the different groups of 
actors may differ greatly.
In the present post-war public remembrance, remembering the 
Partisans—the constitutive heroes of Tito’s Yugoslavia—has taken on a 
new meaning. The analysis of the ceremony has shown how the Partisan 
victims, the liberators who fought against fascism and for a free Yugoslavia, 
are commemorated today equates them with those who fought against 
HVO from 1993 until 1994—also liberators, in the minds of the partici-
pants in the ceremony. Not only are the respective liberators subsumed, 
but so are the respective sets of enemies: the Ustasha and the Croat Defence 
Council (HVO) are both referred to as the ‘fascists’.
Even if several times the organiser and the key protagonists in the cer-
emony—all First Yugoslavs—expressed their wish for a shared BiH and 
peaceful coexistence among all nations (which is also expressed by ending 
the ceremony in the alternative youth centre Abrašević), the ceremony 
is losing its multinational character. By linking the Partisan liberation 
fight with that fought by the ABiH, the commemoration has gradually 
become a Bosniak ceremony. At the same time, it is also acquiring new 
political relevance and legitimacy.
The analysis of the commemoration held on 14 February also gives 
insight into the way experiences and their interpretations are com-
municated by the senior to the junior parts of the population within 
a commemorative context. While it is common that commemorations 
are organised by the generation for whom the commemorated event has 
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the greatest personal reference, it is central that younger generations are 
included in the ‘community of memory’ (Misztal 2003); they can then 
take over the commemoration even if the witnesses have passed away. 
In the particular case of the Partisan commemoration this is facilitated 
by its new political relevance. Although the commemoration is still offi-
cially held in memory of the ideals of Brotherhood and Unity, it similarly 
strengthens a Bosniak national identity.
As pointed out in the Introduction to this book, there is a difference in 
the nature of the ‘stratagems’ found in the official national narratives and 
those in personal narratives. While the former present a goal-oriented nar-
rative, the latter can be better described as target-seeking. While the linking 
of the two chronotopes (Bakhtin 1981), of WWII and of the 1992–1995 
war, among the First Yugoslavs introduced in this chapter, is based first 
and foremost on personal experiences and aimed at a coherent life narra-
tive (see Cave and Sloan 2014), in a public commemorative context, this 
linking easily becomes a political tool. As Dragojevic has shown, personal 
war memories can be exploited when political actors ‘may intentionally use 
symbols or discourse that will sound familiar to those individuals who had 
personal or family memories of the previous cycles of violence’ (Dragojevic 
2013). This shows the importance of including both the way interpretative 
templates serve individual meaning making and, at the same time and con-
nected to the former, how they serve as political tools. Interpretative tem-
plates are not only powerful tools for collectively representing and politically 
‘selling’ history but are equally important in the process of understanding 
and giving meaning to the past on an individual level. Thus they appear in 
discursive strategies as well as discursive tactics.
Wertsch (2008) differentiates between ‘specific’ and ‘schematic’ narra-
tive templates when analysing collective memory in post-Soviet Russia. 
While the former contain specific information about places, dates and 
actors, the latter are more abstract and may serve as templates for a variety 
of narratives. The interpretative templates as understood here are closer to 
Wertsch’s schematic narrative templates but with a stronger emphasis on 
the aspect of sense making these templates offer to individuals.
On an individual level, First Yugoslavs make use of pre-existing inter-
pretative templates around their experiences of WWII and the early years 
of Yugoslavia to give meaning to the recent past. The suffering experi-
enced during the 1992–1995 war is brought into immediate relation 
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to the suffering experienced during WWII. Moreover, the recent war is 
narrated in terms of clear categories: fascist perpetrators and victims of 
fascism, a template borrowed from earlier Yugoslav representations of 
WWII. This shows the entanglement between personal/individual and 
public/collective representations of the past, between discursive tactics 
and discursive strategies transcending different temporalities.
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5
Ruptured Biographies:  
The Last Yugoslavs
All of the Last Yugoslavs were born and grew up in BiH during socialist 
Yugoslavia, that is, after WWII. They thus have no personal memories of 
that war and few, if any, memories of the first years of Tito’s Yugoslavia. 
The youngest of them were in their late teens when the war began in 
1992, while the oldest had already established their own households. This 
generation does not perceive itself as having built up Yugoslavia, as the 
First Yugoslavs do (who were born before WWII and were in their ado-
lescence and early adulthood in the first period of Tito’s Yugoslavia), but 
rather as its beneficiaries.
This chapter shows how the Last Yugoslavs, a generation that finds itself 
between old and new politico-ideological outlooks, deals with the discrep-
ancies they are confronted with when positioning themselves towards the 
past. The war in the 1990s led to a rupture in terms of a discontinuity in 
public discourse. It also constituted a period of rupture in the lives of the 
people. The war was experienced as a disruption in the biographies of all 
the people I talked to, but the narratives of this generation with their spe-
cific discursive tactics show the rupture most prominently.
The Last Yugoslav generation is the generation that grew up under rela-
tively stable political circumstances. At the time the war started, the Last 
Yugoslavs either already had their own households and were pursuing 
their careers or were just about to do so. The particular life situation the 
Last Yugoslavs found themselves in when war broke out and still find 
themselves in at the point of narrating the past is crucial in understand-
ing the Last Yugoslavs’ narratives of the war and the effect it had on their 
lives.
A central discursive tactic characteristic of this generation is the 
switching between opposing discourses, one vividly and positively 
remembering life in Yugoslavia and one defending the national devel-
opments that resulted in the division of Mostar. The switching between 
opposing discourses will be discussed in particular concerning Minela 
and Željko later in this chapter. Both sought explanation for these 
discrepancies in the fact that they and their nations were suppressed 
during socialist Yugoslavia, but that they were not aware of it at the 
time. In this way, they devalued their own autobiographical memories 
(see Volcic 2007).
As outlined in the Introduction to this book, studies on memory and 
Yugoslavia (and its successor states) have primarily concerned them-
selves with collective, national memory (see, e.g., Basic-Hrvatin 1996; 
Dujizings 2007; Hayden 1994; Moll 2013; Müller 2002). The far fewer 
studies that have focused on personal memories or the intersection of 
personal and national memory primarily dealt with memories (collective 
as well as personal) of violence and war. The impact of the enormous 
political-economic transformations in the way in which people reflect on 
the past has received little attention. This chapter shows, however, that 
these transformations play key roles in understanding life narratives, par-
ticularly those of the generation in question here. The immediate time of 
the political-economic crisis is experienced and thus set in relation to past 
time (memory) and future time (prospects).
Regardless of whether people remained in Mostar throughout the 
entire period of the war or fled to (more) secure places and only returned 
after the war had ended, they were forced to build a new life in a place 
that had seen severe transformations. Facing great obstacles and insecu-
rities, many were left in doubt about whether it was the right decision 
to return to (or remain in) Mostar. While the war and the far- reaching 
transformations that accompanied it were decisive for everyone, the 
166 How Generations Remember
Last Yugoslavs experienced the war most prominently as a rupture in 
their lives. Constituting a relatively big cohort, the Last Yugoslavs have 
spent most of their lives in Yugoslavia and grew up under relatively stable 
political and economic circumstances, in contrast to the First Yugoslavs 
and the Post-Yugoslavs, who spent part of their childhood or early adult-
hood either during WWII or during the 1992–1995 war. In contrast to 
the First Yugoslavs, who had already experienced a war and who knew 
that war always comes unexpectedly, the Last Yugoslavs simply could not 
imagine a war in Yugoslavia.
The Last Yugoslavs find themselves at a stage of their lives in which 
they have to, in some way or other, face the political, economic and soci-
etal changes they are confronted with. Compared to the Last Yugoslavs, 
the First Yugoslavs have reached an age that allows them more freedom to 
retreat into the past and delve into memories of better times with others of a 
similar age (see Palmberger 2008). Those belonging to the Post- Yugoslav 
generation, on the other hand, have spent most of their lives in post-war 
Mostar and do not experience the war as such a prominent rupture in 
their lives in the way the Last Yugoslavs do. The loss of social security and 
economic well-being (compared to the present extremely precarious eco-
nomic situation) has had a severe impact on the lives of the Last Yugoslav 
generation, as they carry great economic responsibility today, not only 
for themselves but also for their children and often for their parents. 
Moreover, the education of many of this generation was delayed due to 
the war, and the career prospects they held (or retrospectively believe they 
held) during socialist Yugoslavia vanished.
The transformation of the Yugoslav socialist market economy into a neo-
liberal, capitalist-oriented economy (see Pugh 2005; see also Hann et al. 
2002) directly and most severely affected the lives of the Last Yugoslavs. In 
this respect, Jansen (2008: 47), working with returnees in BiH, describes 
the generation who are (or are supposed to be) in the middle of their work-
ing lives as particularly vulnerable and thus reluctant to return to their 
hometown on a permanent basis. Even if future prospects for the younger 
generation, the Post-Yugoslavs, are similarly grim, they do not feel robbed 
of their hopes and prospects in the same way as the Last Yugoslavs because 
they grew up during a time already marked by extreme insecurity.
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The economic downfall experienced by Mostarians was stark: ten years 
after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in 1995, gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita in BiH was still less than 50 % of its pre-war 
level. The average income in BiH is around 400 Euros a month and about 
40 % of the population describes their household situation as below aver-
age (see UNDP 2008). Some of the Last Yugoslavs even told me that it 
was easier during the war, because back then people ‘only’ had to care 
about their basic existence and not about electricity bills and so on.
For the generation of the Last Yugoslavs, one of the greatest (if not the 
greatest) concerns is Mostar’s extremely weak job market. Many of the 
public enterprises went bankrupt due to the war, the loss of markets and 
a dislocated labour force. As Pugh (2005) reveals, bankruptcy was also 
an effective way for realizing the privatization promoted by the so-called 
international community active in BiH after the war. The privatization 
of public enterprises was propagated as the key to economic growth 
in BiH. In many cases, however, the enterprises fell into the hands of 
corrupt nationalist managers and did not contribute to improving the 
economic situation of Mostar’s larger population. Interestingly, most 
people saw the economic downfall in connection to the war rather than 
to neoliberal post-war policies. Thus, the experience of the war and the 
disappearance of socio-economic security were narrated as one disrup-
tion that separated their lives into a life before and a life after.
After the war, shadow markets became an important survival mechanism 
used by many inhabitants to stop themselves from falling below the poverty 
line (Pugh 2005: 451–456; see also Papić 2001), as illustrated by the exam-
ple of Igor, a Croat in his late 40s. When fighting for the Croat army, Igor 
was injured twice and now receives an invalid’s pension, but the amount he 
receives is far too small to support his family. For this reason Igor, a trained 
electrical engineer, has to work on the side as a pool attendant. Igor is very 
pessimistic about Mostar’s future:
Life is difficult here. I believe people fight for their bare existence. 
One cannot see any improvement. What can I, for example, provide for 
my children? But it is not only difficult for me but also for them; what can 
they do here, which profession should they assume? There are no jobs; 
there is no future whatsoever! You cannot see any!
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Even if the situation of the war invalids presents a special case, Igor’s 
disappointment with his current situation and his pessimism for the 
future is shared by many of the Last Yugoslavs, both men and women. 
Employment is a central concern for this generation.
Aner, one of my Bosniak informants, who was one of the youngest 
soldiers in the Army of BiH during the war in the 1990s (and who was 
in his early 30s when I met him), is convinced that traumatic war experi-
ences are not as threatening as the economic insecurity people face. Even 
though he told me quite openly about the depression he suffers, he hesi-
tated to connect his symptoms with personal war experiences. Instead, 
he linked them first and foremost to his desperate economic situation 
and his hopeless career opportunities. Aner believes that post- traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) is only a myth1 that has been exploited for politi-
cal reasons and is convinced that people in post-war BiH are primarily 
concerned with practical issues like finding a job. At the time I got to 
know Aner, he worked in a small private-run grocery shop, but he knew 
that the shop would be closed in the near future, since it was no longer 
profitable.
For Aner, the war and the break-up of Yugoslavia constitute a clear 
disruption to his life, which is characteristic of the narratives of the Last 
Yugoslavs. Their narratives are clearly divided into a three-fold time 
frame: before the war, during the war and after the war. To give only one 
example, after Aner had given me a comprehensive account of his expe-
riences as a soldier, he told me that he had played the piano before the 
war. There are two remarkable observations about this statement. First, 
the time reference is the war, not a year or date or his age at the particular 
time. Second, the statement ‘before the war I played piano’ is a statement 
that not only informs the interlocutor about musical skills, but also aims 
to capture the approach to life that people held in pre-war Mostar. Aner 
told me about his past as a piano player right after he had told me about 
his life as a soldier. Making music and shooting people represent polar 
opposite activities. The former stands for a truly ‘peaceful’ activity; the 
latter stands for the opposite, absolute violence. The statement ‘before the 
war I played piano’ in the context of his narration also expresses that, at 
that point in his life, Aner had never imagined that he would ever hold 
1 For a critical discussion of PTSD diagnosis see Young (1995).
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a rifle in his hand. Moreover, it implies that since this point, nothing has 
remained the same.
The war severely changed the life course of those who fought as soldiers 
and also of civilians who blamed the war for delaying or hindering their 
education/career and/or their aspirations to start their own family. The 
war narratives of those who experienced the war as civilians (among the 
Last Yugoslavs, these were mostly women) often centred on their families. 
Those who already had children of their own when the war broke out 
mourned for the time with their children that they lost due to the war. In 
extreme cases, parents were separated from their children when they were 
moved to safer locations. One mother who shared this fate broke into tears 
when she told me her story. While she and her husband remained in BiH 
throughout the war, their two children lived in Germany. Even when her 
children assure her that she made the right decision, she still grieves over 
the long period of separation.
In order to carve out the above-presented particularities of the Last 
Yugoslav generation, in a next step I will analyse the narratives of some of 
my interlocutors in more detail.
 Aida: A Lost Home
I was introduced to Aida by one of her lecturers at the university on 
Mostar’s east side. Back in 2006 Aida was in her final year of English 
studies. She already held a degree in science but decided to do a second 
degree in English—the language she had become familiar with as a refu-
gee in Great Britain during the war—hoping to increase her chances in 
Mostar’s weak job market. In her late 30s at the time, she was older than 
most of her fellow students who were still in their early and mid-20s. 
Aida was not alone in having a delayed education or career path; due to 
the war, many of the Last Yugoslavs shared this fate.
Aida, who was at the end of her science study when the war began, 
had pictured her future life in a very different way than how it eventually 
evolved. She experienced the war as an unexpected event that foiled her 
life prospects. Her narrative has a strong component of nostalgia for her 
pre-war life. She divides her life into three clear-cut periods: life before 
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the war, during the war and after the war. According to Tannock (1995) 
this thrice-divided time frame characterises nostalgic narratives. The rhet-
oric of nostalgia is always centred around a lapse that was preceded by 
the pre-lapsarian world—where everything was good or at least substan-
tially better—and is succeeded by a post-lapsarian world where everything 
has become worse (Tannock 1995: 456). Pre-war BiH is presented as the 
‘secure past’, while present and future BiH are seen as insecure (in 
some cases even for those who are in favour of Mostar’s division, as will 
be shown in the proceeding text). The act of comparison is imminent in 
nostalgia since it always forms a reaction to the present state (Davis 1977: 
417). This makes clear that nostalgic feelings are never directed towards 
the past alone but always tell us something about the perception of the 
present as well as the dreams and fears of the future (Boym 2001; Davis 
1979; Pickering and Keightley 2006; Radstone 2010;).2
There are two central events in Aida’s narration of the war: the 
im prisoning of her father and brother, and the parting from her parents. 
At the beginning of the war between Croats and Bosniaks in 1993, her 
father and brother were taken to a detention camp. Fortunately they 
were freed after a few days, but Aida describes those days of waiting as 
a nightmare for her and her mother. Neither of them could sleep; they 
were restless and worried about the lives of the two men. When Aida 
told me about those days, her descriptions were so detailed that it was 
almost as if she were re- living the past once more. When the men were 
finally released, Aida and her brother fled the country. This moment of 
leaving Mostar is central in Aida’s narrative of the war. Although her 
parents had insisted their  children should leave the country, it was the 
first time Aida saw her parents cry, which made her realise they might 
never see each other again.
In the first months Aida spent away from Mostar, in a refugee camp 
in Croatia, she felt stripped of any privacy and autonomy. Many of my 
interlocutors narrated the time they spent as refugees in similar ways; the 
loss of privacy and autonomy is central in their accounts. In his seminal 
work, The Politics of Storytelling, Jackson (2006) describes this experience 
2 In Ugrešić’s (2006) well-written novel The Ministry of Pain, we learn about the gravity Yugo-
nostalgia can bear for Aida’s generation.
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of losing subjectivity as a decisive experience for refugees and as a form of 
violation of a person’s humanity.
For Aida, this state of her life only changed when she arrived at her host 
family’s home in Great Britain. There she found a new—albeit tempo-
rary—home. While she was in Great Britain, Aida’s mother was expelled 
from the west side to the east side of Mostar in 1994 while her father was 
kept in a detention camp once again. Since their expulsion, Aida’s fam-
ily has been living on the east side of Mostar, and after the war they sold 
their former flat in West Mostar. In 1997 Aida had to return to BiH at a 
time when she had already established herself both personally and pro-
fessionally in Great Britain. Upon her return, she hardly recognised her 
hometown; not only did its physical shape show heavy damage but the 
social order had been destroyed as well. The city was divided and most of 
her friends had left the city. In order to explore her experience of loss of 
home, which started with the outbreak of the war and did not end with 
the ceasefire or with Aida’s return to Mostar, we need to further investi-
gate her position vis-à-vis Yugoslavia as well as her present life situation.
Aida describes herself as Muslimanka (Muslim), although not a prac-
tising one. She never joins in prayers at the mosque and tells me that, 
frankly, she has never learned how to pray. In her family, values taught 
by Tito such as Brotherhood and Unity had always outweighed any reli-
gion, she reminds me on several occasions. Still, the members of her 
family perceive themselves as Muslimani (as a national distinction from 
Croats and Serbs more than in a religious sense) and celebrate the most 
important religious holidays. With the war and Mostar’s division, her 
Muslim/Bosniak identity became part of everyday life. Aida studies at the 
Bosniak-dominated university and teaches in an east-side school which 
follows the Bosniak curriculum. Her close friends are all Bosniaks and 
when they meet they do so in cafés in East Mostar.
Aida grew up with her maternal grandmother  (who was divorced from 
Aida’s grandfather), a non-practising Muslim. Her grandmother’s second 
husband, Aida informs me, was a Serb or actually a Partisan, a commu-
nist, as she immediately corrects herself. Her maternal grandfather (her 
grandmother’s first husband) was also a Partisan. He had reached a high 
rank in the Partisan army during WWII and was therefore well respected 
after the war ended. Aida mentions that her grandfather’s second wife 
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was a Serb, as if to stress the fact that her family was a true communist 
family to whom nationality did not matter. From her grandfather Aida 
had learned a lot about the history of the Partisan movement, and I was 
impressed by how she was able to recall a great number of facts about 
Partisan battles and former Yugoslav holidays. In 1985, at the age of 
17, Aida became a member of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
(Savez komunista Jugoslavije) but burned her membership card in 1993 
because she feared it would be held against her if discovered.
Although Aida was open about the fact that she regrets that Tito’s 
Yugoslavia is gone, there was still a kind of secretive atmosphere when-
ever she talked about it. One day, she said to me in a hushed voice, 
as if sharing an intimate detail of her life: ‘I have to tell you, I am a 
Yugo- nostalgist!’ This ‘confession’ was followed by praise for the low 
unemployment rate under Tito, the health insurance everyone enjoyed, 
the good income as well as the free education. ‘And nobody asked you 
about your religion, everyone got along well. Mostar was the place with 
the highest number of inter-ethnic marriages’, she added. Aida does not 
acknowledge any comparison of Yugoslavia with other socialist coun-
tries and was very disappointed especially when foreigners made such 
comparisons. In order to address any possible doubts on my side, Aida 
told me:
Before the war I went out every night. It was a common practice for par-
ents to give their children money to go out every day. My parents for exam-
ple were both working and had a good income which we could live a 
carefree life. I could go out and eat out every night with my friends if I 
wanted. And not only this, we could also spend a whole month on the 
coast each summer. Families got a cheap place from the employer for their 
holidays.
Aida closed her defence of Yugoslavia by saying: ‘If I had a hero it would 
be Tito. This man is my hero! I have to tell you I am really not confident 
in what the future will bring us’ (Fig. 5.1).
Aida believes that the future looked more promising after World War 
II than after the 1990s war. As her grandmother who raised her used 
to tell her, a powerful reconstruction of destroyed Yugoslavia was under 
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way soon after WWII. Young people at the time responded to the call to 
volunteer in several big national reconstruction projects. Aida told me:
That was the reconstruction movement (radne akcije). Everyone was opti-
mistic that the situation would improve and they all backed Yugoslavia. 
These people were volunteering because they believed in it. Many things 
were built this way, for example railway lines, big factories and such things. 
This was Yugoslavia at the start. After WWII, from the mid 1950s onward, 
everything got better. The country rebuilt itself and progressed. Out of its 
own strength it recovered and got better each day indeed. The standard of 
living became higher and higher, apartments were built, plenty of jobs were 
available, good schools and higher education were free for everyone. My 
grandmother always said that life was best in the 1970s. The state was 
strong, salaries were good, and one could enjoy the good pension system, 
health insurance, long vacations, free education. It was indeed great! 
Midway through the 1980s it started to get worse.
Aida was constantly reminded by her grandparents (just as the youngest 
generation, the Post-Yugoslavs, today are reminded by those who fought 
Fig. 5.1 Graffito stating: ‘Živio Tito’ (‘Long live Tito’). Photo by the author
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in the war of the 1990s) of the struggles their generation went through 
in order to secure the life she later enjoyed. As Aida’s case shows, grand-
parents, not least because they often took over an important part in rais-
ing their grandchildren, were crucial in the transmission of memories to 
the Last Yugoslavs generation (see Bertaux and Thompson 2009). Aida 
felt as if she were reaping the benefits of the work of her grandparents’ 
generation and of Tito, and that she owed them all her gratitude. This 
also became clear whenever Aida defended Tito. Several times I noticed 
how important it was for her that the ‘world’ (i.e., ‘the West’) knew what 
Yugoslavia really was like. Tito was no dictator, Aida insisted, but pro-
vided people with security in healthcare, jobs, education, and so on. It is 
true that Tito accumulated a lot of luxury, she admitted, but he did not 
keep it for himself or for his family: ‘When he died, the luxury goods 
became state property again—so we can say he only borrowed it’.
Aida’s nostalgia for Yugoslavia is different to that of the First Yugoslavs, 
described in the previous chapter, since it is first and foremost connected 
to her personal life and only to a lesser extent to Tito’s ideology and the 
idea of Yugoslavia, a country for all South-Slavs. Her nostalgia mirrors 
the economic insecurities, the loss of a social network, together with the 
loss of a life prospect. Besides the changes Mostar went through during 
the war, Aida was additionally exposed to a different lifestyle and value 
system in Great Britain which influenced her and further contributed to 
her sense of alienation.
By the end of my fieldwork, Aida had received her second diploma and 
left university for good. She had difficulty finding a job as a teacher, and 
today works only part-time. She is upset at her situation, since her job 
neither fulfils her nor provides her with the necessary money to leave her 
parents to establish a household of her own. During Tito’s rule, she told 
me, everyone could find a job: ‘You knew that once you completed your 
education you would find a job and a flat. Life was somehow calmer, not 
so fast and not so tough. It was much easier and nicer to live back then.’
Aida defends Yugoslavia just as other people may defend their home coun-
try. One could say that Yugoslavia is what Aida experiences as home, but a 
home that no longer exists. Today, Aida gives the impression of being lost in 
her own ‘hometown’—longing for the past and at the same time knowing for 
sure that this past is gone forever. I am certain that if asked about what her 
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ideal future looks like, she would say it would be like Mostar before the war. 
Aida is aware of the fact that her longing has no chance of being satisfied. Her 
mourning over the loss (of her home) at times is so overwhelming that she 
does not feel strong enough to change anything for the better.
While Aida expresses a strong nostalgia for pre-war Mostar, there is 
little she does to re-enact pre-war Mostar life in her daily practices, for 
example by making use of the entire city rather than restricting herself 
to the Bosniak-dominated part of it. Instead, she prefers to remain and 
to meet with people on the east side. Each time we met, and we met 
many times in the three years of my stay, she always proposed to do so 
somewhere on the east side. Only once did we cross sides because I had 
my children with me and suggested we visit the only proper playground 
in Mostar, located just across the Bulevar. When we arrived there, Aida 
immediately called one of her friends and told her that she was in the 
park for the first time after the war.
Aida’s case demonstrates that political loyalties do not necessarily make 
a difference in the way people move around Mostar and the motivations 
for not crossing are very diverse. For some it is a matter of insecurity or 
a lack of trust or even fear, others are restricted by their aim to conform 
and for yet others it is first and foremost an ideological decision 
(see Palmberger 2013). In Aida’s case I suggest that her reluctance to visit 
places in West Mostar primarily has to do with the painful experience 
of loss of her pre-war home (which was located on that side of the city) 
and only to a lesser degree with conformity and with making a political 
statement.
 Minela and Željko: Shifting Narratives
 Minela
Minela was one of the first people I met in Mostar. We stayed in very 
close contact throughout the first half of my fieldwork until she married 
a Bosnian-German and moved to Germany with him. We became friends 
although we had opposing views on many social and political issues. 
I believe it was exactly these differences in opinion that made our conver-
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sations exciting. When I met Minela she was in her late 20s and was look-
ing for a job after she had decided to quit her university studies—started 
a couple of years before—due to financial difficulties. She was born on 
the outskirts of Mostar, where she still lived with her parents when I met 
her, along with her older brother and her younger sister.
Minela was one of a relatively small group of female interlocutors 
who stayed in Mostar throughout the entire war. She and her family had 
stayed in their own house during the whole period of the war. Only her 
father left to join the Bosniak-dominated Army of BiH (ABiH) and still 
today suffers from nightmares about this time in his life. Her little sister 
was born during the war and Minela felt a special responsibility to look 
after her when her family had no electricity for two years and experi-
enced food, hygiene and medicine scarcity as well as the terror of shelling. 
Besides the fear Minela was exposed to, she remembers the war as a time 
with little privacy and few excitements for a girl in her teens. Her family 
hosted refugees and the room where people sought shelter was always 
overcrowded. Conversations were conducted mostly among adults and 
were of little interest to teenaged Minela. Out of boredom she learned to 
distinguish the different types of grenades by their sound.
The war was a crucial experience for her and in the many conversa-
tions we had it became clear that she perceived this immediate experience 
of war as a clear break in her biography. Still, it took a long time until 
Minela would talk about it with me, but I never tried to press her about 
her experiences and left it up to her whether and, if so, when she would 
decide to share some of her experiences with me. The first time Minela 
gave me a detailed account of some of her war experiences came quite 
unexpectedly and took place when we were sitting together over lunch. 
The feta cheese I had put in the salad inadvertently triggered Minela’s 
strong memories of wartime because it was often found in the aid pack-
ages. I had had similar experiences with other friends on other occasions, 
who were reminded of the war by, for example, eating lentils or drinking 
Cedevita, a popular sherbet (see Sutton 2001).
Minela told me that she no longer thinks of the war as much as she 
used to. Sometimes she realises that she has not thought about it for a 
couple of weeks. She is relieved by this but at the same time worries about 
not keeping up her moral responsibility not to forget the crimes committed. 
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I was surprised to hear that Minela feared forgetting about what hap-
pened during the war since it seemed to be almost always present in her 
narratives as well as in her daily practices.
Even if Minela did not address the war always explicitly in our conver-
sations, it was present in the structure of her personal accounts. Most of 
Minela’s stories built on personal experiences started with either ‘before 
the war’ or ‘after the war’. For example, she did not refer to the time 
before the war as the time when she was a child, but divided her life 
neatly around the rupture of the war. Her personal age was subordinated 
to the political developments taking place so that ‘before the war’ for 
Minela means ‘normal life’, ‘the good and easy life’ and ‘Mostar in its true 
sense’. Another piece of evidence for the presence of the war in her mind, 
even if not directly addressed in her words, is the way Minela moves 
around Mostar. She restricts herself to only one part of the city, the one 
dominated by Bosniaks, and she crosses sides for specific purposes only, 
such as shopping. She does not feel quite comfortable in West Mostar 
and always thinks that people can tell that she is a Bosniak.
Although more than a decade has passed, the period after the war 
(including the present) is still perceived by Minela (similar to Aida) as an 
abnormal state, a ‘state of disorder’ and moral decay. Pre-war Mostar for 
her is the true Mostar, a city she liked and felt at home in. I remember 
the many hours we spent together which were filled with sentimentally 
remembering life in Yugoslavia. Her memories referred to Yugoslav rock 
music, actors, sweets and the Sarajevo Olympic Games held in 1984, 
as well as memories of solidly multinational neighbourhoods. When I 
bought the book Leksikon YU Mitologije (Andrić et al. 2004), which is 
a ‘lexicon’ of Yugoslavia including celebrities, cultural and sport events, 
the arts as well as famous politicians of that period, Minela sat on the 
sofa with me for a couple of hours, flipping through the pages and 
sharing little anecdotes about many of the entries. Even if she often 
indulged in nostalgic discourse about Yugoslav times, she would never 
refer to herself as Yugo-nostalgist, as Aida does. Instead, Minela liked to 
make fun of Yugo-nostalgists, who she thinks carry a distorted picture 
of Yugoslavia.
Minela’s nostalgia for pre-war Mostar is not connected to the urban–rural 
discourse encountered in Armen’s narrative in Chap. 4. Due to the fact that 
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she grew up on the outskirts of Mostar in a village setting, she does not iden-
tify herself as an urban Mostarian. It was interesting to hear that for her, not 
the rural people but the urbanites have spoilt Mostar. Minela finds the way 
the urban population looks down on rural newcomers unacceptable, espe-
cially given the fact that the latter have defended Mostar with their lives and 
made it possible for the pre-war urban population to return to their home-
town. Indeed, she blames those who refer to themselves as pravi Mostarci 
for the decay of the city as well as of moral values. For her, rural people are 
much more civilised (kulturniji) than the urbanites. She pointed out that 
in the villages surrounding Mostar the streets are cleaner, the gardens are 
better looked after and that generally villagers care to keep their properties 
tidier. This attitude in Minela is closely connected to a value system that, 
besides tidiness, includes respect for others, acknowledgement of authority 
(especially of children towards adults) as well as social responsibility. The 
decay of this value system she ascribes not only to the urban population but 
also to a general trend that came with the war or, to be more precise, with 
the end of the war.
In contrast to Aida, who only mourns her lost home and does not attri-
bute any good qualities to the life that came thereafter, Minela does see—
although on a rather abstract level—positive developments that came 
with the break-up of Yugoslavia, especially in regard to the awakening of 
Bosniak national identity. When Minela talks about her Bosniak identity 
she does so with pride. In contrast to Aida, a central part of being Bosniak 
for Minela is to be a practising Muslim.3 For her and her family, religion 
became very important during the war and has played a crucial role for 
them ever since. ‘There was only God who could save you’, Minela told 
me. God was important in order to survive this time, she said, and praying 
gave her family some of the comfort they so needed.
Today, Minela’s family fasts during the season of Ramazan and Minela 
does not show much understanding for those who do not. She does not 
3 Minela is member of the Bosniak nationalist party SDA. Her father had taken it into his hands to 
register his daughter soon after the SDA was founded. Since then Minela always carries her mem-
bership card with her in her purse. Although Minela shows respect for the early SDA when Alija 
Izetbegović  was president, she is critical of the current SDA leadership. In the general elections in 
2006 she therefore decided to give her vote to SBiH (Stranka za BiH, more liberal and multi-
national than SDA, although still clearly dominated by Bosniaks).
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understand why people call themselves Muslims when during Ramazan 
they enjoy themselves in Mostar’s café and bar scene. Although Minela is 
quite vehement in her attitude here, she does not endorse the covering of 
women’s hair whatsoever, viewing it as an unnecessary and even repressive 
gesture. She often emphasises that there was no such tradition in BiH before 
the war and that only elderly women in the villages covered their heads back 
then. She is also very critical of former soldiers from Arabic countries who 
married Bosnian women in order to remain and settle in BiH. For her, Islam 
in BiH is a European Islam that should not be compared with and should 
not be practised like its counterpart in Arab countries. This view is shared by 
the majority of Bosniaks I talked to during my fieldwork.
A Bosniak friend of mine, for example, emphasised his support for a 
liberal and moderate Islam by telling me how happy he was to see that 
his younger sister went out for drinks with her friends. Although he felt 
responsible for her, after the early death of both their parents shortly after 
the war, he said he was more worried about her being introduced to the 
new group of radical Muslims than about her drinking alcohol. Indeed, 
the fact that she did not reject alcohol reassured him that she was on 
the ‘right track’. Of course he told me this story with a certain smile on 
his face; it was common for my informants to stress their acceptance of 
alcohol in order to prove their moderate Islamic orientation. Despite this 
liberal attitude, it is also true that religion has increased in importance in 
BiH since the break-up of Yugoslavia, for both Christians and Muslims. 
For many Muslims, as is the case for Minela, Islam has become more 
central in their lives and religious rules are obeyed more carefully and 
mosques are visited more regularly than before the war. As described in 
Chaps. 2 and 3, religion and nation are closely intertwined in BiH.
Importantly, Minela is not only proud of being a Bošnjakinja (Bosniak) 
or Muslimanka (Muslim) but also of being a Bosanka (Bosnian). In our 
conversations it became clear that much of her patriotism stems from the 
experience of war when her compatriots (including her father and other 
close kin) fought for BiH’s independence. This makes it hard sometimes 
to tell her patriotism for BiH apart from her national identification as a 
Bosniak. Minela is aware that soldiers of Croat or Serb background also 
fought in the ABiH for an independent and multinational BiH, but she 
knows the majority were Bosniaks. She does not have much sympathy for 
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BiH’s Croats and Serbs who do not patriotically stand behind their state 
but rather stress their national distinctiveness, for example, through lan-
guage. Only Bosniaks kept their language, Minela once told me: ‘I speak 
like I did before the war. We [Bosniaks] did not change anything. Before 
the war everyone spoke like this [us].’ She added that one did not even 
know who belonged to which nationality, especially if the name did not 
tell; and most people did not care, as if they were one big nation. Minela 
includes herself in the group of people who saw everyone as the same. As 
if to underline this fact, she said her two best friends before the war were 
Croat and Serb. This claim for the sameness of the people in Yugoslavia, 
however, seems to oppose her view of the Bosniak nation as distinct from 
the Serb and Croat nation.
When referring to pre-wartime, Minela stresses the sameness of people 
in BiH and claims that distinctions are artificially created. At other times, 
however, she follows a discourse that strongly essentialises the Bosniak and 
Croat identity, thereby emphasising people’s differences over their common-
alities. This discourse of essentialising identities became most clear when 
Minela spoke about mixed marriages, especially about children from such 
marriages. She abruptly stopped arguing that all Bosnians were Bosnians 
first and foremost but focused instead on their national differences:
Before the war… we were indeed ashamed to say that we were Muslims. 
Somehow we felt like this. Listen, at the time of Bajram, the last Bajram 
before the war began, I think it was February, I and a friend of mine were 
waiting in the hallway for a lecture to begin when someone came in and 
said, ‘Bajram Mubarek Olsun’ [Bajram greeting]. We looked like this [she 
looks with her eyes wide open] because nobody ever said that aloud. Like 
they were some Hare Krishna or something like that. And so we stayed there 
and just looked at her like, ‘Why do you say that aloud?’ as if she was not 
allowed to say that. It was because of communism. You know, like there is 
no religion, there is no religion, nothing like that exists, you know? As if it 
was wrong, you know? That is why we [Bosniaks] often got married to Serbs 
and Croats and then you lose, you totally lose your identity. You give up 
your faith for your family; this is why these marriages were not good. You 
get married and you lose your faith and then you have nothing. Then you 
just celebrate Christmas and that’s it. You call your child, I don’t know… 
Marija, Kristina [Christian names], you know? Or, for example, a woman 
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got married to a Serb or I don’t know, it does not matter, and then, for 
example, immediately gave her child the name ‘Tea’ or ‘Minea’. You know, 
a name like ‘Višnja’ (cherry), ‘Jagoda’ (strawberry). A neutral name, you 
know? And then everyone knows immediately… I believe that this war had 
only one positive outcome: that we are no longer ashamed of ourselves!
Minela’s narrative is full of ambivalence towards Yugoslavia. As we have 
seen, she speaks highly of Yugoslavia’s progressiveness and the multi-
national coexistence it enabled and nurtured. She emphasises that people 
were all the same and that most people did not care about the nation-
ality of their compatriots. She claims that only the Bosniaks have kept 
this spirit while the others in the Mostar context (referring primarily to 
Croats) have tried to distinguish themselves from the others. Despite this 
positive view of Yugoslavia and her values, Minela simultaneously argues 
that multinationality is dangerous when it affects personal spheres like 
marriage because it leads to loss of identity. When she says, ‘I believe that 
this war had only one positive outcome: that we are no longer ashamed 
of ourselves’; she is referring to the strengthening of the Bosniak identity 
as a consequence of the war. We find both contrary discourses present in 
Minela’s narrative—about the sameness of people and about a primordial 
national difference that one cannot and should not attempt to overcome.
On the one hand, we could reason that the ambivalences found in 
her narrative are connected to the ambivalent position Bosniak political 
elites hold (see Chap. 3). To a certain extent this may be true but I argue 
that this ambivalence is characteristic for the Last Yugoslavs regardless of 
their nationality. This will become clear with Željko, a Croat informant. 
As discussed earlier in the book, the present dominant Croat public dis-
course condemns Yugoslavia much more openly than the Bosniak one 
does. Željko’s positive memories of Yugoslavia thus disturb the negative 
picture of Yugoslavia that he ideologically supports.
 Željko
I met Željko through the so-called snowball effect. A friend of mine intro-
duced me to one of her friends, who then introduced me to her uncle, 
Željko. I met Željko in his office in West Mostar where he works as 
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a structural engineer. He was born in 1961 in a town that was then part 
of the Croat republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
today is a town in Croatia just at the border with BiH. When he was 10 he 
moved to Mostar with his family, where he has remained until today. Only 
his wife and son spent part of the war in Germany. Before the war Željko 
enjoyed stable employment and worked for the same company for many 
years. Today his regular income is much too small to support his family 
and he has to do other work on the side. He has to support not only his 
nuclear family but also his mother, whose pension is too small to live on. 
This responsibility to support his family in the present difficult economic 
situation weighs heavily on his shoulders.
Like Minela, the war for Željko was a formative experience. Željko 
experienced the war first and foremost as soldier. He was mobilised by 
the HVO at the beginning of the war and served in the army until the 
ceasefire was achieved. The way Željko narrates the war is in stark opposi-
tion to Minela’s narrative. In his narrative, the Croats are double victims, 
first of the Serbs and then of their former allies, the Bosniaks. While 
for Minela Herceg-Bosna represents a brutal regime that aimed to cleanse 
West Mostar of all non-Croats, for Željko the establishment of Herceg- 
Bosna was an absolute necessity since in a state of chaos there was need for 
some kind of government. In his narrative, the aggression was initiated 
by the Muslims. He does not admit any guilt of the Croats but holds 
the Muslims fully responsible. He even justifies the notorious detention 
camp ‘Heliodrom’ with an anecdote about two HVO soldiers who were 
perfidiously killed by two Bosniak snipers. He feels that this incident was 
reason enough to take more drastic action.
I was surprised about Željko’s openness about his experiences at 
HVO. A while into our conversation, I even had the feeling that Željko 
was relieved to tell me his story; so I asked him whether he had shared 
his war experiences with others before. As it turned out, he hardly had. 
He told me that he does not want to burden his family with these stories 
and that, if at all, he only speaks with other veterans about the war but 
then only to share funny anecdotes. All the veterans, Bosniaks and Croats 
alike, I talked to tend to keep their war experiences to themselves. 
They gave me different explanations for this decision, but most said they 
did not want to burden their loved ones.
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When Željko told me about his war experiences, his sentences were 
incomplete and often incoherent. This may be because he had not yet 
shared his war experiences with others, but it may also be because such 
experiences are difficult to share, especially with someone without a simi-
lar background. This is a small excerpt of what he narrated about his war 
experiences:
We all thought that this is something that will be over within three months. 
They [his parents, wife and young son] were at the sea in Makarska in this 
period, so that the child was safe. But whoever stayed here did not stay 
normal any longer. Do you understand what I mean? I went through the 
war, you know through bljesak and oluja [names of major military offen-
sives] and so on. And then when I came home for some three months I was 
just not myself anymore. I think these were… although I was not in these… 
let’s say, situations. Once or twice that I something… That means that, 
that… especially one of these units we faced. These people needed to be 
particularly courageous or crazy or on drugs. This is a category of people 
with which a state has to deal somehow, but the state does not exist. Do 
you understand? And then the war is over for you and I stayed here in a 
high-rise apartment building and this guy throws a bomb… throws a 
bomb from the balcony, he does not look who is down there. You know, 
that was the way things went. And I don’t talk about shooting with, with… 
still the Serbs shot. We had to defend ourselves and they attacked.
And do you still think about it a lot?
Yes I do. Well, sometimes, sometimes… yes I do.
And with whom do you speak about it?
Sometimes with colleagues who went through the same things, this and 
that, some stories, but they are always, how to say, amusing events. These 
nicer things, not ugly things but, but nice things. There were a lot of, a lot 
of funny anecdotes, a lot of these tricks and so on. Not everything was so… 
you did not get killed every metre. Time has to pass. It is like that.
How much do you want to talk about this with your children?
Perhaps when they are older. Well, I don’t talk about it with them. I 
don’t talk about it a lot.
Do you think that they need to know…?
Well, they know that I was there. However, this period… this oluja the 
son remembers, but not really, it took place a long time ago. Well, this 
operation lasted… I don’t know how well you are informed about it, I don’t 
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know from Herzegovina, from Livno and Glamoc, Grahovo, I don’t know 
how well you know this terrain and this other side. I was not aware that I 
was in this military action (akcija) until I was out of it, you understand? I 
only know that I was there for 22 days. I was not aware that I was part of 
this military action until I turned on the radio the next day.
But about the war in general?
Generally with the kids, I don’t talk about it. I don’t talk about it. With 
the children—no. There is no need to. But I am always afraid when my 
little ones go to the left riverbank. Then I get a bit afraid.
In the excerpt cited above, Željko describes the war as a period of his life 
that took much longer than he expected, a period he was forced to go 
through and in which he became somewhat confused mentally. When talk-
ing about his war experiences, his language becomes vague and his sen-
tences incomplete. Although I met an unexpected readiness in Željko to 
tell me about the war, at the same time it seemed he could not find the 
right words to do so. Das (2007: 90) describes this in the case of extreme 
violence experienced in India as the ‘non-narrative’. Together with other 
authors (see, e.g., Argenti and Schramm 2010), Das argues that extreme 
violence has the potential to leave behind witnesses without words. Such 
experiences create disruptions in people’s lives in the sense that they cannot 
relate them to the life they lived before. Moreover, the experienced violence 
is too far removed from ‘normal life’ for witnesses to share it with others.
The indescribability of their story is the fate veterans’ face, not only in 
BiH. Not only do they not want to burden others with their stories, but 
their experiences also seem impossible to share because they exceed what 
is regarded as normal experience (see Jackson 2006: 49). This results in a 
silence that manifests itself even between close family members, such as 
spouses, as I was told by several of my female interlocutors. Women who 
have re-joined their husbands after the war often had no information even 
about the positions their husbands held as soldiers. Some of the husbands 
showed clear signs of suffering from that time, for example nightmares, 
but the couples never talked about it. As Lomsky-Feder (2004) shows on 
the case of Israeli veterans, the male fighter is expected to return after the 
battle to ‘business as usual’, to return home not showing any effects of the 
war or only at night when nobody notices.
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In the last part of the excerpt, Željko states that he does not want to 
share his war experiences with his children. As will be discussed in the 
analysis of the Post-Yugoslav generation, the silence regarding the war, 
particularly by older (male) family members about their war experiences, 
irritates the younger ones. Even if Željko does not speak with his children 
about the war, he conveys to them that the ‘others’ are still the Croats’ 
enemies and one cannot be careful enough. In the last sentence Željko 
unexpectedly and directly shares, ‘But I am always afraid when my little 
ones go to the left riverbank’. Željko himself had cut all relationships to 
Bosniaks aside from professional ones. When I asked him whether he 
sometimes went to the east side of the city, he answered:
I have no desire to go to theirs [Bosniak side].
Where?
Down there to the Old Bridge.
You don’t go there?
No I don’t. I have not been there for I think a year, definitely.
But before the war you went there, right?
Before the war, we spent much time down there. When I was a student 
I was there all the time.
And now you don’t feel like it?
I don’t have any desire whatsoever, whatsoever!
Why?
I think because of the way the Muslims behave, with this particular relation 
to, well, let’s say, Islam.
[…]
And your Bosniak friends [the ones he earlier mentioned to me] are they 
different then, are they not like that?
We try to avoid such conversations like the two of us are engaged in 
now. That means we talk about other things, primarily about work related 
things. […] You know, when my mobile phone rings a Croat song plays, 
the one from the recent Eurovision [song contest]. If I went down there 
I would have to turn it off, you know, so that nobody attacks me at the 
bar… do you know what I mean?
As becomes evident in the excerpt above, Željko has made a clear decision 
not to cross sides. His relationships with Bosniaks are restricted to his work. 
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He also strongly wishes that his children do not cross to the Bosniak side, 
which he justifies with the potential danger that such a crossing implies. 
In order to strengthen his argument, Željko reminds me about the young 
Australian man who had been beaten up in East Mostar a few weeks earlier 
because he wore a Croat football jersey. Although my interlocutors were 
aware that violent attacks had become rare, they were taken as good reasons 
why one (or one’s children) should not cross sides.
In Željko’s view, the future for Croats in Mostar looks grim. He believes 
that the Muslims want to take over the city and that gradually the Croat 
population will have to emigrate. Željko claims that Mostar was a Croat 
city before the war but that this is not the case anymore today. This view 
is interesting if we consider that Croat population in Mostar has steadily 
grown since the war and that it is most likely that Croats even hold major-
ity status now, while Bosniaks had been the strongest nation before the war 
(see Chap. 2). Nonetheless, Željko compares the situation in Mostar with the 
situation in Kosovo, where the Albanian population became the great major-
ity within a few decades and the Serbs remained only as a very small minority. 
For him, Muslims are not neighbours anymore, because neighbours know 
what belongs to them and what does not; as Željko argues:
We [Croats] know how to communicate with neighbours here in 
Herzegovina. Because neighbours know what is theirs and I know what is 
mine. And that is why it works out so well. But if you don’t know what 
belongs to whom then nothing works anymore. And I think in the relation 
between Croats and Muslims, Muslims think that everything is theirs and 
they don’t know what is theirs. And that is why I am for a third entity!
Here Željko does not contrast the bad neighbourliness (loš komšiluk) 
with the intact one before the war, as is commonly done, but he instead 
contrasts the Bosniak understanding of komšiluk with that of Croats’, 
identifying the former as inferior. This presents a decisive shift in argu-
mentation, since the art of komšiluk in this discourse belongs solely to 
one nation and not to all, as is usually the case in nostalgic discourse 
on pre-war Mostar. Željko clearly positions himself against future 
co existence and is convinced that 90 % of the Croat population shares 
his opinion and would opt for a third entity, a Croat entity. In his view, as 
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in the view of the Croat historian introduced in Chap. 3, this is the 
only viable option for Croats to survive in BiH.
One of the examples Željko gave for his evaluation of Bosniak non- 
neighbourly behaviour concerns the controversy about the Croat member 
of the BiH presidency. The presidency is supposed to be shared among 
Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, whereby three presidents govern in rotation. 
In the 2006 general election, Željko Komšić was the SDP’s candidate for 
the Croat seat in the presidency member, which he won. It was the first 
time since the war ended that the Croat presidency was not a member of 
the HDZ. Komšić’s success can be traced to two main factors: the then 
recent split of the Croat national party HDZ BiH into two factions, and 
the strong support he received from Bosniak voters. Komšić is not per-
ceived to be a proper Croat because, although from a Roman Catholic 
family, he himself is an agnostic. Moreover, he does not hold dual citizen-
ship (BiH and Croat) as many other Croats in BiH. He also propagates 
a shared BiH and is married to a Bosniak. For Željko, as for many other 
Croats, these are plenty of reasons why Komšić is not a suitable Croat rep-
resentative in the presidency. But this was exactly why so many Bosniaks 
cheered upon his victory. I remember seeing many bright faces among 
my Bosniak friends and hearing cynical comments about the results of 
the election. Ultimately, this situation underscores the absurdity of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement and the governmental structure it produced. 
But for Željko it was proof of Bosniaks’ non-neighbourly behaviour and 
their attempt to take away what belongs to the Croat nation.
So far, the way Željko represents the situation of Croats during and 
after the war is very much in line with the current dominant public 
discourse espoused by the Croat political elites. When he talks about 
pre-war Mostar, however, his narrative deviates. He acknowledges Tito’s 
achievement in playing an intermediary role between the Soviet bloc and 
the West. Moreover, he fondly remembers that people had jobs and good 
incomes, generally enjoyed a good life and that everyone including his 
parents were extremely sad upon Tito’s death. Željko further recalls that 
when he was in school everyone, regardless of national background, got 
along well and he is still friends with his former school friends. However, 
it soon becomes clear that most of these friends have left the city and he 
has lost contact with them. His statement about still being friends with 
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his former school friends of other nationalities may rather mean that 
Željko does not see them as enemies because he was never ‘forced’ to clas-
sify them along a friend–enemy framework.
Indeed, Bosniaks and Serbs from pre-wartime were friends and may 
remain friends (in Željko’s memory) because they left Mostar, but Bosniaks 
(and Serbs) whom Željko meets today cannot become friends anymore 
because this would dangerously blur the boundary between Bosniaks 
and Croats, thereby threatening Croat existence. This fear of the Croat 
nations’ assimilation and absorption is clearly in line with the dominant 
Croat public discourse. Nevertheless, as opposed to the Croat professor 
introduced in Chap. 3, who is professionally involved in rewriting his-
tory and denies any positive experiences of Yugoslavia, Željko’s narrative 
includes positive personal memories of Yugoslav times. At several points 
during our interview Željko came to realise the discrepancies between the 
dominant Croat discourse he follows when narrating the present situa-
tion and the divergent discourse when narrating his personal experiences 
of pre- wartime. The explanation he gave for it, however, rested on the 
argument that he was simply ignorant during the period of Yugoslavia. 
He claimed he was not politically sensitive enough to realise his nation 
was being repressed (including the economic injustices of, for example, 
Western Herzegovina, a region dominated by Croats). He blames his 
ignorance on his age, stating he was too young and more interested in 
playing football than engaging in serious subjects.
Not only on the subject of national coexistence but also his position 
towards the church and ongoing present language politics demonstrate 
how Željko is caught between different discourses. Although he ideologi-
cally supports Croat national politics, from time to time he reverts to inter-
pretative templates from Yugoslav times. In terms of language, Željko says 
how amusing it is that his children do not understand some of the words 
he uses, words that are today regarded as Serb and have been replaced by 
‘proper Croat’ words. From what he told me, I initially concluded that his 
children are exposed to this revised language in school while he himself is 
unwilling to change his language, but I learned otherwise:
No, no, no when we were in school we were taught in what was called 
Serbo-Croatian and it was predominantly Serb. The Muslims took over a 
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lot of Serbian. Well, they made some sort of Bosniak language [sic: not 
Bosnian!]. They made a language and then they unmade it again. There are 
a lot of these things going on. Well, but I did not know about it. What does 
a child know? Is it Serbian, is it Croatian kava or kafa [both meaning coffee 
but the first is used today primarily by Croats while the latter is used by 
Bosniaks and Serbs] and so forth.
What do you use now? Hljeb or kruh? [Both meaning ‘bread’ but the first is 
used today primarily by Bosniaks and Serbs and the latter by Croats.]
Now kruh. Now I use the Croatian word.
Was hljeb more in use or both before the war?
Before it was hljeb.
As becomes evident in the cited excerpt, Željko actually expresses sym-
pathy for this linguistic development, even if he finds some situations 
resulting from it bewildering. He claims, however, that he used these 
words only because he was unaware they were actually of Serb origin. 
Now that he knows better, he has adapted his language. This attitude is 
different for the First Yugoslavs I introduced in the previous chapter, who 
are more reluctant to change their language.
Later during the same conversation, I asked Željko about his relation-
ship with the church:
And how is your relationship to the church?
To the church? I don’t… my father… the relation of my family always 
has been… my father’s not my mother’s! My mother always went to church 
and so forth, but my father was a communist. And so was I. I just did not 
go to church.
And your children?
The children are… I don’t know. You know what? Still, how can I say, 
religious education. You know, that is for me… I have always been against it. 
Who wants to join religious education should go, that’s fine, but not in 
school, not to misuse it. Do you understand? Of all these subjects. And 
they have many of them. They have one year of computer science and four 
of religious education, right? I think it would be better to invest in another 
language. I am really against it… I have always had a good relationship 
with the church. […] Well, but I think it goes too far, too far into our lives. 
[…] I would say, wait until the children are 18 and then they should choose 
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for themselves. For some time during the war you could not earn a 
domovnica4 from Croatia if you were not baptised [in the Catholic Church]. 
You know, that is discrimination.
It is obviously not easy for Željko to express his (and his family’s) rela-
tionship with the church. He constantly searches for the right words but 
does not seem to find them. The way he positions himself vis-à-vis the 
church is very vague. It is possible that he has not been asked about this 
issue in such an explicit manner before. While he talked it seemed as if he 
suddenly became aware of his out-dated views stemming from Yugoslav 
times. He and his father were both in the Communist Party and his father 
distanced himself strongly from the church, although his wife attended 
church. During our conversation, Željko probably became aware that his 
criticism of the church and its involvement in education and politics is 
not ‘politically correct’ anymore, and he eventually softened his criticism 
towards the church when he talked about his daughter’s involvement in 
it. In this case he believes that his daughter is in good hands and that the 
values the church teaches are the right ones.
The narratives of Minela and Željko show that the Last Yugoslavs 
are the generation who struggles most in the process of (re-)positioning 
themselves towards their own and their nation’s past and at the same time 
of (re-)envisioning the future. In this reorientation process, two central 
phenomena can be observed: firstly, the narratives of the Last Yugoslavs 
tend to oscillate between different, even opposing, discourses; and sec-
ondly, narratives do not proceed towards a conclusion but show a lack of 
cohesiveness.
The rupture that the war and the end of socialist Yugoslavia caused in 
the lives of the Last Yugoslavs not only finds expression in the three- fold 
time frame discussed above, but also penetrates their narratives as a whole, 
creating accounts that are characterised by a lack of conclusiveness. This is 
different for the older and younger generations, whose narratives are much 
more conclusive. While the First Yugoslavs tend to connect the two wars 
they experienced during their lifetime into a broader and more coher-
ent narrative, the Post-Yugoslavs tend to distance themselves from wider 
4 The domovnica is an official document providing proof of Croat origin.
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societal experiences caused by the war. The Last Yugoslavs’ narratives of 
local history and of their lives as being closely bound to it stand out due 
to the way they oscillate between different discourses: one localised dis-
course centring around the worsening of quality of life with the break-up 
of Yugoslavia and the war, and one delocalised discourse centring around 
the national liberation that came with it. While the former constitutes an 
immediate experience, the latter exists on a more ideological level.
 Lost Homes: Oscillating Between Opposing 
Discourses
As has been shown, the narratives of the Last Yugoslavs are characterised 
by two central phenomena. First, they tend to oscillate between differ-
ent, even opposing, discourses. Second, they are subject to the disruption 
that the war and the political-economic transformations caused. This 
 disruption in the expected life course (in regard to education and career 
as well as family life) continues to this day, since for many of this genera-
tion life and, in particular, the course of their life remains ‘out of order’. 
In the Last Yugoslavs’ narratives, pre-war BiH is presented as the ‘secure 
past’, while present and future BiH is seen as insecure, even for those who 
are in favour of Mostar’s division and support the nationalist discourse.
Besides human losses and loss of familiar neighbourhoods, the loss 
of economic security (viewed with reference to the extremely precarious 
economic situation many people face today)5 has had a strong impact on 
the lives of the Last Yugoslavs. Severe changes brought about by the war, 
as well as by the transformation of the Yugoslav socialist market economy 
into a neoliberal, capitalist-oriented economy, directly affected the lives 
of the Last Yugoslavs. Thus we can say this generation experienced a ‘dou-
ble rupture’ (Jansen 2008: 47).
This generation’s discursive tactics are marked by their attempts to deal 
with their ruptured biographies. Compared to the First Yugoslavs, the nar-
ratives of the Last Yugoslavs show much less continuity and conclusive-
ness. While the First Yugoslavs are likely to connect the recent war and 
5 In 2008 the average income in BiH was around 400 Euros; around 40  % of the population 
described their household situation as below average (see UNDP 2008/3).
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their experience of it with WWII or to embed it in a narrative of suffer-
ing that goes beyond the experience of war, in the narratives of the Last 
Yugoslavs the 1992–1995 war stands out as an experience that cannot be 
connected to any other experience. Moreover, a longing is expressed for 
the normal life (normalan život), which is tightly connected to the social 
security and economic well-being people fondly remember from Yugoslav 
times but also to good komšiluk (neighbourliness) (see Jansen 2015; Spasić 
2012). So, we may say that the idea of normalan život and its connotations 
are an interpretative template borrowed from Yugoslav times.
In this nostalgic discourse Yugoslavia is often remembered as the 
ideal home, a lost home that can never be regained (Palmberger 2008). 
Home thus does not represent a geographically defined place but is, as 
Jansen (2007) vividly shows in the case of BiH’s returnees, strongly tied 
to feelings of security (Sicherheit), which again is bound to specific needs 
 arising from the stage of life in which people find themselves. For the 
Last Yugoslavs, pre-war, not post-war, Mostar presents this ‘secure’ place. 
Evidently, only the relatively prosperous Yugoslav period is remembered 
by the Last Yugoslavs and not the economic decay of the 1980s. Even 
if social security and equality were central ideals of Tito’s Yugoslavia in 
order to legitimise the socialist regime, these ideals were never achieved 
and the system failed to develop progressive redistributive mechanisms. 
Basic social securities, for example, in respect to housing, health care and 
education—often mentioned by my informants—were not as abundant 
as they are remembered today (see Allcock 2000; see also Pešić 1988).6 
Nevertheless, in the narratives of the Last Yugoslavs the past is clearly set 
in relation to the present. Considering the extreme difficult economic 
situation BiH’s citizens face today, Yugoslavia is recalled in a highly 
idealised fashion and evidently only the relatively prosperous period is 
remembered and not the economic crisis of the 1980s.
In the case of Aida and her longing for Yugoslavia it became clear that a 
loss of home can be experienced even when one is, geographically speak-
6 Especially in urban areas accommodation was in chronic short supply and, with a few exceptions, 
only those in leadership positions received housing through their occupational position. In terms 
of healthcare it has to be said that it was free but medicine provision was not. Education was free, 
too, but there was limited financial aid available. Moreover, unemployment insurance was not suf-
ficient (Allcock 2000: 192–194).
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ing, at home. Although after the war she returned to Mostar, the city she 
grew up in, Aida continues to experience a deep loss of home. Jansen and 
Löfving (2009) rightly remind us that it is wrong to assume that home is 
where one grew up or is a geographically defined place as:
Home itself, then, needs to be problematised, and particularly the self- 
evidence with which it is territorialised. If we fail to do so [...], home is all 
too easily represented unwittingly as a timeless entity in an unchanging 
context of origin, something that is particularly inappropriate if we take 
into account that that context is often one of dramatic transformation, 
such as war or socioeconomic restructuring. There is, then, an important 
temporal dimension to experiences of home. (Jansen and Löfving 2009: 
15)
With the above point in mind, we can better understand why those who 
decided to resettle in Mostar (and even those who never left the city) 
experienced a loss of home in the sense that they lost the city they felt at 
home in. Some even said they do not regain a sense of familiarity when 
re-visiting places, although they previously had lived there for more than 
half their lifetime.7 Returning ‘home’ (or remaining at ‘home’) actually 
meant building a new life in a place that has suffered severe transfor-
mations. Although this chapter focused on those who remained in or 
returned to Mostar, it has to be said that this generation was particularly 
reluctant to return to their pre-war homes, at least on a permanent basis 
(see Jansen 2009).
The notion of home, we can say, is closely connected to people’s sense 
of socio-economic security and future prospects that abruptly van-
ished with the war. Life presents itself as fractured and there is a dra-
matic discontinuity between life before the war and life after the war. 
This is a phenomenon observed in cases of abrupt and traumatising life 
changes, particularly researched in the cases of Holocaust survivors (see 
Rosenthal 1995). As discussed in this chapter, home cannot be defined as 
a geographical place but is connected to familiar social relationships and 
physical and economic securities and provides room for dreams of and 
7 Returning ‘home’ but not recognising that place as home any more is a common experience 
among Bosnian returnees (see Jansen 2006; Stefansson 2006).
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aspirations for the future. This loss of home, I argue, is a crucial reason 
for the lack of conclusiveness in the narratives of the Last Yugoslavs gen-
eration. In contrast to those of my informants who taught local history 
in school or university, my informants presented here could not rewrite 
local history by erasing their personal memories. They did not fully adapt 
their own memories to accommodate the dominant national discourses 
but rather shifted between different discourses—old and new.
Although the loss of home was discussed most explicitly in Aida’s case, 
it is a consistent theme running through all of the narratives presented. 
Moreover, a sense of loss of home is not unique to the Last Yugoslavs but 
is also a strong element in the narratives of the First Yugoslavs, as dis-
cussed in the previous chapter. Still, for the Last Yugoslavs, the rupture of 
the war came at a critical point in life when they were establishing their 
own households and building up their careers or when they were just 
about to do so. Aida blames the war for foiling her life plans (especially 
in terms of career and family) and for the fact that she still lives at home 
with her parents at a point in her life when she expected to be setting up 
her own household.
Becker (1997), in her book Disrupted Lives, draws a clear parallel 
between expectations about the course of life that do not materialise 
because of unexpected life events and the experience of biographical dis-
ruption. Becker conducted research with Americans whose lives took an 
unexpected turn because of diverse reasons, including infertility as well as 
chronic illnesses. Becker noticed that her informants share the experience 
of disruption of a life course pictured as a predictable continuous flow. 
‘Although continuity in life is an illusion, it is an effective one: it organizes 
people’s plans for and expectations about life, as well as the ways in which 
they understand who they are and what they do’ (Becker 1997: 191). 
Becker’s observations, as well as my own, suggest that ideas of the future 
are closely connected to the life course. When the flow of life is interrupted 
due to unexpected circumstances, the anticipated future disintegrates and 
a coherent narrative that connects past-present- future is under threat. 
As I realised in the case of the Last Yugoslavs’ narratives, when expecta-
tions concerning one’s life course are hampered by wide-reaching soci-
etal transformations and war, it is not only one’s physical integrity that is 
threatened, but also the meaningful life that people long for. This makes 
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clear that we need to consider questions concerning the life course in order 
to understand the multiple ways people position themselves toward and 
make sense of historical-political ruptures.
The life situation the First Yugoslavs face (presented in the previous 
chapter) gives them more leeway where they are not forced to grapple 
with the political and economic changes the way the Last Yugoslavs 
have to. The former also seem to find more possibility and legitimacy in 
indulging in the past and to remain among like-minded people in order 
to revive the spirit of the ‘good old days’ and to cherish a generationally 
shared past time. The Last Yugoslavs face the difficult task of orienting 
themselves anew in a society that has changed so significantly. Those who 
feel incapable of doing so experience the world around them as alien 
and often also hostile. Oftentimes, the place where they were born is 
not experienced as home anymore and the experience of loss of home 
is shared not only by those who left the country but also by those who 
remained in or returned to Mostar.
While there seems to be a consensus in the literature that individu-
als aim to ‘connect disparate parts into a coherent, meaningful whole’ 
(Holstein and Gubrium 1995: 28; see also Roseman 1995), in this chap-
ter I have shown that this is not necessarily always possible. In the case of 
the generation of the Last Yugoslavs I argued that the experience of dis-
ruption and loss of future prospects due to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
the war and political-economic transformations prevent people from 
narrating their lives and the history of their society in meaningful and 
coherent ways. Moreover, I have revealed that the way wider societal 
transformations in Mostar are perceived as biographical disruptions var-
ies along generational (rather than national) lines.
I have, moreover, shown that generational demarcations are informed 
by the past as well as by present shared experiences and by expectations of the 
future (or lack thereof ), which are closely connected to the life course. 
Due to the life situation the Last Yugoslavs find themselves in, they face a 
particular challenge when it comes to re-orienting themselves in the new 
post-war socio-political context. The Last Yugoslavs’ narratives discussed 
above have illustrated how the disappearance of a home and the future 
prospects tightly tied to it hamper the construction of a coherent and 
meaningful narrative. As some researchers working with refugees have 
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observed, a sense of belonging and of home is crucial for a coherent nar-
rative of one’s life: ‘Forced movement as a rupture with the familiar social 
world tends to undermine the premises on which meaningful stories are 
built’ (Eastmond 2007: 259). Although not all Mostarians experienced 
forced movement, they all experienced the disappearance of a familiar 
world. As long as they have not found a new home that suffices as a base 
from which to create future projections, they are likely to struggle to 
find a coherent life narrative. As Skultans (1997) has shown in her vivid 
account of Latvian life narratives, her interlocutors were able to deal well 
with loss and discontinuities as long as they found ‘an end’ to the stories 
of their lives. For Skultan’s Latvian interlocutors, the end of their story 
is the homecoming. However, as has been shown above, no such home-
coming exists for the majority of my interlocutors who belong to the 
generation of the Last Yugoslavs. Moreover, even for those who believe 
that the war has fostered national liberation, it seems too abstract an 
achievement to serve as the ‘story’s end’.
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6
The (Un)spoilt Generation: 
The Post-Yugoslavs
In this chapter I give voice to the Post-Yugoslavs, the youngest generation. 
The Post-Yugoslavs were teenagers or in their early 20s when I met them, 
between two and 10 years old when the war started, and between five and 
14 years old when it ended. This means that all of them spent more years 
of their lives in post-wartime than in pre-wartime. The majority of my 
interlocutors spent at least part of the war as refugees away from the war 
zone (either in BiH or outside the country), some of them accompanied 
by a sibling or parent and others by themselves.
In Mostar young people are often presented by older people as being 
crucially different from the rest of society because of their lack of pre- war 
experience. Mostar’s youths are often presented as ignorant, manipulated 
and lethargic. Pre-war memories are used here as boundary markers, allow-
ing, for example, young Mostarians in their late 20s or early 30s to differ-
entiate themselves from those in their early 20s. Mostar’s youths are often 
presented as ignorant, manipulated and lethargic. As shown in the previ-
ous chapters, for many Last Yugoslavs and First Yugoslavs, pre-war Mostar 
is still the true Mostar while post-war Mostar is a kind of artificial state. 
Following this line of thought, the youngest generation, which I refer to 
as the Post-Yugoslavs, are pitied for their lack of memory of true  (pre- war) 
Mostar. Due to the post-war division of BiH and Mostar in particular, the 
youngest generation is much less familiar with customs associated with the 
other national group, which are part of the older population’s common 
knowledge. A Croat woman in her late 20s when I met her repeatedly 
expressed her astonishment about the youngest generation. For instance, 
she once expressed disbelief at the fact that her younger friends are no 
longer familiar with Bosniak names. Names which for her were typically 
Bosnian (sic: not Bosniak!) did not sound familiar to her friends who 
were only a few years younger than her. This unfamiliarity also extends to 
socialist festivities, pre-war rock bands as well as turcizmi1 (in the case of 
Croat youth), which were all common in pre-war BiH.
The way the Post-Yugoslavs are presented by older compatriots is contra-
dictory. They are said to be the part of the population that is most manipu-
lated by nationalist politicians as well as traumatised; they grew up in a time 
of extreme nationalism, war and national partition. On the other hand, 
the Post-Yugoslavs are the generation who shoulder the hope for a more 
positive future on behalf of their parents, grandparents and teachers, as well 
as domestic politicians and members of the so-called ‘international com-
munity’ (see Palmberger 2010). As I will show below, the Post-Yugoslavs 
instead perceive themselves as the ‘unspoilt’ rather than the ‘spoilt’ genera-
tion, which is less affected by negative feelings caused by the war.
Even if most of the time my interlocutors ‘downplayed’ their war expe-
riences, most of them also had an alternative story to tell, indicating that 
neither their young age nor the fact that they were evacuated to safer 
places spared them from feelings of fear and insecurity. Three immedi-
ate realms were essential in these narratives: the family, neighbourhood 
and school. It was first and foremost in these places that children sensed 
changes, changes that were often left unexplained. There were the fathers 
who began to dress in military uniform (an item of clothing the children 
had never seen at home before) and to leave the family for days or weeks. 
Plus the silence upon their return about what they had experienced. 
There were the pupils who disappeared without saying good-bye, leaving 
behind empty desks in the classroom. In particular, those who had just 
1 Turcizam is the local name for a word of Arabic origin incorporated into what used to be referred 
to as Serbo-Croatian and is nowadays used mainly by Bosniaks or the older population.
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reached primary school age when the war started described how confused 
and threatened they felt, sensing that something was going on without 
ever being told.
First, their Serb schoolmates suddenly disappeared. Then, during the 
following weeks, more and more friends stopped attending classes and 
their schooling was often interrupted by shelling. For many of my inter-
locutors this was the point when they first realised that they belonged to 
a nation or at least became aware of the importance of such an identity. 
There were long periods when many of the children were parted from 
their families (or part of their families) after being evacuated to safer places 
in and outside BiH. In accounts of the time they were away from their 
family, young Mostarians expressed the anxiety and fear they experienced 
on behalf of the family members who stayed behind. Lacking any means 
of communication with their loved ones, they were entirely dependent on 
the news on foreign TV channels broadcasting images of war and destruc-
tion. Some of them even had lost hope they would ever see their family 
again. One young man, who had been evacuated to a foreign country, 
learned only months after the event that his little brother had died after 
being shot by a sniper. He told me this during a stroll through Mostar 
when we passed by the graveyard where his brother is buried. Such events 
made it very clear that my youngest informants had also experienced the 
war in its fullest sense. Nevertheless, they tend to dissociate their experi-
ences from that of the wider society, as I will show in this chapter.
Even though the Post-Yugoslavs tend to present themselves and 
their environments as somehow ‘untouched’ by the war, this does not 
mean that members of this generation are not critical of their city at 
all. The Post-Yugoslavs often told me how unhappy they were with 
BiH’s education system, especially with the old-fashioned teaching 
and examining methods. There was also a considerable group of Post- 
Yugoslavs who complained there was too little to do in Mostar for young 
people besides meeting friends in coffee bars.2 Mostar does not even 
have a cinema. Those who had already finished school especially com-
plained about the constraints they faced around travelling (not only 
2 The lack of public places for young people besides coffee bars is significant throughout BiH 
(see Abaspahić et al. 2003).
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about financial constraints but also about the restrictive visa regulations). 
Another worry, expressed especially among the older Post-Yugoslavs, 
was the difficult economic situation in Mostar (as throughout BiH) and 
the relatively bad prospects for finding an appropriate job. Among the 
students I talked to, many considered the high unemployment rate as 
one of several factors causing them to pursue university study (rather 
than being unemployed). I also sensed that the Post-Yugoslavs (like the 
older generations) were tired of politicians’ inability to improve the 
situation.3
This chapter focuses on two central questions. Firstly, how do the 
Post- Yugoslavs narrate their and their nation’s war experiences and 
which discursive tactics do they follow to deal with the legacy of the 
war in everyday life? Secondly, how do they narrate the pre-war period 
and incorporate the narratives of that time passed on to them by their 
older compatriots? As this chapter will show, encounters between young 
Bosniaks and Croats in Mostar are rare and members of the Post-
Yugoslavs generation rarely speak about memories of the war. They nev-
ertheless share discursive tactics utilised in order to position themselves 
with reference to the past and, at the same time, to situate themselves 
within the context of present-day Mostar. Their discursive tactics, I sug-
gest, are characterised by depoliticising their personal lives and their city. 
This way of coping with war experiences and defending one’s life (and to 
some extent one’s generation as well) is due to generational positioning 
rather than to national affiliation.
 Mario and Lejla: ‘Distancing’ Personal 
Experience from that of the Collective
Mario was 22 when one of his friends introduced me to him. Like many 
other young Croats, Mario came to Mostar to study history at Sveučilište 
u Mostaru (University of Mostar), the only Croat university in BiH, as he 
3 A report on youth and youth policy in BiH confirms that BiH’s youth are primarily dissatisfied 
with the education system, unemployment, lack of prospects and unstable political situation, see 
Youth Information Agency Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005 for the UN Review of the World 
Programme of Action for Youth.
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repeatedly said to me. He grew up in a city that was part of Herceg-Bosna 
during the war, some 50 kilometres away from Mostar, and was divided 
along similar conflict lines. There, too, Bosniak and Croat forces first 
fought as allies while during the second part of the war they fought each 
other. Mario was born in 1984, and was eight years old when the war 
began. Although he does not glorify the war, he believes that it brought 
an end to the ‘dark and worn-out’ period of communism in his country 
and enabled Croats to freely practise their language, culture and religion. 
His personal memories of pre-war times, however, are not as dark. He 
still fondly remembers the building complex he grew up in where families 
of different nationalities used to live. Although he has always been aware 
of his Croat identity, he only sensed the impact of it when war broke out 
and some of his classmates did not attend classes anymore.
Generally, Mario liked to talk to me about BiH’s history. This used to 
change, though, when I showed interest in his personal experiences of the 
war. His answers then became brief and he was quick to point out how 
young he was when the war broke out. He claimed the war would surely 
have had a completely different effect on his life if it broke out now and 
he had to take up a rifle and fight. Although the war had a traumatic 
influence on people, this was not the case for him personally, he told me. 
Mario’s narrative of the war is ambiguous. While he states that this war, 
like any war, did leave behind many scars, he simultaneously removes 
himself from that experience by stating he had been too young to under-
stand what was going on. He explained why he was spared any feelings of 
hate due to his age and his lack of direct war experience:
Because when my town was shelled I was in Split, I went to excursions on 
islands, I went swimming, I didn’t feel the war and later on when I came 
back to my community I didn’t have anything against Muslims or Serbs. 
(...) Coexistence (suživot) is good, especially among young people in my 
age who didn’t feel the war a lot.
When narrating the war, Mario shows that he distances his personal 
story, and to some extent also that of his entire generation, from what is 
often described as a collective experience. Other interlocutors of his age 
narrated their war experiences to me in a similar way, especially when 
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they had been evacuated to safer places. This was also the case for Lejla, a 
16-year-old, who will be introduced in more detail below. Lejla told me 
the following:
It is for sure easier for us than for our parents, because they are familiar 
with everything, with the situation that led to war and everything else, 
while we were protected from everything; we were just facing some conse-
quences of the war.
In this citation Lejla clearly expresses what I so often encountered in 
conversations with young Mostarians, namely that they present them-
selves as the ‘unspoilt’ generation due to their young age and thereby 
distance their personal experiences from that of the wider society. Lejla 
does so with the phrases, ‘we were protected from everything’ and ‘we 
were just facing some consequences of the war’. These phrases also 
show that Lejla (as others of her generation) speaks of youth in Mostar 
(at times at least) as a ‘we’ group although the lives of young Bosniaks 
and Croats are separated and points of encounter are rare. Most of the 
time, my young interlocutors removed their personal memories from 
the discourse of victimisation, which is a strong element of the domi-
nant Bosniak and Croat public discourses as well as of the older gener-
ations’ narratives. Discursive tactics of distancing also find expression 
in the choice of the grammatical person and, consequently, the pro-
noun employed. Personal war experiences among the Post-Yugoslavs 
generation are generally narrated in first person singular (‘I’), while 
those of older generations are often told in first person plural (‘we’), in 
which personal experiences come to be narrated as a collective experi-
ence of the nation.
Mario only told me about experiences of fear, including the fear for 
his father who joined the HVO (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane, Croat Defence 
Council) when I explicitly asked him about it. Otherwise, he spoke 
about the war without showing much emotion. Without planning it, 
I obtained a direct reaction to Mario’s narrative from Marina, a Croat 
woman who is only eight years older than him, when she helped me with 
the transcription of Mario’s interview. Apologising for her indiscretion, 
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she told me how irritated she was by the ease and light-heartedness with 
which my interviewee spoke about the war and especially about present- 
day Mostar. She became very emotional and started cursing and accusing 
‘these kids’ of being ignorant of what had happened in and to Mostar. In 
her view, they do not and cannot know better because they possess too 
few memories of Mostar before the war, and they do not understand that 
the war ruined a whole world, her old Mostar, over whose destruction 
she still grieves.
I heard many similar statements from other young adults who were 
sometimes only a few years older than those they blamed to be ignorant. 
Although Mario’s words did not provoke me as they provoked Marina, 
I was still puzzled to hear from Mario about the good coexistence of 
members of his generation across national lines since in Mostar most 
young people, including Mario, have little contact with their peers on the 
other side. To a good part this is to blame on the division of schools and 
universities introduced during the war, an effective way of institutionalis-
ing the division of Mostar (see Chap. 3).
As described above, young Mostarians have a story to tell that includes 
fear and hardship connected to the war. At many times, however, they 
distance themselves from the nationalised discourses of victimisation, 
discourses that serve as important reference points for members of the 
two older generations. In the following section, I suggest that such appar-
ent ambivalences in my interlocutors’ narratives are strongly bound to 
the specific social context of their present lives. Maurice Bloch reminds 
us that ‘the past is an ever-changing resource according to the situations 
or moods in which the persons find themselves, situations and moods 
which will often be due to organised social contexts’ (Bloch 1998: 119). 
With this is mind, let us first explore the immediate environment of my 
interlocutors, and the attitude towards the experiences of the young gen-
eration that they confront.
A study by Freedman and Abazovic (2006) on secondary school stu-
dents in Mostar and Vukovar, focusing on those who experienced the 
war as children between the age of five and eight, states that adults tend 
to belittle the war experiences of this age group or deny them altogether. 
Freedman and Abazovic report: ‘Some said that their parents thought 
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they were too little to remember very much and that their parents thought 
that they themselves were the ones who really suffered most in the wars’ 
(Abaspahić et  al. 2003). I heard similar complaints from some of my 
interlocutors, such as Lejla.
Lejla is from a Mostar family whose members identified themselves 
as Yugoslavs before the war but today declare themselves as Bosniaks. 
Lejla left Mostar with her parents and sister in 1992 for Italy and 
only returned six years later, while her grandparents, cousins and 
other family members remained in Mostar throughout the war. At the 
time I met Lejla, she was a student of Mostar’s prestigious old gram-
mar school (Stara gimnazija) that was officially reunited in 2004 (see 
Chap. 3). Although uniting ‘two schools under one roof ’ was sold as a 
big success by the international community (OSCE, the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe, was active in the reunifica-
tion process), it needs to be said that Bosniak and Croat students 
attend different classes following different curricula even though they 
share the same building (see Hromadžić 2008, 2015). Lejla was dis-
turbed by this division and thus became active in school politics. Lejla 
is very aware of the serious shortcomings existing in her hometown. 
In spite of her young age, Lejla is active in one of the youth NGOs 
and full-heartedly fights for more participation of youth in the politi-
cal decision making process.
Even if, as illustrated above, at times Lejla distances her personal war 
experiences from that of the older generations similar to Mario, she still 
claims the right of young people in Mostar to engage with war and post- 
war issues, which older generations claim for themselves. When it comes 
to war-related issues, however, she faces a situation in which adults do not 
find it appropriate to discuss them with her due to her young age. In the 
following story, she illustrates this experience:
I wrote [in an article for the youth magazine she works for] how sad it was 
to see that art, which shouldn’t be divided, shouldn’t be put under any 
conditions of national division, had been divided after all. In our city we 
don’t actually realise this anymore because it has become normal to us to 
have two sides, to have this and that side, left and right side, left is their side 
and right is our side and so on. I realised that nobody wants to speak about 
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it; everybody was avoiding the topic saying that I’m too young and cannot 
write about it. But it’s not only about me! ... When I tell them that I am 16 
(Lejla appears older) their faces freeze and they suggest changing the topic. 
Why? We students, especially from Stara gimnazija are faced with this ugly 
situation of separatism every day, and I really hope it will improve.
It is not only due to her age that Lejla does not feel taken seriously enough 
but also due to the fact that she left Mostar during the war. On one hand, 
she feels privileged not to have had to experience the war in Mostar and 
believes that this gives her the opportunity to be more impartial (in a sim-
ilar way to Mario). On the other hand, Lejla stresses to always have cared 
about her hometown and to have feared for her loved ones remaining in 
Mostar. When she returned she sensed that those who had remained in 
Mostar did not believe she cared about her hometown since she and her 
family had decided to leave.4 Most of the time, Lejla downplays her expe-
riences related to the war, disentangling her experiences from the Bosniak 
victimisation discourse. However, at other times she contests her exclu-
sion from debate and claims the right to have her experiences accepted as 
part of the national experience of victimisation.
 Darko and Elvira: ‘Normalising’ Mostar
I observed another discursive tactic among my young interlocutors that 
I see connected to ‘distancing’; the attempt to present Mostar as just 
another city. Both phenomena represent ways of dealing with the war 
and its aftermath. In both cases, individuals disentangle their personal 
experience from (what is claimed to be) collective experience. Not only 
did my interlocutors distance their personal memories of war from that 
of their nation, but they also removed their (and their generation’s) 
4 She not only shares this experience with others of her generation but also with other returnees who 
did not necessarily receive a warm welcome by those who had stayed. The latter saw themselves as 
defenders of the city (nation) and those who left as traitors. On the other side, those who stayed 
wished that they had left the city too, sparing themselves and their families the direct experience of 
war. The exclusion of those who fled the country during the war from the discourse of victimisation 
and suffering has become increasingly contested by the people in question, even if feelings of guilt 
coexist.
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present life from the wider society by narrating their lives (at least at 
times) as if they were not affected in the same way by the aftermath of the 
war as the older population was.
In the spring of 2006 I was asked by an Austrian university professor 
to find a tour guide for a group of political science students from Vienna 
visiting Mostar on a study trip. I thought the students would benefit most 
from a tour covering both the east and west sides of the city. Armen, an 
elderly Bosniak man introduced in Chap. 4, who had grown up in Mostar 
and possessed seemingly infinite knowledge about its history was my first 
choice as tour guide for East Mostar. Darko, a young Mostarian, agreed to 
show the students West Mostar where he lived with his family. Back then, 
Darko was in his penultimate year at Stara gimnazija, the same gram-
mar school Lejla also attended. I was happy about Darko’s offer to help, 
especially as I hoped the relative small age difference between him and the 
students would make it easy to engage everyone in a post-tour conversa-
tion over lunch. Though I knew the sites we were visiting and had read 
and heard about them before, it was very interesting to see how Armen 
and Darko respectively presented their city to the foreign students.
It was not particularly surprising how much Armen’s and Darko’s 
tours differed. I knew (from conversations and a previous tour) that 
Armen’s knowledge of Mostar’s history was extensive, to say the least. 
Unsurprisingly, Darko did not have the same historical knowledge if for 
no other reason than his younger age. Still, his tour (after Armen’s seem-
ingly endless and detailed explanations) was, I suppose, refreshing for 
everyone. However, what struck me about Darko’s guided tour was his 
effort to depoliticise all spheres of life that touched upon his own per-
sonal life. In order to discuss the discursive tactics inherent in Darko’s 
narrative, I give a short account of the tour he gave us.
The first site Darko decided to show the students was the modern 
shopping mall at Rondo, the central roundabout in West Mostar. He 
proudly presented this piece of ‘modernity’ in his city that otherwise 
was still heavily marked by its destruction. Darko’s tour soon revealed 
which places he thought to be presentable and which not; oftentimes 
these places did not correspond with the foreign students’ ideas of places 
of interest. This was the case when the students said they wanted to visit 
the biggest Partisan memorial in the city which, ironically, is located on 
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the west side where it has survived so far, albeit in a heavily neglected 
state. Darko had not planned to show the memorial to the students. He 
thought of it as a dirty place where drug addicts hung out, so he decided 
to stay at the memorial’s entry at the bottom of the hill until the students 
returned. Darko’s strong dislike of this place, which made him refuse to 
even enter it, is most likely connected not only to the monument’s pres-
ent state of neglect but also to the fact that for him it no longer has a right 
to exist. In conversations with Croats who pursue a nationalist discourse, 
such as with professors at Sveučilište u Mostaru (the Croat-dominated 
University), I realised that the place is noticeably absent from discussions 
such that when I mentioned it I was likely to be asked which memorial 
I was talking about. Ironically, in such conversations the existence of the 
by far largest memorial site in all of Mostar (just opposite Sveučilište) was 
neglected or ignored.
A site that Darko was happy to show the students was the Catholic 
cathedral. On our way there he pointed to the street where he and his 
family live, proudly stating that the former HDZ leader lived in a flat in 
the same building. When we arrived at the cathedral, Darko spoke about 
the suppression of religion under Tito. He shared that while preparing 
this tour his mother had told him the cathedral’s tower had not been 
allowed to be built any higher than the nearby Partisan memorial (which 
is located on a hill). This resulted in the church’s decision to remove some 
earth by digging several metres into the ground on and around the site 
so that building the cathedral in this hollow would maintain the tower’s 
originally planned height. In this explanation, the two sites—the Partisan 
memorial which he refused to visit and the cathedral that he decided to 
show the students—were finally put into relation to each other.
Besides this instance, this type of political-historical contextualisa-
tion was otherwise absent in Darko’s tour, such as when he talked about 
the annual pilgrimage of young people from Mostar to Medjugorje. The 
Austrian students, all of whom had taken courses on Yugoslavia and the 
war in BiH, were well aware of the contested meaning of Medjugorje 
(see Chap. 2). I noticed their bewilderment when Darko discussed the 
pilgrimage in a highly apolitical way, stressing only the fun parts of it, like 
going out with peers before the pilgrimage, listening to music they liked, 
and so on without acknowledging any religious or political connotation.
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At the end of the tour the Austrian students, quite obviously puzzled 
by the ‘depoliticised’ tour Darko had given, tried to get to the more ‘seri-
ous political matters’ in Mostar. In the question-and-answer session they 
persistently asked Darko about his experience of living in a divided city, 
of being taught in a reunited but still divided school, and so forth. Darko 
insisted, however, that his life was quite normal and did not differ greatly 
from any other young person’s life. His daily routine included going to 
school, returning home for lunch and doing his homework so that he 
could meet friends in one of the numerous cafés afterwards. He made 
an effort to explain the importance of cafés as places to socialise and the 
amount of time people spend there. He also said how easy it was for 
young people in BiH to get hold of alcohol and cigarettes, hinting at 
the many parties they had. He made clear that he did not support the 
national division of his school and that young people knew best how to 
break this division; secretly smoking in the school’s bathrooms is the best 
way to bring pupils from both curricula together and works much better 
than any of the ‘reconciliation programmes’ brought to them from the 
outside.5 When asked about the effects of war on Mostar, Darko tried 
to explain that the war had already been over for more than 10 years as 
if he hoped that the students would finally understand that Mostar had 
become a normal city.
Darko’s representation of Mostar certainly has to be understood in 
the context of its narration, in the encounter with foreigners. Since the 
war, almost all international news coverage on Mostar has concentrated 
on tensions between Bosniaks and Croats; this is also true of most inter-
national NGOs active in BiH, not to mention tourists and researchers 
who visit Mostar, sometimes only for short periods. The fact that Darko 
presented Mostar as a city just like any other city and his life just like any 
other teenager’s life is not only a reaction towards the judging eye of out-
siders, but also serves as a way to protect his own life and to restore hope 
for the city to which his life is bound.
Considering these attributes ascribed to my interlocutors, normalising 
present-day Mostar can be seen as a discursive tactic that detaches the 
actor from the legacy of the war, in defence against the stigmatisation of 
5 For a detailed discussion of this subject see Hromadžić (2015).
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being trapped in the realm of the ‘lost generation’ but also in defence of 
one’s own future. Haukanes (2013) encountered a similar phenomenon 
among Czech youth, who did not include the far-reaching transforma-
tions of their country’s recent history and the ‘biographical uncertainties’ 
that came with it in their biographical narratives. In the case of Mostar’s 
youth this is complemented by the act of distancing personal memories 
from the collective. While the latter represents an attempt to disentangle 
past experiences from that of the nation, the act of normalising present-
day Mostar has a similar role for present experiences. I was supported 
in this interpretation by the observation that those who felt the conse-
quences of war in their personal lives the most were likely to be those who 
skilfully avoided addressing their experience as related to the wider prob-
lems Mostar’s society faces today. I encountered this vividly with Elvira, a 
21-year-old woman whom I became friends with at the beginning of my 
fieldwork and whose life I followed for the three years I was based in BiH.
Elvira faced the difficulties of the city’s division in her private life more 
than most others I knew. She had been in a relationship with a Bosniak 
man for a couple of years but had to keep it entirely secret since she was 
from a Croat family. Neither her friends nor her family were allowed 
to know about it as they would have greatly disapproved. Unlike her 
parents who avoided crossing to the Bosniak-dominated east side of 
the city, Elvira crossed sides almost every day because she studied at the 
Bosniak-dominated university. This choice was approved by her parents 
only because the Croat-dominated university did not offer the subject she 
had chosen. When asked about the experience of being a Croat student at 
the Bosniak-dominated university, she told me she had not encountered 
any problems, after a while adding that indeed nobody knew of her Croat 
origins as her first and last names are not clearly and exclusively identifi-
able as Croat. I was surprised she never complained about having to keep 
the issue about her Croat background as yet another secret.
Love relationships between young Bosniaks and Croats are rarely 
approved by parents. This is particularly difficult since all of my young 
interlocutors still lived at home. Sometimes it seems as if such relations 
are considered a betrayal not only of the family, but also of the nation. As 
a result, cross-national couples often find themselves forced to keep their 
relationship a secret. While some of the Post-Yugoslavs were open to cross- 
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national relationships, when it came to marriages they were sceptical in 
a similar way as their parents. They thought it would be too difficult in 
a cross-national marriage to agree upon how to raise the offspring, such 
as in terms of religion and knowing that children from cross-national 
marriages face particular hurdles in BiH. A teacher of ethics in Mostar, 
herself from and in a mixed marriage, told me in an interview that her 
high school pupils perceive religious identities as primordial. For them 
their religious and national identity was so intertwined that they did not 
think they had a free choice to change their religion. In a similar vein many 
of them did think of Mostar’s division as a given and historically grounded.
When from time to time I went for coffee with Elvira and her fellow 
students in a café on the university campus, I understood how it was pos-
sible for her to keep her national identity out of conversations. Elvira and 
her friends talked about exams, professors, fellow students, fashion and 
similar topics, but avoided conversations about local politics. Their dis-
satisfaction with Mostar’s present situation was expressed mainly through 
sharing their mutual dissatisfaction with the bad economic situation and 
bleak job prospects. Like others of her generation, Elvira would consider 
leaving Mostar if the right opportunity presented itself.6
It was only Elvira’s Bosniak partner who, now and then, challenged 
her way of presenting Mostar’s reality as removed from politics. Once in 
a coffee bar at the beginning of my stay in Mostar, Elvira, her boyfriend 
and I discussed in which parts of the city it would be good for me and 
my family to live. Elvira suggested West Mostar (where she lived) since 
it was greener than East Mostar. Her Bosniak boyfriend, however, found 
this statement provocative, adding that the east side used to be green 
as well but during the war people needed heating material so they had 
cut down most of the trees. I never felt quite comfortable challenging 
Elvira’s depoliticised presentations in such a way and assumed that once 
6 Several opinion polls in BiH have shown a high percentage (more than 70 %) of young people 
wanting to leave their country, especially for economic reasons. In my judgement this high percent-
age expresses the frustration experienced by youth due to grim job prospects and other difficulties 
they face. However, I believe that a much smaller number than those who declare their desire to 
leave the country would actually decide to move when given the chance. See, for example, UN 
Review of the World Programme of Action for Youth (2005). Independent Evaluation of the National 
Youth Policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. http://www.un.org/esa/socdev//unyin/documents/wpaysub-
missions/bosnia.pdf [03.07.2015].
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we knew each other better she would share her thoughts on such matters 
anyway. But I was wrong; all my subtle attempts to engage her in conver-
sation about the political situation of her city failed despite the fact that 
we met frequently over a period of almost three years. By offering me 
only monosyllabic answers she clearly indicated her desire to change the 
topic and talk about more light-hearted things such as parties, shopping, 
holiday plans and so on. When once she passed by a photograph exhibi-
tion in the Bosniak-dominated university showing images of a heavily 
destroyed Mostar, I was sure she would be moved to share her thoughts 
about Mostar’s recent past with me. However, she only said three words: 
‘That is horrible!’
As shown, the discursive tactics of those who experienced the war as 
children included strong elements of silencing and distancing the effects 
the war may have had on their lives. Similar observations were made by 
Kolind (2008) in Stolac, a town in Herzegovina, where young people also 
tended to avoid the war in conversations. While those belonging to older 
generations sometimes expressed the wish to forget about war atrocities 
that they themselves or their nation had experienced, the war and its 
aftermath crept into almost every longer conversation. This was particu-
larly true for those who experienced great loss (of family members, prop-
erty, social and economic status and so on) during the war and did not 
think that it had changed anything for the better. Instead, they narrated 
the war as a ‘senseless historical drama’, as Skultans (1997: 767) termed it 
in the case of Latvian victim narratives. Often, personal experiences were 
subordinated within the dominant national discourse of victimisation.
Though individuals tend to embed their personal memories into wider 
officially accepted narratives, one is also likely to encounter dissonance 
between stories of individual experience and their larger social and histori-
cal context. By analysing life stories of Israeli male veterans, Lomsky-Feder 
(2004) shows how her interlocutors narrated their lives as not affected 
by the war. Similarly to the Post-Yugoslavs they thereby separated their 
personal memories from wider societal experiences. But  different to the 
Post-Yugoslavs, Lomsky-Feder’s war veterans described their generation 
as traumatised, while excluding themselves from this experience. Lomsky-
Feder traces this distancing back to the veterans’ feelings of inferiority 
due to the fact that her interviewees did not take part in key battles. Not 
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being actively involved in the war due to their young age, my interlocu-
tors may, like Lomsky-Feder’s war veterans, feel that their personal war 
stories do not pass as ‘true’ stories of the war. But their distancing from 
the older generations’ experiences may also be an act of self-protection, 
as suggested below.
Climo (2002) describes a similar phenomenon of distancing autobio-
graphic from group memories in the case of WWII and suggests that it may 
be a conscious choice when people do not make a connection between their 
personal and social memories. This may occur when it feels too threatening 
to put oneself into the recognised historical context. So, by separating per-
sonal memories from collective memories, the person feels protected from 
the difficult collective experiences (Climo 2002: 126; see also Leydesdorff 
et al. 1999). This would suggest that past war events are so overwhelming 
and threatening that young Mostarians prefer to remove their personal sto-
ries from the wider social context. This avoidance or distancing may well 
be a constructive (rather than pathological) mechanism for children who 
experienced war (Jones 2004). Achugar and colleagues (2013) and Larkin 
(2010) come to similar conclusions in the context of the Uruguayan post-
dictatorship period and the post-civil war period in Lebanon respectively. 
They show how young people distance themselves from the past in order to 
construct a positive self-identification (in the case of Uruguay) and in order 
to make room for reconciliation (in the case of Lebanon).
It is likely that both explanations outlined above are true in the case of the 
Post-Yugoslavs. They may not feel that their own war experiences count as 
full ones, not least because this is often suggested to them by older family 
 members. On the other hand, distancing their personal war memories 
from those of older compatriots may provide a strategy to make room for 
one’s future. For the young Post-Yugoslav generation, adopting a victim 
identity would not only mean having to acknowledge the effect the war 
had on their lives but would also lead them into having to adopt a passive 
position. Discursive tactics of distancing and normalising are then 
utilised in order to cope with the legacy of the war and as a defence against 
stigmatisation by the older generations as well as to create room for hope 
for the city to which the Post-Yugoslavs’ lives are inextricably bound 
(see Palmberger forthcoming). This dynamic is likely to be connected 
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to the Post-Yugoslavs’ strong orientation towards the present and the 
future, which also becomes visible in their narratives, which are less past-
oriented than those of the older generations (see Neyzi 2004). But the 
relative silence of war experiences may also be connected to the fact that 
the Post-Yugoslavs have not yet found their meta-narrative. Silence, as 
Connerton (2011) rightly reminds us, ‘is not a unitary phenomenon; 
there are, rather, a plurality of silences’ (2011: 53), which seems also to 
be the case here.
 Sabina: Facing Conflicting Memories 
of Yugoslavia
Having attended primarily to the war and post-war periods, I now turn 
to some observations and insights into the way my young interlocutors 
narrated Yugoslavia. This will open up a discussion about the way the 
Post-Yugoslavs give meaning to the experiences of the older generations 
and about the transmission as well as transformation of (collective) mem-
ory. Yugoslavia is not a central topic in everyday conversations among the 
youngest generation as it is among the older generations who often speak 
of life in Mostar at the time of Yugoslavia as ‘normal’ compared with the 
present situation. With the Post-Yugoslavs, I often had to take the initia-
tive in triggering conversations on Yugoslavia.
Unlike the memories of the 1990s war discussed above, memories of 
Yugoslavia among the Post-Yugoslavs are to a very limited extent only per-
sonal memories. Most things they know of Yugoslavia were passed on to 
them by older family members. Besides personal transmission, the Post- 
Yugoslavs also gain information about this period in school and through 
the media. Narratives of Yugoslavia among this generation differ as they 
do among the other generations. Nevertheless, something distinguishes 
the Post-Yugoslavs’ Yugoslavia narratives. Those who have no or very 
limited memories of Yugoslavia and mainly refer to experiences shared 
by their parents express less emotion towards the period. Regardless of 
whether they condemn Yugoslavia or have positive feelings for it, they do 
so less vehemently, less emotionally than the First and the Last Yugoslavs. 
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Although I examine the way Yugoslavia is narrated among this generation 
by analysing Sabina’s narrative, this does not mean that her narrative is 
representative of her entire generation. Instead, I focus on her narrative 
because it poses important questions crucial to this discussion.
Sabina, an energetic and communicative young woman in her early 
20s, grew up in a town about 200 kilometres from Mostar. By the time I 
met her, she had been living in Mostar for more than three years already. 
She fell in love with the city right from the beginning. After spending the 
war years together with her little sister at her aunt’s place in Zagreb (the 
rest of her family remained in their hometown and her father joined the 
HVO), she returned to her comparatively small hometown. Later on, it 
was a relief for her to move to Mostar for her studies at Sveučilište because 
Mostar offers not only a beautiful Old Town but also a vibrant student 
life, with plenty of cafés, pubs and parties. Already during the first days 
after her arrival in Mostar, she was desperate to see the Old Bridge. All her 
colleagues warned her not to go to the Old Town, saying she would put 
herself in danger if she did not take their advice seriously. But she did 
not pay attention to them and, as she had expected, nothing untoward 
happened to her.
Sabina is aware that nobody can tell the difference between a Bosniak 
and a Croat just from appearance alone. They could identify her from 
her accent (mainly because she spent a long time in Zagreb) but no one 
in the Old Town treated her offensively. Today, she frequently crosses the 
Bulevar (the main-street before the war and frontline during the war), 
especially because of her involvement in one of the youth NGOs situ-
ated on the east side. Through her activities at the NGO she met a young 
Bosniak with whom she fell in love. Sabina is aware that if her parents 
find out about the relationship they would strongly disapprove.
Sabina is very aware of her national background. She also shows an 
interest in learning more about it by studying Croat language and lit-
erature. Catholicism plays a central part in her life as well. Nevertheless, 
her strong national awareness does not prevent her from believing that 
Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs can live together in one city in the same state. 
She always stresses the fact that Bosnians of all national background share 
a lot of local customs and attitudes, so what they share is at least as strong 
as what sets them apart. Sabina maintains a peculiar mixture of sympathy 
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and antipathy towards Yugoslavia. From her parents she heard many neg-
ative stories about the time of Yugoslavia. She was taught, for example, 
that her paternal grandfather was killed by the communists and that legal 
action was taken against her mother for using the Croat language (instead 
of Serbo-Croatian) at her workplace.
In conversations with Sabina (as well as with others), I observed that 
when she referred to memories of a time she had not experienced she 
made clear that what she recalls is an account she was told by an older 
family member. When asked about her memories of Yugoslavia, she char-
acteristically replied: ‘I don’t remember anything, only some things, I 
remember what my parents told me.’ In this, Sabina not only makes 
explicit the fact that what she remembers are the memories of her parents 
and not her own; she also makes clear that the way a political period is 
presented depends on a person’s experience of it. She explains that her 
father and mother hold different points of views regarding pre-war BiH 
because of their differing personal experiences. Her paternal grandfather 
was murdered under Tito’s period of rule, but all of her mother’s close kin 
survived. She reasons that this is why her father has much worse feelings 
about this period and never stops cursing Tito, elaborating:
My family went through a lot of bad things, especially my father because 
they killed his father. He doesn’t like to talk about it but he thinks that 
they are all evil people; that nobody can justify what they did. My mother 
on the other hand is milder about it, she didn’t so much… she didn’t go 
through a lot of bad things. I, for example, I don’t have any bad memories. 
I don’t know, there is just what I was told and what I found out, but life 
has to go on.
When Sabina told me the story of her grandfather’s execution she did 
not express the anger her father had felt. And it became obvious that she 
gave a different meaning to her father’s memories. Frequently, memo-
ries of a time they have not experienced themselves acquire a touch of 
unreality when recalled by young Mostarians. Such stories are somewhat 
absurd to them, exotic and sometimes, even amusing. Therefore it might 
be more accurate to talk about ‘recalling’ than ‘remembering’, with the 
latter including a heightened emotional component. When Sabina told 
me the story of her grandfather she eventually even started giggling:
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When was your grandfather killed?
Killed? 1979.
And how was he killed?
They suffocated him. They suffocated him close to his home, two metres 
away, but my father shouldn’t know that they killed him, no. He died, they 
said. They didn’t kill him, he died. That was it. [Martina starts giggling] 
But I’m laughing.
Other Post-Yugoslavs I interviewed also admitted their parents had a cer-
tain degree of authority to speak of history, but at the same time the 
children audited what they were told by their parents by putting it into 
their own context. Despite the fact that Sabina was a small child when 
the war broke out, she still has personal memories of life before the war. 
Her narratives are all about good komšiluk which the children as well as 
their parents enjoyed:
I remember we lived at my grandfather’s, my mother’s father. Croats lived 
there, Serbs were there, across from them Croats too, and upstairs Muslims, 
one mixed family of a Serb woman and a Muslim. They were all married 
couples of similar age to my parents and they all had kids. We played and 
hung out together. My parents were drinking coffee with our Serb neigh-
bours every day, and they joined us at Christmas.
Did you know who belonged to which group?
Yes, I knew pretty early who was who. Yes I knew, I knew we were differ-
ent. I understood that. But not all kids did. For example, I spoke with my 
friend Božica, she is Croat too, she didn’t understand it, but I did.
How did you know, did your parents tell you or did you know it from their 
names?
Yes, I asked, I went to church on Sundays and I asked why Jovica was 
not coming with us? Jovica went to another church. In fact Jovica didn’t go 
to church at all. This way I found out. Or for example one of my friends, 
Alma, came to my place for my birthday party and afterwards her mother 
called my mother in anger, because we had juice, cake, hats, smoked ham, 
cheese. In fact my mother asked Amela if she was allowed to eat that. She 
said yes. She ate smoked pork. It was all settled with a talk. And I was ask-
ing why Amela was not allowed to eat smoked ham when it was so tasty.
From the above excerpts we can clearly see that Sabina’s personal memo-
ries differ starkly from those of her parents’. Unlike her parents’ more 
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straightforward memories, she is confronted with conflicting memories, 
especially between her father’s sad memories and her own cheerful per-
sonal ones. When asked about her explanation of how war was possible, 
considering the good neighbourliness she remembers, she reached the 
following conclusion:
I think that most people were just pretending to have good friends and if 
one day that friend needed help…they wouldn’t help, they would act 
against him.
But was that also the case for kids?
No, friendship for kids was true friendship, for sure!
Interestingly, Sabina seems not too bothered by the contradicting nar-
ratives between her father and herself. Not before I asked her to do so 
did she give an explanation for the discrepancies. During my research I 
realised that many of my youngest interlocutors were confronted with 
diverse and divergent stories about Yugoslavia because in Mostar it is 
likely to find in the same family members with different political and 
religious loyalties.
Although Sabina was certainly influenced by her parents’ perception 
of Tito, she actually grew up at her maternal grandmother’s house. It is 
most likely that Sabina owes to this grandmother, to whom she feels clos-
est in her family, the positive picture she also maintains of Yugoslavia. 
Sometimes I even sensed something akin to nostalgia for Yugoslavia in 
Sabina, for example, when she recalls childhood memories like her excite-
ment at becoming one of Tito’s Pioniri (Pioneers).7 But nostalgia for her 
has a somewhat different quality from that displayed by older Mostarians 
characterised in previous chapters. Even when Sabina recalled positive 
memories of Yugoslavia, I never encountered the same types of strong 
emotional ties expressed by older generations. It is also important to bear 
in mind that the Yugoslavia Sabina grew up in was already in decline, a 
rather different Yugoslavia than that experienced by her parents.
7 For a discussion on the Yugoslav Pioneer Organisation and its role in the Yugoslav socialist project, 
see Erdei (2004).
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More often than simply being directed towards the past, Sabina’s 
type of Yugo-nostalgia is an expression of her political views and is used 
to criticise the present political situation. Sabina strongly believes that 
BiH should be a multinational place. She herself feels a double iden-
tity, as a Croat and as a Bosnian. Her Croat identity is more private/
family-based, where religion and religious holidays play a considerable 
role. Her Bosnian identity links her with all her other compatriots, be 
they Muslim, Catholic, Orthodox or atheist. In Sabina’s case nostalgia 
for Yugoslavia is actually a tool for overcoming the troubled relationship 
between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in her country; she uses memories of 
Yugoslavia and the good coexistence as a ‘guiding star’ for the future. She 
also employs Yugo-nostalgia in order to find a basis of communication 
with those of Bosniak background. One day, Sabina and another friend 
of mine, Minela (see Chap. 5) met at my home. It was their first meeting, 
and I could feel their mutual uneasiness. It was the time of Ramazan and 
Minela was fasting, but Sabina was not aware of this, so was surprised 
to hear that Minela did not want to join us for coffee and cake. After a 
while they found a subject that gave them the way out of this somewhat 
tense situation: their pre-war memories. They remembered the Pioniri, 
the sweets they liked back then and many other things connected to their 
childhoods in Yugoslavia. It was a safe discourse for them to follow as it 
showed their mutual willingness to communicate, to get to know each 
other without fear of being caught up in some political discussion related 
to the war or the post-war politics of their country (see Palmberger 2013).
For Sabina, the act of remembering Yugoslavia in a nostalgic way is less 
oriented towards the past than is the case with the many older compatri-
ots introduced in previous chapters; instead she adopts Yugo-nostalgia in 
order to envision a future for Mostar specifically and for BiH as a whole. 
Although Yugo-nostalgia is not always employed to counter the national-
ist discourse (as seen in Chap. 5), it brings with it not only the poten-
tial for criticising the present situation but also provides an orientation 
towards the future. Sabina feels free to do so because of her comparatively 
loose emotional tie with Yugoslavia. Yugo-nostalgia for her does not have 
the same gravity as for her older compatriots. This gives her the possibil-
ity to playfully adopt and adapt the parts of Yugoslavia she believes can 
contribute to a better future.
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As I have shown in the cases of Minela and Sabina, positive (often 
nostalgic) memories of pre-war times even bear an integrative potential. 
In sharing positive anecdotes of Yugoslavia (most often with others of the 
same generation), individuals with different national backgrounds find 
an initial common ground that is less controversial than topics related to 
the war or the present situation. The concentration on pre-war memo-
ries also includes a strategic silence of more divisive topics, such as the 
war. The act of silencing memories of war in order to re-establish cross-
national relationships has been described by several authors, working in 
diverse regions, as conducive for post-war coexistence (Argenti-Pillen 
2003; Cole 2001; Eastmond and Mannergren Selimovic 2012; Hayden 
2009; Skaar et al. 2005; Stefansson 2010). By drawing close attention to 
strategic silences, the ‘ethics of memory’ is questioned that emerged at 
the end of the twentieth century and in which remembering is presented 
as a virtue and forgetting as a failure (Connerton 2011: 33). Such eth-
nographic insights may also be valuable for other post-war societies that 
are equally divided along ethno-national lines, particularly if a relatively 
peaceful past preceded the violence.8
 Transmission of Memories: Between 
Persistence and Change
Sabina’s story touches on one central topic of research connected to 
memory, the transmission of (collective) memory, which at this point 
deserves a more lengthy discussion. In the tradition of Durkheim9 and 
Halbwachs, anthropologists have paid special attention to the phenom-
enon of the transmission of memories downwards through generations, 
from old to young, stressing the way that collective identity is main-
8 Even in cases, such as that of Northern Ireland, whose violent past stretches back centuries, there 
have been peaceful periods in between the violence that are easily overlooked (Barton and McCully 
2003). To shift the focus from violence and conflict between national groups to ‘conviviality’ 
(Nowicka and Vertovec 2014) and to elements of a ‘shared identity’ helps to re- establish post-
conflict trust and subsequently encourage more cross-national engagement (see Dembinska 2010; 
MacDonald 2013).
9 Durkheim’s idea of society as an organism, held together by shared social ideas or the conscience 
collective, greatly influenced Halbwachs’ work, see Durkheim 2001 [1912].
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tained. Cornelia Sorabji (2006) in her article, ‘Managing memories in 
post-war Sarajevo’, engages in a pioneering endeavour by instead focus-
ing special attention on memory as a personal experience. Her data reveal 
that people in BiH are not less conscious of what or what not to pass on 
to the next generation than anthropologists who study this process. The 
same is true for those to whom these memories are passed on. In con-
trast to Cappelletto (2003) who suggests there is no difference between 
autobiographical memory and historical accounts of WWII massacres in 
the Tuscan village she studied, Sorabji highlights differences she encoun-
tered among accounts of WWII massacres in a BiH village. Sorabji tells 
of a father who had lost his entire family in a massacre committed by 
Chetniks and who, more than 60 years later, still mistrusts all Serbs. He 
has passed on his memories of this traumatic event his son from a second 
marriage. But even if his son can recall in detail these memories passed 
on from his father, the meaning ascribed to the memories by the two men 
should not be viewed as identical:
While Tarik’s son may have been able to imagine (or ‘recall’) the past events 
richly and without great deviation from factual accuracy, his imaginings or 
recollections would also have been partially constructed from other images 
and ideas which formed part of his experience, and not of Tarik’s. (Sorabji 
2006: 13)
Sorabji’s observations correlate with mine. Sorabji’s informant Tarik and 
my informant Sabina were both told traumatic memories by their respec-
tive fathers, which they are able to recall. But their accurate recollections 
do not mean they share the same emotions as their fathers. Rather than 
unconsciously adopting their fathers’ memories (in which case they could 
be called ‘ingrained memories’), Tarik and Sabina both put what they 
were told within the context of what their fathers, the narrators, had 
experienced.
Wertsch (2002) suggests differentiating between ‘mastery’ and ‘appro-
priation’ when analysing the reception of historical narratives. ‘Just 
because someone is exposed to a cultural tool—and just because she 
has mastered it—does not guarantee that she has appropriated it as an 
identity resource’ (Wertsch 2002: 120). When applying this distinction 
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in analysing Sabina’s narrative, there are good reasons to speak of mas-
tery rather than of appropriation because while she recalls her father’s 
memories they do not serve as vital identity resources for her. When nar-
rating the past my interlocutors, rather than unconsciously taking over 
the memories of older family members, were aware of the fact that the 
memories they shared with me were not their own (not least because the 
emotional tie was often missing) and thus sought to contextualise them 
vis-à-vis their own personal experiences.
Understanding the transmission of (traumatic) pasts as a communi-
cative practice ‘highlights the tension between the determinism of the 
inherited tradition and beliefs embodied in discourses, in relation to the 
creative action of individual meaning-making agency’ (Achugar et  al. 
2013). This means that memories are not directly transmitted to younger 
generations but are rather re-narrated by the latter (Welzer 2010). In a 
similar vein, Pickering and Keightley (2013) stress the importance of the 
imagination in the process of transmission. It enables a move beyond 
straightforward bringing of the past into the present since ‘imagination 
exceeds lived experience insofar as it can make something qualitatively new 
through recombining ideas, objects, practices and experiences’ (Pickering 
and Keightley 2013: 122). Sabina’s case shows very well how transferred 
memories are scrutinised, contextualised and selectively adopted to 
accommodate personal worldviews. ‘Such a reformatting of heard and 
narrated stories follows familial loyalty on the one hand and generational 
and individual needs for meaning on the other’ (Welzer 2010: 6). This 
has become visible in the case of Sabina, whose re- narration was guided 
by loyalty to her grandfather and by generational and personal meaning 
making.
Bibliography
Abaspahić, Haris, Zehra Kačapor, Dagmar Kunzmann, Emir Nurkić, and 
Marsela Pećanac. 2003. Mladi u Bosni i Hercegovini 2003. Da li si dio 
Problema ili si dio Rješenja? Sarajevo: UNDP.
Achugar, Mariana, Amparo Fernandez, and Nicolas Morales. 2013. Re/
Constructing the Past: How Young People Remember the Uruguayan 
Dictatorship. Discourse & Society 24(3): 265–288.
6 The (Un)spoilt Generation 225
Argenti-Pillen, Alex. 2003. Masking Terror: How Women Contain Violence in 
Southern Sri Lanka. Philiadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania University Press.
Barton, Keith C., and Alan McCully. 2003. History Teaching and the 
Perpetuation of Memories: The Northern Ireland Experience. In The Role of 
Memory in Ethnic Conflict, eds. E. Cairns and M.D.  Roe. Ethnic and 
Intercommunity Conflict Series, 107–124. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bloch, Maurice. 1998. How We Think They Think: Anthropological Approaches to 
Cognition, Memory, and Literacy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Cappelletto, Francesca. 2003. Long-Term Memory of Extreme Events: From 
Autobiography to History. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 
9(2): 241–260.
Climo, Jacob. 2002. Memories of the American Jewish Aliyah: Connecting 
Individual and Collective Experience. In Social Memory and History: 
Anthropological Perspectives, eds. J.  Climo and M.G.  Cattell, 111–130. 
Walnut Creek: Altamira Press.
Cole, Ardra L., and J. Gary Knowles. 2001. Lives in Context: The Art of Life 
History Research. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.
Cole, Jennifer. 2001. Forget Colonialism? Sacrifice and the Art of Memory in 
Madagascar. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Connerton, Paul. 2011. The Spirit of Mourning: History, Memory and the Body. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dembinska, Magdalena. 2010. Buidling Trust: Managing Common Past and 
Symbolic Public Spaces in Divided Societies. Ethnopolitics 9(3): 311–332.
Durkheim, Émile. 2001. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. Original edition, 1912.
Eastmond, Marita, and Johanna M. Selimovic. 2012. Silence as Possiblity in 
Postwar Everyday Life. International Journal of Transitional Justice 6(3): 
502–524.
Erdei, Ildiko. 2004. “The Happy Child” As an Icon of Socialist Transformation: 
Yugoslavia’s Pioneer Organization. In Ideologies and National Identities: The 
Case of Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe, eds. J.R.  Lampe and 
M. Mazower, 154–179. Budapest: Central European University Press.
Freedman, Sarah, and Dino Abazovic. 2006. Growing up During the Balkan 
Wars of the 1990s. In International Perspectives on Youth Conflict and 
Development, ed. C. Daiute, 57–72. New York: Oxford University Press.
Haukanes, Haldis. 2013. Precarious Lives? Narratives of Hope, Loss, and 
“Normality” across Two Generations of Czechs. Focaal 66: 47–57.
Haukanes, Haldis, and Susanna  Trnka. 2013. Memory, Imagination, and 
Belonging across Generations: Perspectives from Postsocialist Europe and 
Beyond. Focaal 66: 3–13.
226 How Generations Remember
Hayden, Robert. 2009. Comments to Carol Kidron ‘Toward an Ethnography of 
Silence: The Lived Presence of the Past in the Everyday Life of Holocaust 
Trauma Survivors and Their Descendants in Israel’. Current Anthropology 
50(1): 5–27.
Honwana, Alcinda, Elin Skaar, Siri Gloppen, and Astri Suhrke, eds. 2005. Roads 
to Reconciliation. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Hromadžić, Azra. 2008. Discourses of Integration and Practices of Reunification 
at the Mostar Gymnasium, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Comparative Education 
Review 52(4): 541–563.
———. 2015. Citizens of an Empty Nation: Youth and State-Making in Postwar 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Jones, Lynne. 2004. Then They Started Shooting: Growing up in Wartime Bosnia. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kolind, Torsten. 2008. Post-War Identification: Everyday Muslim Counterdiscourse 
in Bosnia Herzegovina. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.
Larkin, Craig. 2010. Beyond the War? The Lebanese Postmemory Experience. 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 42(4): 615–635.
Leydesdorff, Selma, Graham Dawson, Natasha Burchardt, and T.G. Ashplant. 
1999. Introduction: Trauma and Life Stories. In Trauma and Life Stories: 
International Perspectives, eds. K.L. Rogers, S. Leydesdorff, and G. Dawson, 
1–26. London: Routledge.
Lomsky-Feder, Edna. 2004. Life Stories, War, and Veterans: On the Social 
Distribution of Memories. Ethos 32(1): 82–109.
MacDonald, David. 2013. Living Together or Hating Each Other? In 
Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative, eds. C.W. Ingrao 
and Th. Allan Emmert. Central European Studies, 391–424. Washington, 
DC and West Lafayette, IN: United States Institute of Peace Press; Purdue 
University Press.
Neyzi, Leyla. 2004. Exploring Memory through Oral History in Turkey. In 
Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory, ed. M.N. Todorova, 60–76. London: 
Hurst.
Nowicka, Magda, and Steven Vertovec. 2014. Introduction. Comparing 
Convivalities: Dreams and Realities of Living-with-Difference. European 
Journal of Cultural Studies 17(4): 341–356.
Palmberger, Monika. 2010. Distancing Personal Experiences from the Collective - 
Discurisve Tactics among Youth in Post-War Mostar. L’Europe en Formation. 
Journal of Studies on European Integration and Federalism 357: 107–124.
6 The (Un)spoilt Generation 227
———. 2013. Acts of Border Crossing in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
The Case of Mostar. Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 20(5): 
544–560.
———. Forthcoming. Between Past and Future: Young People’s Strategies for 
Living a “Normal Life” in Post-War Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Everyday Life in 
the Balkans, ed. D. Montgomery. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Pickering, Michael, and Emily Keightley. 2013. Communities of Memory and 
the Problem of Transmission. European Journal of Cultural Studies 16(1): 
115–131.
Skultans, Vieda. 1997. Theorizing Latvian Lives: The Quest for Identity. The 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 3(4): 761–780.
Sorabji, Cornelia. 2006. Managing Memories in Post-War Sarajevo: Individuals, 
Bad Memories, and New Wars. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute 12(1): 1–18.
Stefansson, Anders. 2010. Coffee after Cleansing? Co-Existence, Co-Operation, 
and Communication in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. Focaal  – 
Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 57: 62–76.
UN Review of the World Programme of Action for Youth. 2005. Independent 
Evaluation of the National Youth Policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. http:// 
www.un.org/esa/socdev//unyin/documents/wpaysubmissions/bosnia.pdf 
[03.01.2008].
Vertovec, Steven, ed. 2014. Migration and Diversity. Cheltenham Glos and 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Welzer, Harald. 2010. Re-Narrations: How Pasts Change in Conversational 
Remembering. Memory Studies 3(1): 5–17.
Wertsch, James. 2002. Voices of Collective Remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, 
duplication, adaptation, distribution, and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, a link is provided to the 
Creative Commons license, and any changes made are indicated.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included 
in the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory 
regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or 
reproduce the material.
228 How Generations Remember
229© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016
M. Palmberger, How Generations Remember, 
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-45063-0_7
7
Conclusion
At the beginning of 2006, two new graffiti messages appeared in Mostar, 
one was on the Bulevar, the former frontline, and one next to the rebuilt 
old Ottoman Bridge. Both read the same words: ETO SVEMIRICI SU 
SRUŠILI MOST. NLO=HVO (‘Look, the aliens destroyed the bridge. 
UFO=HVO’). This graffiti mocks the seemingly endless ingenuity of local 
actors in interpreting history. It can also be seen as a statement against 
the manipulation of history. It implies ironically that people will not just 
adopt any interpretation of history that is offered to them (Fig. 7.1).1
In his methodological critique of memory studies, Kansteiner 
argues that what studies on memory have to offer is ‘the opportunity 
to acknowledge that historical representations are negotiated, selective, 
present-oriented, and relative, while insisting that the experiences they 
reflect cannot be manipulated at will’ (Kansteiner 2002: 180). I took 
this area of tension between historical representations in the making and 
1 These graffiti can be seen as a reaction to an article published in Nacional (a Croat weekly journal) 
just days before, which elaborated on the theory that the Bosniak-dominated ABiH themselves 
destroyed the bridge and not the Croat army HVO—as is believed by Bosniaks as well as by the 
majority of the ‘international community’. Rogošić, Željko: “Stari most: nije srušio HVO” (HVO 
did not destroy the Old Bridge), in Nacional, 21 February 2006.
personal experiences as a point of departure when probing into questions 
of memory and generation in Mostar.
As shown in the book, individuals are not only exposed to changing 
political contexts but are also confronted by their personal past and present 
experiences, which serve as the backdrop against which they rethink the 
past in the present. By now we have become so sensitive to the idea of the 
flexibility of the past that we tend to forget that it rests—at least to a cer-
tain degree—on an experiential base (Irwin-Zarecka 1994: 17). Appadurai 
(1981) argues that the past does not offer an infinite source for interpreta-
tion but is always told within certain cultural norms and rules. In this book 
I have demonstrated that the past is not an unlimited resource by show-
ing how it is genuinely influenced, not only by a predefined discursive 
space but also by people’s personal experiences. By looking at the inter-
section of memory and generations, both continuities and discontinuities 
Fig. 7.1 Graffito stating: ‘Look the aliens destroyed the bridge. UFO=HVO’, 
2006. Photo by the author
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become apparent. By introducing the concept of ‘generational position-
ing’, this book demonstrates how the past informs the present (and thereby 
generates the potential for persistence) as well as how the present informs 
the past (and thereby creates the potential for change).
What I have argued in this book is that generational positioning has a 
crucial impact on the way individuals relate to the past, as well as on how 
they draw on the dominant public discourses of present and past and 
make use of pre-existing interpretative templates. I revealed generational 
commonalities across nations in a city which, to a large extent, is still 
segregated along national lines. This is yet another indicator of the signifi-
cance of generational positioning in studies of memory, particularly but 
not only in places that have experienced severe socio-economic transfor-
mations and/or war. The nuanced presentation of different generations 
and of the interplay between public dominant discourses and personal 
narratives by unravelling different positions as well as commonalities, 
provides a profound insight into ongoing societal processes in a society 
that has been in recent memory torn apart by conflict and war.
 Between Nation and Generation
I have followed a two-fold aim throughout this book. Firstly, I analysed 
differences related to generational positioning by considering people’s 
personal experiences of different historico-political periods, and the life 
situations the narrators were confronted with at the time of narrating 
the events, as well as at the time of the narrated event or period itself. 
Secondly, I sought to illustrate how personal narratives of the recent 
past deviate from present ‘official’ national narratives in terms of their 
content and nature. This aim could only be achieved by investigating 
both the dominant national public discourses and individuals’ narratives, 
two realms that I separated analytically but which in practice are closely 
interlinked.
My research revealed that there is a difference in the nature of the ‘strat-
agems’ found in the official (Bosniak and Croat) national narratives and in 
people’s personal narratives. Using de Certeau’s distinction between strate-
gies and tactics as a starting point, I referred to the former as ‘discursive 
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strategies’ and to the latter as ‘discursive tactics’. Individuals are not only 
exposed to changing political contexts but are also confronted by their 
personal past experiences, even if the two do not always fit together neatly. 
For this reason individuals’ reconstructions of the past have to remain 
more flexible and situational than the official national history. While the 
latter presents a goal-oriented narrative, the former can be better described 
as target-seeking.
In order to explore the dominant public discourses, I analysed how 
history is currently taught to students in Mostar. The main focus was 
on representations of the local past by history professors at the respec-
tive Bosniak- and Croat-dominated universities. My analysis revealed 
that while the representations of the past (as well as the imagined future) 
presented by Croat and Bosniak historians are antithetical, the discur-
sive strategies they draw on are not. This is particularly true in the way 
the historians connect different historical periods in order to achieve a 
coherent national narrative and in how the respective historiography is 
objectified. Thereby ‘the past’ strongly serves national claims and political 
aspirations for the future in present-day BiH. In this endeavour, history 
is taught as a coherent narrative as if recent history, including the 1990s 
war, was predetermined by preceding historical events and as if there was 
only one future suited to ensure the respective nations’ existence.
One discursive strategy employed in linking different historical peri-
ods I paid particular attention to was the connection between WWII 
and the recent war, which was most prominent in the dominant Bosniak 
public discourse. In this discourse the Bosniak-dominated army ABiH, 
which fought in the 1992–1995 war, is equated with the Partisans, while 
simultaneously the Croat army, HVO, is equated with the fascists of 
WWII.  As I have shown, this linking strategy can be found not only 
in the Bosniak national narrative but also in the personal narratives 
of the First Yugoslavs, the generation that holds personal memories of 
WWII. WWII—the first war for this generation that took place early in 
their lives—constitutes a formative experience and is central in the life 
narratives of the First Yugoslavs. The war in the 1990s is interpreted in 
relation to it, whereby WWII serves as the core interpretative template 
for explaining the recent war. The image of the good Partisans fighting 
against the evil Nazis was powerfully nurtured by Tito and still serves as 
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an interpretative template today for many First Yugoslavs. In the case 
of the First Yugoslavs, the linking of the two wars is strongly connected 
to their personal experiences and serves to give meaning to their lives, 
whereby meta-narratives of suffering and loss as well as of a continuing 
fight against fascism are central. I found this discursive strategy of linking 
the two wars in personal narratives among both Bosniaks and Croats.
Unlike the First Yugoslavs, who were in a later stage of their lives when 
the 1990s war began, the Last Yugoslavs were in the middle of their 
lives and faced very different life situations and challenges. Although the 
recent war and its subsequent political, societal and economic changes 
had a crucial impact on the lives of all my informants regardless of their 
generational positioning, the Last Yugoslavs experienced the war differ-
ently in terms of the rupture it caused in their lives. While the war forced 
everyone to position themselves in relation to Yugoslavia, to the war 
itself and to contemporary politics, the Last Yugoslav generation, who as 
young adults had just started life away from their parental homes or were 
just about to do so, experienced the war as an extreme disruption to their 
life course.
Depending on their political orientation, members of this generation 
draw on the dominant national public discourses to a greater or lesser 
degree. Interestingly, however, even those Last Yugoslavs who strongly 
believe in the current national project still rely on interpretative templates 
from Yugoslav times. Thus the predominant discursive tactics of the Last 
Yugoslavs are characterised by an oscillation between different—often 
opposing—discourses, old and new. This is also expressed in the non- 
conclusiveness of the Last Yugoslavs’ narratives, which is tightly bound to 
the rupture in the expected life course this generation experienced due to 
the war in the 1990s.
Even if there seems to be a consensus in the literature that individu-
als aim to ‘connect disparate parts into a coherent, meaningful whole’ 
(Holstein and Gubrium 1995: 28; see also Becker et al. 2000; Roseman 
1995; Zerubavel 2003), I have shown in my work that this is not always 
possible. After great political and societal rupture and economic transfor-
mations—periods that are perceived as chaotic and insecure—people seek 
to remake order by rethinking the past with respect to the changing pres-
ent situation and their future prospects. Memory work is thus expected 
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to become most prominent in times of crisis (Cave and Sloan 2014). 
But as Pierre Nora (1989) argues, memory not only enables people to 
maintain a sense of continuity, but also illuminates discontinuity. This is 
evident in the Last Yugoslavs’ narratives, the generation who experienced 
the war and the transformations that came with it, as a deep rupture in 
their biographies. Their narratives oscillate between a discourse of exclu-
sive nationalism and fond memories of a multi-ethnic and secure past. 
This indicates that in situations in which an entire population is affected 
by war and great political-economic transformations, generational differ-
ences exist regarding the extent to which people experience these events 
as disruptions to their lives. In addition, I have shown through the case of 
the youngest generation confronted by different and sometimes conflict-
ing narratives of the local past (communicated by parents, grandparents, 
teachers and through textbooks and the media) that individuals can cope 
with inconsistencies and discrepancies while simultaneously being con-
fronted with silences.
The Post-Yugoslavs, the youngest generation, who were children dur-
ing the 1990s war, possess only limited, if any, memories of pre-war 
times. For that reason, and because they grew up during a period of 
extreme nationalism and war, they are perceived by the older population 
as a distinct and often also ‘spoilt’ generation. In conversation with Post- 
Yugoslavs, however, it became clear that they adamantly reject this nega-
tive portrayal. On the contrary, they perceive themselves as the ‘unspoilt’ 
generation because, they argue, they were too young to have really experi-
enced the war. In their narratives, the Post-Yugoslavs present their young 
age and limited war memories as a gift, rather than as a fault, which they 
said allows them to be more impartial and less burdened by mistrust 
and hatred. Their discursive tactics are thus strongly characterised by a 
dissociation of their lives from the war and its aftermath. They do not 
subordinate their lives to the dominant national public discourses of vic-
timisation but at the same time have not yet found a meta-narrative in 
which to situate their experiences of war and post-war time.
This was already noticeable during my revisits (2010 and 2014) in 
Mostar when I had the chance to catch up with my interlocutors two 
and four years after my fieldwork period (2005–2008). When I asked 
them what was new in Mostar, most of them were quick to assure me 
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that ‘nothing has changed’, only to add, ‘it only got worse!’. But some 
things, as I learned in the ensuing conversations, had changed, even if 
only small in scope and mostly concerning private matters. This became 
most evident when catching up with my Post-Yugoslav interlocutors such 
as Emina. When we met in 2010 in one of Mostar’s new fancy cafés I 
was most surprised when I learned that she had moved away from Mostar 
to study abroad. At the end of my fieldwork in 2008, Emina was finish-
ing secondary school. At that time I lived in Mostar and had regular 
contact with Emina; she always defended her hometown and told me 
that she could never imagine leaving Mostar and living anywhere else. 
She never said things were ideal in Mostar, but she always kept a certain 
distance from Mostar’s politics and the way they affected her life, as did 
many others of the Post-Yugoslav generation. At our 2010 meeting she 
shared many critical observations of her hometown with me, and the 
discursive tactic of ‘distancing’ and ‘normalising’, so prominent only two 
years previously, no longer dominated Emina’s narrative. In 2014 I met 
Emina again in my own hometown, Vienna, where she had started work 
on her PhD, only to move to Asia for a job shortly thereafter.
 Between Sharing and Silencing the Past
Individuals’ narratives are never solely personal memories but always 
include a social component, a wider social framework in which the 
memories are placed and are told. Once past experiences are verbalised, 
personal memories are no longer exclusive and can be exchanged, cor-
rected, disputed, confirmed and even appropriated (Assmann 2008: 50; 
see also Tonkin 1992). Moreover, in endeavouring to make the past 
meaningful, individuals do not draw strict distinctions between ‘his-
torical facts’ and ‘personal experiences’; the two are closely interwoven 
in people’s narratives. Moreover, the personal history that allows people 
to develop a sense of individual identity is socially contextualised in 
wider frameworks and is always constructed in relation, even in opposi-
tion, to others, since ‘people live in, and deal with, a world that extends 
beyond themselves’ (Middleton and Edwards 1990: 7). By examining 
the role of generational positioning in this book, it was precisely the 
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intersections of the private and public and of the individual and the 
social that came to the fore. Memories are created, manifested, but also 
contested in social fields, through direct or indirect exchange, but also 
through (individual and collective) silences. As became clear in the 
analysis of Mostar’s generations, different modes of silences and forget-
ting exist and ‘neither silence nor forgetting are necessarily pathological 
“symptoms”’ (Shaw 2010: 255).
The most common practice for keeping memories alive is to share 
them with others, for example, with schoolmates, colleagues and friends. 
In many cases this is not possible for people in Mostar (at least not 
on a regular basis and face-to-face) owing to the tremendous popula-
tion changes that accompanied the war. Even in the cases where contact 
had been maintained, the nature of the relationship had often changed. 
Thus, we can say that, in Mostar, the intimate space required for keep-
ing shared experiences alive has been lost for many. This also concerns 
the material space to which memories are bound. The houses and flats 
people inhabited and the personal objects they treasured, which have 
been identified as a valuable pillar for nurturing memories (see Bahloul 
1992; Morton 2007; Parkin 1999), often had to be left behind during 
the war. As I have shown, the First Yugoslavs were the generation most 
keen to return to their pre- war houses whenever they could and at the 
same time to (re-)establish spaces for cherishing a shared past. These 
intimate spaces enabled them to freely and often nostalgically remember 
the past with others of their generation.
Even while there is most room for nostalgia for Yugoslavia among First 
Yugoslavs, it cross-cuts all the generations; still, the phenomenon has dif-
ferent meanings for individuals of different generations. The nostalgia of 
the First Yugoslav generation is first and foremost related to fond memo-
ries of Tito, but also to memories of an intact family and neighbourhood. 
For the Last Yugoslavs, nostalgia for Yugoslavia is highly connected to 
the loss of future prospects they experienced with the outbreak of war, 
while nostalgic expressions for Yugoslavia among the youngest genera-
tion, the Post-Yugoslavs, have at times at least a rather utopian character 
connected to a longing for a better future (see Palmberger 2008). We thus 
can speak of generation-specific nostalgias.
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Silences concerning the war in the 1990s in BiH were especially prominent 
in the analysis of the Post-Yugoslav generation, including silences in the 
narratives of Post-Yugoslavs themselves, as well as the silences of older gen-
erations with which the Post Yugoslavs were confronted. I noticed a general 
tendency for war experiences to be shared among those of the same genera-
tion and often also of the same gender, such as in the case of veterans. This 
dynamic most affected the youngest as many of them faced a disturbing 
silence about the war, especially among their parents. Parents justified their 
silence by stating that they did not want to burden their children with 
war stories, but at the same time they made clear that they expected the 
young to be grateful to them. After all, it was they who had fought for a 
better future for their children. This can be seen as an act of demarcation 
between generational groups in which hierarchies are created by defining 
who is eligible to speak for the past. Secrecy about the past and the selec-
tive disclosure of only parts of it is a privilege of power of those who hold 
personal experiences of the past in question. It is in their hands which parts 
and versions of the past to transmit to younger generations (Berliner 2010).
Importantly, however, this does not mean that silences in the transmis-
sion of memories down the generations necessarily result in forgetting. 
The ‘charged silences’ transmitted to younger generations, as Filippucci 
shows in the case of memory of war destruction in Argonne (France), 
bring the war into the lives of the younger generations despite silences 
around personal war experiences ‘as a gap to be filled by imagination and 
emotion’ (Filippucci 2010: 171). In a similar, although different, vein, 
Kidron (2009) analyses this phenomenon in the case of Israeli Holocaust 
survivors. As Kidron learned, while the Holocaust is silenced in the fam-
ily context, it takes on a ‘copresence’ in the everyday life of the fam-
ily. The children of Holocaust survivors whom Kidron interviewed thus 
did not experience an absence of the past but rather a ‘silent matrix of 
Holocaust presence’ that Kidron analyses as a ‘silent transmission’. 
Like Kidron, I suggest refraining from any overhasty interpretation of 
silences as pathological. This would not do justice to the multiple silences 
I encountered in my interviewees’ narratives nor to the silences my inter-
locutors encountered within their families.
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Since people’s representations of the past and the importance they give 
to past events are likely to change during the course of their lives, not only 
because of changing political contexts but also because of the different life 
situations people face, longitudinal studies are needed to generate more rig-
orous theorising. Other than in ambitious studies of generational memory 
of the Holocaust, which seek to analyse changes in public and autobio-
graphical memory discourses over a period of more than 60 years (see, e.g., 
Hirsch 2012; Welzer 2007), a long time frame is not available when ana-
lysing memories of recent conflicts and wars, such as those presented here.
In the case of Mostar a longitudinal study could, for example, follow 
the lives of the Post-Yugoslavs and their changing representations of the 
recent local past throughout the course of their lives to, for example, 
investigate the way they position themselves vis-à-vis the recent war and 
Yugoslavia. Will they keep their defensive position about the effect the 
war had on their lives? Will they break the silence about the war, with 
which they were confronted by their parents? And how will they attempt 
to transmit their past experiences of war and its aftermath on to their 
children? We cannot yet predict how the Post-Yugoslav generation will 
narrate their autobiographical memories at a later point in their lives and 
which memories they will pass on to their children and grandchildren. But 
we can assume that narratives will change during the course of the lives of 
my interlocutors, due to political-societal changes and changes in the his-
toriography of the local past and due to their progressing age and the dif-
ferent life situations they will find themselves in over time. Longitudinal 
research, moreover, would have the potential to further explore the role 
trust plays in the processes of the generational transmission of past expe-
riences. When and why do individuals of different generations decide to 
pass on their memories and to whom; and whose narratives are perceived 
as trustworthy?
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